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ABSTRACT

A Volitional Theory of Aesthetic Value
by
John Dyck
Advisor: Noël Carroll
In this dissertation, I defend a volitionalist theory of aesthetic value. The volitionalist theory is a
species of response-based models of aesthetic value: It holds that aesthetic value is based in a
kind of human response. Traditional response-based theories of aesthetic value hold that value is
based in responses of cognition, perception, desire, or pleasure. The volitionalist theory offers a
new response as the home of aesthetic value. The home of aesthetic value is the will. We find
things beautiful, I argue, because we orient our selves towards them; we find things ugly, I argue,
because we orient our selves against them. The volitionalist theory I offer here is what I call,
following Ruth Chang, a form of hierarchical voluntarism. On the first stage of the theory, there
are objective aesthetic reasons in the world. Objects have features that give reasons for their
aesthetic value or disvalue. But these reasons are not sufficient for value. Value, I argue, requires
actual valuers. At this second stage, aesthetic value arises when human agents engaging in
valuing particular objects and practices. This valuing is an act of the will; we orient ourselves
alongside certain reasons.
The volitionalist theory is meant to respond to a crisis in contemporary aesthetic theories
of value. The standard Humean theory of aesthetic value holds that aesthetic value is based in
hedonic responses of pleasure (Levinson 2002). Some hedonic theories hold that aesthetic value
is a kind of pleasure for its own sake (Iseminger 2006). Increasingly, however, it is becoming
iv

clear that pleasure is an inadequate basis for aesthetic value (Lopes 2018). If hedonic theories
were right, good aesthetic agents trade up in their pursuit of aesthetic goods, optimizing the
amount of pleasure that we get from art and the natural world. But this is not the way that
aesthetic agency tends to work; we tend to stick to our own aesthetic projects, seeking beauty
from our own distinctive sources. One response, holding fast to hedonic theories, might be to
hold that we are bad aesthetic agents. I argue here that, to the contrary, our distinctive aesthetic
styles are crucial parts of a good aesthetic life.
In light of this crisis, it is surprising that aestheticians have not drawn from one of the
most influential trends in the past thirty years in value theory: The emergence of normative
volitionalism, or voluntarism (Korsgaard 1996). My goal here is to draw from this rich strain of
normative thinking to offer a new picture of aesthetic value—a picture that fits better with the
aesthetic lives we actually live. In these chapters, I aim to show that aesthetic agency exists, and
that the aesthetic reasons we encounter in the world do not force any response upon us. Instead, I
argue, we construct aesthetic values by aligning ourselves to reasons—by committing, avowing,
or endorsing them.
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Introduction
In this dissertation, I propose an original model of aesthetic value, the volitional model of
aesthetic value. According to the volitional model, aesthetic value—or beauty, for short—is
essentially based upon alignments of the will. This is because, I claim, aesthetic value is based
upon aesthetic experiences, and aesthetic experiences essentially involve volitional movements.
Or, to put things another way: What’s central to our experiences of beauty and ugliness is not
pleasure, desire, perception, or knowledge. What’s central to our experiences of beauty and
ugliness is a certain alignment of our wills, a situating of our practical identities for or against
things. A strong way to put this is in terms of commitment—a weaker way of putting this, as
Cheshire Calhoun suggests, is in terms of prizing.
The volitional model is an unorthodox model. It stands in stark contrast to traditional
theories of aesthetic values, which are standardly response-based theories of aesthetic value.
According to response-based theories of aesthetic value, for an object to have aesthetic value is
for it to tend to produce some sort of response in viewers. I agree, of course, that aesthetic value
is rooted in responses—this is a central aspect of the volitional model. However, I disagree about
the way that these responses are traditionally cashed out. Traditional hedonic theories of
aesthetic value hold that aesthetic value is rooted in desire or pleasure. Central to the volitional
model is the view, first, that we have agency over our aesthetic evaluations, and secondly, that
our experiences of beauty are necessarily rooted in alignments of our wills.
I begin by arguing in the first chapter that we have agency over our aesthetic evaluations.
I argue that our evaluations can be wrapped up in decisions we make about interpretation and
evaluation. We can have direct agential control over some aspects of interpretation and
1

evaluation—our experience of art and aesthetic objects can involve perspectival slides which we
can consciously put off and take on. So, we can have some agential control over our aesthetic
evaluations. We can sometimes decide, I claim, what we like and what we don’t like. Of course,
this is not the core component of the claim that an experience of beauty is rooted in the will; it
only shows that our experiences of beauty can sometimes be agentially effected.
The claim that we have some agential control over our aesthetic evaluations may be
necessary for the volitional model of aesthetic value that I propose here. However, it is not
sufficient—or at least, not obviously sufficient. After all, I think that advocates of traditional
theories of aesthetic value may want to allow that we can have control, say, over our desires,
such that the control over our desires may sometimes be direct, and it may sometimes exist in the
aesthetic domain. At the very least, I would not want my argument for volitionalism to depend
upon this claim. I make this claim only to advocate for an important connection between
agency—which, I think, is best understood in a volitional sense—and aesthetic evaluation. This
chapter is meant to provide an overlooked perspective on aesthetic evaluation, one which I think
helps someone get in the frame of mind that is more receptive to the volitional model, although it
does not imply the volitional model.
In the second chapter, I present a framework for aesthetic value through thinking about
aesthetic reasons. The volitional account of aesthetic value is part of a two-level story about
aesthetic value. On a basic level, objects, events, styles, and movements have features which
count for or against their being beautiful, ugly, etc. These features are objective parts of the
world. In some ways, this account is fairly standard, and presents a straightforward and standard
account of aesthetic reasons—an account that is even silent on several questions. This chapter
focuses in particular on the force of aesthetic reasons. I argue that aesthetic reasons are not
2

enough to compel anyone to act. Aesthetic reasons are not like moral reasons. I argue that
aesthetic reasons are a kind of reason that Jonathan Dancy calls ‘enticing reasons’. This helps to
lay the groundwork for a practical role in the will in our aesthetic lives. If aesthetic reasons are
not enough to compel us to act, this explains why we think of the aesthetic realm as an area of
freedom—we express our own styles, figure out our own preferences, and decide what suits us.
The first two chapters, then, do not defend the volitional model of aesthetic value
directly; they merely make conceptual room for it. In the first chapter makes room for
volitionalism from the inside. By arguing that we have agency in our evaluation, we can see
aesthetic evaluational experience in a way that is more favorable to the volitional model. The
second chapter makes room for volitionalism from the outside. It argues that there are no
obligations in our aesthetic lives; our aesthetic appreciation and attention are not compelled. This
allows in another way for us to have aesthetic agency.
In the third chapter, I argue for what a picture of aesthetic value should explain. I present
two constraints on any good theory of aesthetic value. First of all, I will argue that a theory of
aesthetic value should not merely provide justification for attributing value to objects.
Justifications of aesthetic value come cheap: The world is ablaze with beauty. And traditional
views of aesthetic value were provided as justificatory models of aesthetic value. Instead, I will
argue, theories of aesthetic value should explain aesthetic motivation. Secondly, I will argue, an
adequate theory of aesthetic value is response-based; it is based in the responses of agents. But, I
argue, these responses are real, not ideal. Traditional hedonic theories of aesthetic value, by
contrast, derive their force from ideal responses. I will argue that a proper theory of aesthetic
value must explain the role that beauty plays in our actual lives. I call this approach The Personal
Approach. I argue that traditional theories of aesthetic value fail to meet these conditions.
3

In the fourth chapter, I present the volitional model of aesthetic value. Philosophers in
value theory more generally have made space for robust theories of volitional accounts of
normativity and value in the past forty years. I explain how the previous work helps provide an
argument for the volitional theory of aesthetic value, modeled on Ruth Chang’s work on hard
choices. I argue that, given the picture of aesthetic reasons I endorse above, our aesthetic choices
are hard choices in Chang’s sense—choices about aesthetic value are ones through which we
construct our identities. I also show how the will can operate in ways that are not as strong as
paradigmatic instances of commitment—volition is apparent in lower-stakes volitional actions
such as prizing and endorsement. I argue that these are also species of commitment.

4

Chapter One: Choosing Beauty
“The man in the street, finding no worth in himself which corresponds to the force
which built a tower or sculptured a marble god, feels poor when he looks on these.
To him a palace, a statue, or a costly book have an alien and forbidding air, much
like a gay equipage, and seem to say like that, ‘Who are you, sir?’ Yet they are all
his, suitors for his notice, petitioners to his faculties that they will come out and
take possession. The picture waits for my verdict: it is not to commend me, but I
am to settle its claims to praise.”
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance (1841)
“I don’t have a strong opinion either way on dubstep but since I saw that photo of
Skrillex I’ve decided I hate it.”
user complex_reduction, on an internet forum (2011)

1. Introduction
On the way into work, you decide where to stop for coffee. Do you get the cheap coffee from the
coffee cart? Or do you walk a couple of extra blocks—and shell out a couple of extra bucks—to
get a fancy pour-over from the artisanal coffee place? Coffee from the cart tastes muddy and
strong; artisanal coffee tastes bright and floral. Your choice between them is aesthetic, at least
partly. It involves more than aesthetics—finances, social status, practical considerations. But it is
partly a choice about what kind of taste you prefer, and what you’re willing to put up with.
Choices like this are practical choices about aesthetic actions.
For the most part, we have agency over our actions; and this includes our aesthetic
actions. Maybe one day you decide to stop going to the fancy coffee place—the place with
artisanal small-batch pour-over coffee—and start going to the coffee cart instead. You decide
that you’re done with fancy coffee; it’s too thin, too precious. The decision—this control over
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your aesthetic action—seems to reflect a kind of control you have over your evaluation: you no
longer value artisanal coffee. Your decision here isn’t based in a difference in your response, in
how the coffee tastes; you still taste the same floral brightness. The difference lies in how you
evaluate the taste; you no longer care for it. Your practical agency—your decision to start going
to the coffee cart—reflects evaluative agency: You had control over how you evaluated the
coffee flavor. It seems that you freely chose a new evaluation of the coffee’s flavor. Or so I will
argue here.
To put it in terms of evaluation in generally, we could put this as a thesis about evaluative
agency.
EA:

We can have direct agential control over our evaluations.

In this paper, I argue for EA. Specifically, I argue that we have direct control over our aesthetic
evaluations. I do not claim that we have agency in other domains of evaluation, such as epistemic
and moral evaluation—but I am right, this shows something about the structure of evaluation in
general: We sometimes have direct control over it.
I call this thesis aesthetic evaluative agency.
AEA: We can have direct agential control over our aesthetic evaluations.
If aesthetic evaluative agency is true, it follows that evaluative agency is true—if we have
agency over some aesthetic evaluations, then we have agency over some evaluations. Either view
has received little discussion. This is significant and surprising, especially regarding the more
general view about evaluation. Perhaps this is because theories of normativity and evaluation
mostly focus on moral evaluation, where EA seems less plausible. Some epistemologists have
argued for doxastic voluntarism, the view that we have some control over which beliefs we
6

adopt. If evaluation is cognitive, then it may be true that doxastic voluntarism implies EA. But it
may be false; doxastic voluntarism usually concerns descriptive rather than evaluative beliefs.
This line of argument isn’t obvious.
To some, it seems that we never have direct agential control over our evaluations.
According to a common response-based model of evaluation, popular from early modern
philosophers, our judgments are delivered up to us by internal processes—perceptual, emotional,
or social. While we may have some control over these processes, any such control is indirect at
best. Indeed, philosophers rarely ask whether we could have evaluational agency, simply
assuming that we do not. If this is correct, our evaluations are at the mercy of subagential
processes. This same view seems to be common sense. If you smell a stinky sock, you don’t
seem to have any control over the stinkiness of the sock.
In this chapter, I shall argue to the contrary: We have evaluative agency. We can
sometimes freely settle something’s claim to praise; we can be direct authors of our aesthetic
values. Specifically, I will argue for AEA. I will not argue that we always have control over our
aesthetic evaluations; I could not decide to find a sunset ugly or a bag of trash beautiful. 1 AEA
says just that sometimes, we do have such control.
The ultimate goal of my dissertation is to argue for a particular view of aesthetic value:
volitionalism. According to the volitionalist account of aesthetic value, aesthetic value
essentially involves certain alignment of the will. The thesis I defend here, aesthetic evaluative
agency, is not a claim about aesthetic value; it is a claim about aesthetic evaluation. If I want to
defend the volitional model of aesthetic value, it’s not enough to defend AEA, since AEA does

I use ‘beauty’ and ‘aesthetic value’ interchangeably here, for ease of terminology. Of course, not all aesthetic value
is beauty, and perhaps some things we think of as beautiful really have no aesthetic value.

1
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not imply the volitional model. Even if we have some direct control over our evaluations, it does
not follow that this direct control is volitional. And furthermore, I need to show how a thesis
about aesthetic evaluation could imply a thesis about aesthetic value. But it may not even be
necessary, either. For AEA to imply volitionalism, I need to argue that evaluative agency
involves acts of the will; and that is not my task in this chapter. So, I do not assume that this
chapter is sufficient or even necessary for my ultimate goal of proposing and defending
volitionalism about aesthetic value. For all I say here, there may be some other way of defending
aesthetic agency besides through volition.
Yet I still think that this chapter is a crucial step in defending a view of aesthetic
evaluation—and, indeed, aesthetic value—which foregrounds the importance of agency. I take it
to be common sense that we are passive with respect to our aesthetic experience. A stinky sock
smells stinky, for example, in a way that seems completely out of my control. Examples like this
suggest a picture of phenomenal aesthetic experience as passive; and indeed, this passive view of
phenomenal aesthetic experience is pervasive and common, not just in academic philosophy but
in our everyday lives more generally. In order to show that aesthetic agency exists, I want to
begin by chipping away at this view, drawing attention to aspects of our aesthetic experience that
are not passive—aspects that are active. Part of the conceit of this chapter, then, is to convince
my readers that our experiences of aesthetic evaluation are at least sometimes active and not just
passive.
This identifies one reason for my argument in this chapter about aesthetic agency to be as
catholic as possible: My motivation here is to make room for the view I will ultimately endorse
in this dissertation. If I can show that we do have control over our aesthetic judgements, then a
volitional view of aesthetic judgment starts to become more plausible. Or, at least, it is no longer
8

out of the picture. Defending evaluative agency helps to highlight the importance of aesthetic
agency; and highlighting the importance of aesthetic agency will help to show the importance of
volitionalism. But I want the thesis in this chapter to be plausible independently of the view of
aesthetic value that I will eventually endorse. If my readers cannot follow me to as radical an
idea as aesthetic volitionalism, I hope they will at least accept that we have much more aesthetic
agency than we have often realized. Even this notion, I believe, is underappreciated.
I start by explaining and motivating the view in the next section, §2; I explain what it
means more carefully, and I consider five reasons why it is worthy of consideration. In §3, I
explain some historical resistance to the view that we have evaluative agency, especially from
Hutcheson and Hume. I show why standard aesthetic theories have allowed only for indirect
agency. I then consider arguments for AEA. In §3, I begin with an argument based upon artistic
agency. It is widely accepted that artists have creative control over the content of their artworks.
If that is so, perhaps they have control over aspects of evaluation as well. I find this argument
unsuccessful in the end; artists might have agency, but it does not support AEA. Finally, in §5, I
present two arguments for direct agency in aesthetic evaluation. I argue that we have direct
control over certain processes that are directly related to evaluation. Through such control, we
have direct agency over our evaluations.

2. Aesthetic evaluative agency
AEA is a claim about our aesthetic evaluations, not about aesthetic value itself. It says that some
of our aesthetic evaluations are up to us; we can make decisions about what we hold to be
beautiful or not. It does not say that we decide what is beautiful. And yet, nearly all accounts of
9

aesthetic value are based on (real or ideal) aesthetic evaluation. While I will restrict my focus
here to aesthetic evaluation, and while it is theoretically distinct from aesthetic value, it is worth
noting that, in traditional theorizing about aesthetic value, evaluation and value often play roles
that inform each other.
Nor does AEA say that we can just decide to evaluate just anything as beautiful. Again, I
could not decide to find a sunset ugly. But then, no one ever thought that agency requires doing
whatever you want. 2 Keep in mind the parallel case about free agency in ordinary action. Many
people accept that you have direct control over your actions, but that doesn’t mean you can do
anything you want. You can’t grow wings and fly just because you want to.
Although I believe that the main idea is clear enough, I will clarify some aspects of the
thesis here.
What do I mean by ‘evaluation’? There are various accounts of evaluation. Some are
hedonic: they hold that evaluation is a kind of desire (Lewis 1989). Other accounts of evaluation
are cognitive: they hold that evaluation is a kind of belief (Smith 1989, Carroll 2008). 3 Samuel
Scheffler (2012) argues that evaluation involves both beliefs and desires. Our evaluations are
neither fully considered (as beliefs are) nor fully automatic (as desires are). The hybrid aspect of
Scheffler’s view is reflected, for instance, in contemporary hedonic views of aesthetic value,
such as Levinson (2010), Mothersill (1984), and Nehamas (2007).
I will remain relatively agnostic here on what exactly evaluation is. I endorse only three
conditions. The first condition is that evaluation, whatever it is, can involve both beliefs and

For discussion on this point, see Ryan 2003.
Smith’s view is reflected in Carroll’s (2015) content approach to aesthetic experience, which holds that aesthetic
experience is attending with understanding to the content of an artwork. See also Carroll (2008).

2
3
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desires. This allows that there are other important aspects to evaluation, and it is agnostic on
whether belief or desire is more fundamental. (Later in this dissertation, I will argue that volition
is fundamental in evaluation. I do not want to commit myself to that strong thesis in this
chapter.) The second condition on evaluation is that it is not limited to one’s immediate
reactions; evaluation can also involve considered reactions. In the longstanding tradition of
aesthetic discourse, it may help to think of ‘evaluation’ in the sense I mean here as something
equivalent to (or relevantly similar to) judgment, an important notion in aesthetic theory. The
final condition pertains to aesthetic evaluations in particular: Aesthetic evaluations regard
particular things, rather than kinds of things. In aesthetics, evaluation is particular rather than
general.
My claim is that we have some agency or agential control over our evaluations. What do
I mean by ‘agency’ and ‘agential control’? Obviously the issue of agency is hotly contested by
philosophers (see Schlosser 2015 for an overview). Many philosophers hold that agency involves
intentions, so that it involves action guided by one’s intentions. One is an agent, in this sense,
when one’s attributions of aesthetic value can be at least partly attributed to one’s intentions. 4
Many hold, in addition, that agential action is action that is initiated by the self, whether in virtue
of belief-desire pairs or in virtue of some other kind of initiation. One is an agent, in this sense,
when one initiates one’s action in one way or another. Fortunately, both of these conditions are
consonant with my account of evaluational agency. By ‘agency’ I mean the ability to decide for
oneself in one or both of these ways. If one has agency over one’s evaluations, one’s evaluations
are self-guided, either by one’s own intentions or by one’s own initiation or by both.

4

See for example Davidson 1963, 1971; Bratman 1987; Dretske 1988; Mele 1992, 2003
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The claim I make here is relevantly similar to a view discussed in epistemology, doxastic
voluntarism. According to doxastic voluntarism, we have control over our beliefs in the sense
that we can decide to believe or disbelieve some propositions. Discussions of doxastic
voluntarism often do not involve the exercise of defining agency in a broad sense. I am claiming
that we have control over our evaluations in the same sense as it is discussed by doxastic
voluntarists. This claim, as I have said, is not common sense; the usual thought is that our
evaluations are subject to conditioning, learning, or biology. It is this aspect that I reject. All of
these aspects may be at play, but, I argue, our evaluations can come from our selves—we can
make up our minds about what we like or not. It is this claim that, to my knowledge, has never
been defended regarding aesthetic evaluation. Once we can see how controversial the claim is on
any standard conception of agency, it should be clear that I do not need to be picky about agency.
So, then, what is direct agential control?
Direct agential control is characterized by immediacy in virtue of intentions or selfinitiation. It occurs when one’s evaluation—say, that lattes are tasty—is an immediate result of
one’s decision to evaluate lattes as tasty. Indirect control, on the other hand, is not immediate; it
is a diachronic process that extends over time, since it necessarily involves a re-orienting of
one’s perception or evaluation, and this re-orientation takes time. Suppose, having hated jazz
music all your life, you want to come to positively appreciate jazz. While this change certainly
seems possible, it may not be immediate. You can take steps to expose yourself to jazz, learn
about jazz, and thereby, over a process of education or enculturation, come to prize jazz
eventually. This is an example of indirect evaluative agency. It is clear—and, I take it,
uncontroversial—that we have indirect evaluative agency sometimes. Such indirect agency is
involved in Agnes Callard’s (2018) theory of aspirants—people who set out to develop different
12

values than they already have. Aspirants, in Callard’s sense, aim to develop certain values
through a process, even when they do not fully grasp those values. Such development takes time.
Direct evaluative agency, on the other hand, is a controversial thesis.
The distinction between direct and indirect agency in this sense is similar to Mele’s
(2009) distinction between acting and trying to act—in Mele’s words, there is a difference
between “trying to ψ” and “trying to bring it about that one ψs”. One has direct control in the
former case (trying to ψ) but not the latter (trying to bring it about that one ψs).
There are two characteristics that distinguish the immediacy of direct control. First, direct
control is temporally immediate. If one has direct control over O, one’s action immediately
influences O. Indirect control is not temporally immediate; it takes time. Second, direct control is
causally immediate; there is direct causal interaction rather than indirect causal interaction. I
allow for some leniency in causal immediacy; X can be causally immediate to Y even if X is not
causally next-door to Y. I can immediately scratch my back by using a backscratcher; I kick a
fence even if my shoe and not my foot hits the fence. X can directly cause Y even if X is not a
next-door causal neighbor of Y. But X and Y cannot be more than a few houses apart. So then,
the claim that aesthetic evaluations can be under our direct control amounts to the idea that they
are both temporally immediate and causally immediate. The main idea here, of course, is that
one’s own evaluation can come across directly by one’s own decision—by intending, initiating,
or committing to have some evaluation.
So much for my explanation of direct evaluative aesthetic agency. As I keep mentioning,
the thesis has rarely (if ever) seen the light of day. So why should we consider it? Briefly, here
are five motivations for discussing evaluative agency in the first place.

13

First, as mentioned earlier, some epistemologists have argued for doxastic voluntarism:
we have some direct control over our beliefs. 5 It is worth asking whether something a similar
claim is true in the aesthetic realm. We may not be able to transpose the arguments, given a
hybrid view of evaluation; but it is worth asking whether such a view is plausible. Can we
control our evaluations? Of course, if it is true, doxastic voluntarism may support evaluational
agency, especially if a cognitive account of evaluation is correct.
Second, there is some prima facie evidence for control over our aesthetic evaluations.
Our aesthetic judgments—and our claims about the aesthetic judgements of others—seem to
track agency since they are things we hold people responsible for: We hold people’s evaluations
to be attributable to their selves in a way that allows for change—the kind of change that people
can make themselves. 6 We try to convince people to change their minds, or to adopt views—if
you liked this, you ought to really love that! More generally, our aesthetic practices involve
reasons over which we can have some control—we make up our minds about whether we like
something. 7 In fact, the aesthetic realm might seem especially individualistic in our world: We
each try to find and cultivate our own individual aesthetic sensibility—everybody wants a unique
style. 8 In our searches for our own styles, it seems plausible that we will sometimes make
decisions about what we value.
Third, consider artistic intentions. The importance of creative intentions in art has long
been acknowledged by philosophers: it is generally agreed that the existence and content of some
works of art partly depends upon—or is even determined by—the right kinds of creative

Ryan (2003) and Weatherson (2008) argue for DV. Alston (1988) and Williams (1976) argue against it.
See especially Wolf (2016). Some have argued for responsibility without control, notably Smith (2005) and
Hieronymi (2006, 2008).
7
Moran 2001 and Boyle 2011 argue that we have some (indirect) agency over beliefs.
8
Riggle 2015 argues that personal style is an expression of one’s personal ideals.
5
6
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intentions. 9 If artists can determine the contents of artworks through intentions, then it is at least
worth asking whether artists and audiences have control over their evaluations. (I will consider
this argument in more detail in section 3.)
Fourth, many philosophers have recently emphasized robust agency in aesthetic
engagement. 10 Noël Carroll (1984: 185) has argued for the importance of our own interaction
with art—as a reasoned process that requires our own reasoned engagement. Alex King (2017)
argues that subtlety in art is valuable because it allows active engagement with artworks.
Anthony Cross (2017) argues that art criticism can be a kind of practical reasoning, because it
gives us strategies for engaging artworks. Paul Crowther (2009) has argued that listening involve
agency in the sense that it involves maintaining awareness with some goal; such perceptual
agency seems necessary for any artistic engagement. Dominic McIver Lopes (2018) has
defended the view that a theory of aesthetic value must explain aesthetic agency. Perhaps, in
addition to having agency over engagement, we can also have agency over evaluation. If we
have agency over our aesthetic engagement, does it suddenly stop as soon as we start evaluating
the work? That would be curious. So maybe our evaluations involve agency, too.
Finally, consider autonomy, a crucial notion in contemporary and historical aesthetics. 11
As emphasized by Kant 12 and in the literature on aesthetic testimony, 13 aesthetic judgments
ought to be (or are constitutively) autonomous inasmuch as they ought to (or do) arise from one’s

See Irvin (2005, 2006) and Mag Uidhir 2013.
O’Shaughnessy (2000) presents some arguments that agential perception is impossible. One of these arguments is
that agency requires acting from reasons, but perception does not admit of reasons.
11
More recently, ‘autonomy’ is taken to mean a judgment’s independence from extra-aesthetic (practical or moral)
considerations. See Carroll 1996.
12
Consider Kant’s claim that, when one makes a judgment of beauty, one insists upon it even if the whole world
would claim otherwise.
13
See for example Ransom 2017 and Nguyen 2017.
9
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own experience. It would be curious if one’s judgements ought to be autonomous yet one had
only indirect control over them.
A vague but common resistance to evaluative agency comes from a common idea that our
aesthetic preferences are static. We like what we like; we can’t change our preferences. If this is
true, aesthetic agency is impossible: If our preferences can’t change, we cannot control them.
The conditional is true. But the initial idea—that our aesthetic preferences are static—is false.
Our aesthetic preferences are more dynamic than we often realize. Surely you, or at least some of
your friends, have undergone radical aesthetic changes in preferences. Some folks grow out of
their earlier punk or grunge phases; others stay metalheads. Whether we stay faithful punks or
not, there seems to be at least some agency at play. Further, recent work in neuroaesthetics
suggests that our aesthetic preferences are surprisingly plastic (Pugach et al 2017). Of course,
this plasticity is not necessarily due to agency. But aesthetic plasticity exists, so agency is at least
possible.
In the next section, I will consider why philosophers have been reluctant to allow for
evaluative agency. I will explain why philosophical theories of aesthetic value and aesthetic
experience have tended not to allow for direct agency.

3. Opposition to direct aesthetic evaluative agency
Many accounts of aesthetic value do not take an explicit stance on whether aesthetic evaluation
is under one’s control. When it is explicitly addressed, philosophers argue that we do not have
agential control over our evaluations. Call this view the received view. Like AEA, we can
distinguish two versions: A strong version says we have no control at all, even indirect control. A
16

weak version says we have only indirect control but no direct control over our evaluations. My
goal in this section is modest; I explain why philosophers have endorsed the received view, in
either version, and why they do not endorse that we have direct evaluative agency. I will then
consider whether a form of subjectivism can allow for such agency.
Why is the received view so popular? At least in aesthetics, one reason is that it is
implied by an orthodox thesis about aesthetic judgments: the immediacy thesis. There are various
versions of the immediacy thesis. Sometimes it amounts to the claim that aesthetic judgements
are experientially direct; they seem to flow immediately from one’s perceptual experience.
Usually it amounts to the claim that aesthetic judgments are non-inferential. The immediacy
thesis has been endorsed by Addison, Hutcheson, and Kant; 14 and it lives on today in discussions
of aesthetic testimony. 15 It is easy to see how the immediacy thesis implies the received view: If
aesthetic judgments are immediate, they cannot be under our direct control.
There are also top-down theoretical reasons why philosophers accept the received view.
Many theories of aesthetic value come fully loaded with an account of aesthetic experience
which imply, or at least strongly suggest, the received view. Consider realism about aesthetic
value. On this view, when things go right, our evaluations are caused by real features of the
world. These features are not subject to our agency. 16 A similar picture is also adopted by
rational accounts of aesthetic evaluation, according to which evaluation is grounded in reasons.

“The colours paint themselves on the fancy, with very little attention of thought or application of mind in the
beholder. We are struck, we know not how, with the symmetry of anything we see, and immediately assent to the
beauty of an object, without inquiring into the particular causes and occasions of it.” Addison 1711. See also
Hutcheson 1726, Kant 1797.
15
See Dorsch (2013). Dorsch cites Walton (1970), McDowell (1983), Budd (1999), Zemach (2001), and
Schellekens (2006) as endorsing the view that aesthetic judgments are non-inferential.
16
See for example Zemach (1997).
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Evaluating an artwork means evaluating its different features, but the evaluative valence of these
reasons strikes us as a fabric of the world.
Prominent forms of subjectivism or quasi-realism also imply a strong version of the
received view. The main forms of subjectivism or quasi-realism are response-based theories.
These theories are committed to this core claim: “to have aesthetic value is to be disposed to
bring about a particular response for a particular audience under suitable conditions” (Watkins
and Shelley 2012: 338). This response is assumed to be automatic and immediate, which
suggests that there can be no agency. Many response-based theorists hold that our evaluations
are caused by processes—social or innate—over which we have no control. Consider
Hutcheson’s view, according to which our aesthetic judgments are immediate responses to
objective features in nature, produced by a special aesthetic faculty. On this view, our aesthetic
evaluations are psychologically innate, formed by “the very Frame of our Nature” (1726: 8):
In reflecting upon our external Senses, we plainly see, that our Perceptions of
Pleasure, or Pain, do not depend directly on our Will. Objects do not please us,
according as we incline they should. The presence of some Objects necessarily
pleases us, and the presence of others as necessarily displeases us. Nor can we by
our Will, any otherwise procure Pleasure, or avoid Pain, than by procuring the
former kind of Objects, and avoiding the latter. (1726: 8)
There is some debate about whether Hutcheson’s account of aesthetic value is a response-based
theory or an objective realist theory; but either way, it is clear that we do not have direct control
over our evaluations. Hutcheson says here that aesthetic perception doesn’t depend upon our
evaluation. But, for Hutcheson, proper aesthetic perception is where evaluation lies; for
Hutcheson, our aesthetic sense is immediate. We do not have control over our responses, and we
certainly do not have control over the features of reality to which they are responding.
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It is not just response-based or realist theorists who accept the received view. According
to one version of Bourdieu’s (1984) subjectivism, our aesthetic evaluations are, often
unconsciously, determined by a social superstructure. We, individual humans, could have no
control over the superstructure (or at least, if we ever could, it would be very rare and difficult).
If we look a little closer at some response-based theories, there is room to allow for some
form of evaluative control. Here I want to pause and take a closer look at the Humean responsebased theory of aesthetic value. For one thing, Humeanism about aesthetic value is a popular
account of aesthetic value. For another thing, there has been contemporary discussion about how
much agency Hume’s account allows for. 17 I’ll focus especially on the basics of Hume’s account
of aesthetic experience—a view which is common to many response-based theories. 18
The standard Humean view of aesthetic experience involves a perceptual stage and an
affective stage; here I follow James Shelley’s (1998) interpretation of Hume. First, one perceives
an object; then, one has an affective response. 19 According to Hume, this elicitation of the
affective from the perceptual is automatic. 20 Against Hume, one might think that we have no
agency in either stage, the perceptual or the affective. This is Noël Carroll’s objection to Hume’s
view. Carroll alleges that, in ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, “the notion that the aesthetic response is

Hume gives accounts of both (1) evaluation and (2) correct evaluation. I focus on the first.
The first stage involves evaluation. But it is not yet an account of aesthetic value, since it doesn’t say which
responses are correct and which are incorrect. The second stage of Hume’s theory is designed to answer this
problem. Aesthetic value is fixed or identified by ideal critics; good artworks—beautiful artworks—are
whatever the ideal critics prefer. Hume famously lists five features of the good taste of ideal critics: “strong
sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all
prejudice”. According to contemporary orthodoxy, ideal critics are ideal on hedonic grounds (Mothersill
1984; Railton 1998; Levinson 2010). Given Mill’s test for pleasure, ideal critics are ideal in virtue of their
ability to identify the most pleasurable items (Lopes 2016).
19
More specifically, approbation in the case of beauty and disapprobation in the case of ugliness.
20
There is some disagreement about whether approbation is this emotional response itself, or whether it is a
further reaction to this emotional response.
17
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a simple causal effect—a sentiment consequent to a stimulus—predominates” (Carroll 1984:
185). 21
Theodore Gracyk and Dabney Townsend have argued that the Humean view allows for
some indirect control over our responses. The idea is that we can have indirect control not only
over our initial perceptions, but also over our subsequent affective reactions. We can learn to see
things in new ways, and we can forge new affective associations. 22 This allows for at least some
agency—indirect and diachronic—even if our responses are automatic and immediate. I can’t
directly have control over my response to whiskey; I can’t like it just by a decision. But I can
learn things about whiskey, make different associations, and increase the amount of my
engagement with whiskey. Hopefully, over time, I come to like whiskey. In this way, we can
have some indirect agency over our aesthetic evaluations. If we think that taking steps of
increased or decreased exposure will help us to like something or dislike it, we can take those
steps. Indeed, Hume wants to help his readers develop their evaluative and perceptual abilities.
To paint this picture in more detail, one might try to draw from more general Humean accounts.
Neil Sinhababu’s recent account of Humeanism (2017) argues that, although our actions are
guided by desire, we can shape our desires by intentions. Perhaps the Humean could appeal to
intentions.

There are various other arguments that Hume’s account is overly causal, and cannot allow for real normativity
(Budd 1994, Shiner 1996).
22
“Hume regards this ‘immediacy’ of taste as entirely compatible with the influence of intellectual and imaginative
faculties.” Gracyk 2016.
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While an appeal to intentions may be able to allow for some agency in the Humean
picture, it still cannot allow for direct agency. There is no reason to think that intentions about
responses will directly result in evaluative changes for the Humean. 23
Of course, there are other theoretical accounts of evaluation. I don’t think they are any
more promising in allowing for direct agency. Consider, for example, an aesthetic version of
Frankfurt’s view. On this view, aesthetic evaluations are rooted in second-order desires; our
evaluations are rooted in what we desire to desire (Frankfurt 2006). One may think that we have
more control over second-order desires, but it is not clear how we can have authority over our
second-order desires any more than first-order desires (Wallace 1999). Further, this view is
implausible about aesthetic evaluation. We do not often identify positive aesthetic evaluations
with what we desire to desire. 24
My fundamental claim here is not that the Humean view is unable to allow for direct
evaluative agency—although it seems to me that Humean views of aesthetic experience connect
naturally to Humean views of practical reason, and it is unclear this combination could allow for
direct evaluative agency. My point instead is that Humeanism, the view which seems to come
closest in allowing for aesthetic evaluative agency, has traditionally allowed for only indirect
agency; and there are several principled reasons why it has done so. This is not an objection to
Hume; the point is just that no one has made room for direct evaluative agency in the aesthetic
realm.

Wallace (1999) argues that we still lack agency on this view. According to Humean accounts of practical reason,
we simply do not have control over our desires—and only desires can change intentions.
24
This objection is also raised (in a way not specific to aesthetic evaluation) by Samuel Scheffler (2012).
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My goal here is to make room for such agency. In the next section, I consider an
argument that starts from a natural place: artistic creation. Scholars in various disciplines have
emphasized that aesthetic agency is possible in artistic creation or aesthetic movements. I will
consider whether this could involve a kind of direct evaluative agency.

4. Evaluative agency in creation
The argument here begins with two commonly-accepted claims. First, artists are creators. 25 As a
minimum, this means that artists have agency over their creations, even if they are subject to
constraints. Second, artworks embody a point of view, which means that they avow certain
valences or values, or are intended to perform certain functions (Carroll 2008; Gilmore 2011).
Chopin ballads aim at a certain kind of gracefulness, taking for granted that gracefulness is
valuable; many of Nam June Paik’s works assume that irony is aesthetically valuable. This
evaluative embodiment occurs not only in individual artworks, but also in genres. Action films
like The Italian Job (dir. Gray, 2003) put a value on fast-paced, action-based storytelling.
If artists have agency with respect to their works, and if works embody evaluative
perspectives, then it is plausible artists have agency over certain evaluative perspectives in their
works. Artists decide what kinds of values they want their works to have. This is clearest in the
case of inventive, creative, artworks. Sometimes artists invent new genres or make new moves in
an artistic game. David Lynch’s films embody a kind of kitsch absurdity that didn’t exist before.
Often this occurs when artists realize certain values that were not positively evaluated before.
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See for example Levinson 1980, Lamarque 2006.
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Musicologist Ingrid Monson (2007) has argued that the innovation of modal postbop
jazz, such as Miles Davis’ 1959 album Kind of Blue, expressed an aesthetic kind of selfdetermination for some African-American musicians. Rigorously developed by George Russell,
modal jazz involved a new system of scales and chord changes. In adopting this new practice of
modal jazz, musicians were free to express a new system, and to build a musical practice that
was both original and intellectually rigorous. 26 Monson explains:
As musicians explored various ways of thinking about harmony, rhythm, melody,
and sound (timbre), they both applied ideas acquired through the study of Western
music to improvisational practice and developed their own distinctive harmonic
conceptions and practice devised to fit the demands of an improvising musician.
(2007: 286)
Monson points out that the new values expressed a kind of agency in expressing a distinctively
black musical voice. Notably for my purposes, the adoption of this new practice of modal jazz
involves the adoption of certain values. In particular, modal jazz places a positive value on
certain kinds of sounds—i.e. a system of chord changes—that were not valuable in jazz music
before. Through innovating this system, musicians decided to place special value on certain
kinds of sounds and certain kinds of modulation. And this new practice asks for uptake in the
listeners. Listeners had to make decisions about whether they shared the values of modal jazz.
Part of the innovation of artists, and of ordinary people, is to positively evaluate what was
thought to be bad.
Similarly, Paul C. Taylor (1999, 2016) argues that the ownership of certain groups over
certain aesthetic values can be crucial for self-determination in aesthetic life more generally.

Monson especially focuses on innovations based in George Russell’s Lydian Chromatic Concept of Tonal
Organization, an important text for modal jazz. She writes: “a self-actuated quest for knowledge and understanding
was very much respected in jazz circles of the 1950s and 1960s.”
26
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Often groups change the valence of a certain feature; Taylor describes how some traditions of
African-American culture reclaimed a value in straightening hair. These practices have the
vitality they do at least partly just because groups employ them by deciding that they have
certain meanings; and, in virtue of certain meanings, they have certain valences. This is crucial
for the self-determination here.
Artistic movements often involve this sort of value agency. Consider feminist art
movements like Womanhouse (1971-72), a feminist art collective based in CalArts and directed
by Judy Chicago and Miriam Schapiro. This movement focused on reclaiming ‘women’s work’
as art, reorienting how we see ordinary objects and actions so that they were seen as art.
One might object at this point that, in such movements, aesthetic values are anchored in
political values; the beauty just piggybacks on the politics. So if you buy into these political
projects, it’s only natural to buy into the aesthetic value as well. But this undersells again the
amount of aesthetic agency and presents these movements as monolithic expressions of a
political fever. That’s not how things work. Not every person who advocated for freedom in
black life could get behind the sound of modal jazz. Not every feminist thought that feminism
needed any such relationship to art. People still needed a degree of aesthetic agency in choosing
whether or not they would go in—or not—for these movements and their associated values. And,
indeed, the decision not to go in for a movement is an expression of one’s aesthetic agency, too.
Unfortunately, however, there is still a problem with this argument as an argument for
direct evaluative agency. While this allows for evaluative agency in the aesthetic realm, it is not
clear that the evaluative agency is direct in the sense specified above. Consider the changes in
group meaning that Taylor points to (indeed, these changes are similar in structure to the kind
discussed by Monson). Since they are social, such a phenomenon seems to necessarily be
24

extended over time, and cannot be direct because it is not temporally immediate. Consider also
individual decisions by composers to place value on, say, the Lydian scale applied in the way it
was. Such a decision could be direct, but it need not be. These arguments are suggestive, but they
are not decisive.
In the next section, I consider two more arguments for direct evaluative agency. I believe
these arguments are more successful.

5. Two arguments for evaluative aesthetic agency
Recently, aestheticians have been arguing that agency is important to aesthetics. As Dominic
McIver Lopes (2016) notes, aesthetic value figures not just in appreciation, but also in actions—
of collection, curation, donation, and so forth. Lopes defines an aesthetic reason as a reason to
perform an aesthetic action. But this does not yet suggest that we have agency over our aesthetic
evaluations. Presumably what Lopes points to here is true in the moral realm, too. Moral value
plays a role in our action— perhaps even constitutively so. But it does not follow that we have
agency regarding our moral evaluations.
In what follows, I will give two arguments that we have evaluative agency regarding our
aesthetic evaluations. These arguments will rely upon the idea that the aesthetic features of the
world are objective; but further assessment requires our own agency.

5.1 The Multiple Interpretations Argument

25

The first of these starts is based upon the idea that we have agency over our engagement with
artworks. Earlier I cited contemporary philosophers (Carroll, King, Crowther and Cross)
suggesting that we have agency over our engagement with artworks. There is more precedent for
this view. C. Thi Nguyen (forthcoming) takes games to be an artform of agency; if this is right,
then part of the benefit of such games must be that they allow agency. Bence Nanay (2016)
claims that aesthetic attention is focused upon a particular object and distributed across the
properties of that object; presumably, we have agency over how we direct our attention inasmuch
as we have agency over how we distribute our attention. All of these accounts try to show that
we sometimes have agential control over our engagement with art.
Some artworks involve multiple interpretations, each of which are legitimate. 27 I mean
‘interpretation’ in a broad and inclusive sense, so that it includes modes of attention and largerscale interpretation. The point here is that our agency over our own engagement with art can
amount to agency over our interpretation. We can ‘put on’ various interpretions; we might also
think of this as an ‘interpretive slide’. These are modeled off of perceptual slides, as in, for
example, the duck-rabbit illusion; we interpret what the lines represent, and we can freely switch
back and forth between seeing the lines as a duck or seeing the lines as a rabbit.
Consider the ending of the Sopranos, which admits of multiple interpretations. We can
‘put on’ either interpretation and evaluate the Sopranos using that interpretation; ‘putting on’
various interpretations is easily under our control. In these cases, we choose what we attend to,

Sometimes these multiple interpretations contradict each other. There is some discussion about whether
contradictory interpretations can ultimately be assigned correctly to the same work. See Davies (1995), Margolis
(1995), and Stecker (1992). The argument could be applied with regard to attention or perception.
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and we thereby have agency over different, equally warranted, perceptual experiences. This is
especially plausible given the importance of artistic categories in a Waltonian sense.
But one’s interpretation directly affects one’s evaluation. At least sometimes, there is a
direct connection between our attention, our interpretation, and our evaluation. So, the ways that
we choose to attend and interpret directly determine our evaluations. In the Sopranos, one’s
interpretation will greatly affect how one interprets and evaluates the scenes before, and the
show as a whole. This is also true of olfaction and gustation; our associations decide how we
evaluate something, and we have robust control over our associations. Since we can easily
modulate between different associations, we can easily modulate between different evaluations.
The documentary Ants on a Shrimp (dir. Dekkers, 2016) follows the avant-garde
Scandinavian restaurant Noma and its head chef Rene Redzepi. In an early scene, a sous chef
creates a dish of deep-fried fish sperm with a sperm emulsion. Together, the restaurant crew try
the dish hesitantly. Redzepi is hesitant at first, but triumphantly proclaims that they should think
of it as fish and chips: “If you look at it like that, then it was fucking amazing.” By modulating
our attention and interpretation, we can immediately modulate our evaluation.
And we can modulate our engagement in very direct and quick ways. In some cases I
might not be able to grasp the fish-and-chips nature of the fish sperm; it might be faint if it is not
fried properly. But when it is apparent, I can switch back and forth between sperm and sperm
emulsion and fish and chips. And, by modulating my attention, I can immediately modulate my
evaluation; the interpretation and the evaluation are bound up together. If I see the dish as fish
and chips, I might immediately begin to like it. Indeed, fine dining often involves these kinds of
experiences: perspectival slides that are based upon different interpretations. We try out various
‘interpretive slides’, see which one we like the best, and go with that one.
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Consider Walton’s (1970) claim that perceiving a work in its category, first, can be
correct or incorrect, and second, makes a difference to how we perceive the work. Take the film
Apocalpyse Now. Certain interpretations of this film are simply not warranted. It would be wrong
to watch the film as a romantic comedy, for example. But there are multiple permissible
categories in which we might see the film; we might see it as a horror film, or as a war film, or as
a political film. There are various admissible interpretations of the film. And, of course, which
interpretation we employ will make a difference to our evaluation.
Importantly, we don’t just keep on sliding between perspectives or interpretations. We
can stick to an interpretation, deciding to go with it on the basis of the evaluation we want to
make. We sometimes modulate our interpretation with an evaluation in mind. You try the
eggplant dish hesitantly, thinking of it as mush, but then someone suggests you taste it as
hummus, and it starts to taste much better. You adopt a hummus interpretation of the dish
because you want to like it. In this case, your interpretation is made with your ultimate
evaluation in mind. It is because it tastes better as hummus that you can choose to interpret it as
hummus.
To be clear, the idea here is not that we can always switch between different evaluations.
Our range of possible interpretations is often bounded. And it depends on the artform.
Intuitively, there are more ways to interpret food than there are to interpret films.
Here is the argument, formalized:
The Multiple Interpretations Argument
P1.

Some artworks admit of multiple interpretations, each of which are equally warranted.
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P2.

We have direct control over our interpretations; we can intentionally switch between
multiple interpretations.

P3.

Interpretations directly determine our evaluations of artworks.

C.

So, we can directly control our evaluations of artworks.

This evaluative control is not direct in the strictest sense; but it counts as direct under my
definition above, since it satisfies both conditions. It is temporally immediate. And it is causally
immediate, since it’s causally close enough.
An objection: Are we modulating our attention with regard to what will give us the most
pleasure? If so, one might wonder whether we genuinely have agency here. After all, one might
say, being guided by pleasure is a hedonic matter, not subject to our own authority or agency.
I have two points in reply. First of all, even if it is pleasure, there is no reason in principle
why this should not be subject to some intentional or initiational choice on our end. (Later in this
dissertation I will take issue with hedonism and take up this issue in more detail, but I wish to
grant it for the time being.) Second of all, as philosophers have discussed regarding
interpretation, it is clearly not true that we are interpreting purely with an eye to what will give
us the most pleasure. Stephen Davies (e.g. 2006) has argued for just such a picture of
interpretation, according to which the best interpretation is the maximally fruitful interpretation.
But consider an argument from Noel Carroll (1991): If we interpreted films with a view only to
what gives us the most pleasure, we would take bad films and try to interpret them in better
lights than how they are intended. But this isn’t how things work. If a film seems bad, we don’t
try to re-interpret it in a way that would make it seem better. Carroll’s point, of course, is to
argue that interpretations are constrained by, and occur in light of, artist’s intentions. But, when
artist’s intentions leave multiple interpretations open, we have latitude to interpret on our own.
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5.2 The Weight-of-Significance Argument
The second argument starts with a straightforward picture of aesthetic evaluative properties.
Assume that artworks have objective and determinate features, and that each feature has an
objective value—features are good-making or bad-making. We sometimes evaluate artworks by
weighing its good-making features against its bad-making features: The script is good and the
acting is bad. To evaluate the movie as a whole, we have to weigh these features against each
other. Sometimes this is easy; in a drama, bad make-up usually doesn’t matter if everything else
good. Genre can be a good guide to what’s important. But sometimes this is difficult. How do
we evaluate a movie as a whole when the acting was good but the script was bad? It is
sometimes not clear how to weigh the importance of different features.
An example: Childish Gambino’s music video This Is America. This music video is
visually very bold; but unfortunately, the music is not very original. Let’s suppose that the
visuals are a triumph and the music is a failure. To evaluate the work, it is not enough to identify
the triumphs and failures; we must also weigh triumphs against failures; we must decide the
comparative evaluative significance of these components. You say: “Perhaps we should weigh
the visual features of this music video more heavily—after all, we are evaluating a music video
and not the audio recording.” I say: “Perhaps we should weigh the musical features more
heavily—after all, isn’t music important for a music video?” In cases like this, we have latitude
in the weight we give to such features. There are multiple acceptable ways to assign evaluative
significance to different properties. I can decide to place more evaluative weight on music, you
can decide to place more evaluative weight on the movie.
If we have latitude in the evaluative weight we assign to these features, then we can have
control over how we assign such significance—we can decide over whether the music matters a
30

lot or just a little. Furthermore, the significance we assign to individual evaluative features
determines how we evaluate the work overall. If we think that the music is important, then we’ll
tend to think the music video is a failure.
What’s important for my view here is that we can often decide to make an evaluation by
deciding to place more evaluative weight on one feature rather than another. I can decide that
This Is America is good by placing more weight on the film than on the music. So, by
manipulating the weight we give to certain kinds of features, we have control over our
evaluations overall.
The Weight-of-Significance Argument
P1.

Our evaluations of a particular work W is often centrally guided by the weight of
significance we assign to certain features F1, F2,… FN of W.

P2.

We can have control over the weight of significance we assign to features F1, F2, … FN of
W.

C.

So, we can have control over how we evaluate W.

One may object that this is improperly holist. “This requires aesthetic properties to be isolated,
but aesthetic properties cannot be isolated because they are gestalt properties or because they are
organic unities.” But this argument does not require aesthetic properties to be completely
atomized. It only requires them to be compared against each other, which is possible with gestalt
properties or organic unities. I assume only that we can focus on some central properties, such as
acting and screenplay, comparing those elements against one another.
This, I believe, is what occurs in the coffee case at the beginning. Nothing in our
perception of the properties have changed; and we still evaluate the properties individually as
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before. What has changed is the weight we give to such properties. Whereas I know that being
floral is a good-making feature of coffee, I decide that it does not count for very much.
Both of these arguments have corollaries to arguments by Charles Taylor (1985) and
Richard Moran (2001) about the importance of self-interpretations. Both Taylor and Moran
argue that some kinds of self-ascriptions are partly constituted by our own self-interpretations. In
order to be ashamed, I might not need the concept of shame, but I will need to interpret myself as
being guilty. In the same way, having an interpretation requires certain conceptual tools at one’s
disposal. Moran, of course, is not concerned to show that we have authority over which
conceptions we use; but he is concerned to show that the kinds of conceptions we use are
responsive to reason, and, by employing certain kinds of self-interpretations, we constitute our
states of mind in certain ways. By adopting certain self-interpretations, we constitutively effect
our states of mind. Moran points out that making up your mind is often not a function of any kind
of learning new evidence, but rather in terms of positioning ourselves differently in light of such
evidence. For Moran, it is crucial that making up our minds is a matter of being responsive to
reasons. But this responsiveness in no way precludes the importance of the importance of
adopting a certain interpretation.
What goes for self-interpretation goes for art interpretations. We can consider various
interpretations, sliding between them, but ultimately we often adopt an interpretation. And while
our adopting interpretations is responsive to reasons, it also involves the kind of conceptions we
choose to employ in our interpretations. Given the Waltonian view of categories, we can switch
between interpretations, and an interpretation comes hand in hand with an evaluation.
And there is more than just a similarity between self-interpretation on the one hand, and
artistic or aesthetic interpretation on the other. Self-interpretation is often wrapped up in our
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interpretation of objects. Your decision about the coffee, is, as I introduced it, a decision about
what kind of person you are, what kind of style you have, what you go in for. By undergoing
various self-interpretations, we implicate ourselves in various interpretations—and evaluations—
of food and drink, movies and music. And crucially for this argument, I believe that perspectival
slides about self-interpretation can happen directly and easily. This part about self-interpretation
is not crucial for the Multiple Interpretations Argument, but I believe it helps to give the
argument some context.
One may point out that you can expose yourself to one aspect of the thing, but then,
through mere exposure effects, come to love other aspects of the film. So say you like the video,
but as you watch it more and more, you begin to enjoy the music as well. In this case, there is
nothing about your decision to like the thing that has changed; all that has happened is that the
constant presence of, say, the music video has simply worn down any resistance you might have
had to the music. My response is that certainly this happens. However, there is no reason to think
that because mere exposure effects occur, they are the only things responsible for aesthetic
evaluations.

5.3 Objections
Here are three larger-scale objections that stick out against both of the above arguments:
The first objection is that there is no real agency in either case. Here we appeal to another
classic definition of agency: Agency exists only in choices that are guided by reasons. While our
weighing of reasons here involves reasons, it is not always determined by reasons. So, these
choices do not arise from real agency. Consider, for example, Sydney Morganbesser and Edna
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Ullmann-Margulit’s (1977) distinction between picking (selection which is not guided by
reasons) and choosing (selection which is guided by reasons). One might claim that both of these
cases are cases of picking, not choosing. Reasons do not determine how you should weigh
evaluative features, nor do they determine which associations you should make in gustatory
cases above.
The essence of this objection is that our choice in either case is arbitrary. But one’s
choice here is not arbitrary. For Morganbesser and Ullmann-Margulit, the paradigmatic case of
picking is between different cans of Campbell’s chicken noodle soup in the grocery store aisle. It
does not make a difference which one you choose. But it does make a difference how you weigh
different features, since it makes a difference to your evaluation of the artwork. The fact that we
often disagree and passionately argue over the values and properties of various artworks. This is
not a case of picking.
The second objection is that the final arguments rely on a mischaracterization of aesthetic
experience. According to a careful account of aesthetic appreciation, the aesthetic appreciation of
an object involves a reaction to a feeling: namely, that the feeling is merited by the object in
question (Gorodeisky and Marcus 2018). Moreover, one might say that neither of these elements
are under one’s control, neither the feeling nor the attribution of merit.
I would not want to rule out such a view of aesthetic experience. Within that view of
aesthetic experience, my claim here is just that aesthetic experience itself involves many
different components (say, the acting and the script), each of which can involve feelings and
thoughts of merit. One still makes a decision—when one watches a film, reads a book, or listens
to music—about which of these feelings and thoughts of merit to prize over the others.
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The final objection is that these are not cases of direct evaluative agency, since they are
not temporally immediate. One might think that any change in evaluation necessarily takes time.
Agnes Callard claims that “people do not seem to be able to choose or decide to have different
values” for this very reason. She continues:
Coming to value something tends to represent a deep change in how one sees and
feels and thinks. Acquiring a new value often alters the structure of one’s priorities
by demoting or even displacing something one valued before. Such changes take
time, over the course of which one has done many different things in the service of
value-appreciation. (Callard 2018: 3)
The idea here is that, while evaluative change is possible, it requires a very long process. A
change in evaluation involves changes in many different levels of evaluation, each of which
takes time. Callard’s claim is that any change in evaluation is necessarily indirect.
Applied to central moral values, it may be correct that such values, and attendant
evaluations, would take substantial time to change. However, it seems false about evaluation in
general. Not all evaluations in general necessarily take time in this way. To insist that this is true
without some sort of argument is to beg the question in the present context.
One might try to push this line in this context by presenting positive evidence that it takes
time to change our aesthetic evaluations. For instance, one may revert to a kind of generalism,
either about weighting aesthetic properties or about interpretive practices. The idea here is that
we have general principles regarding what interpretive strategies we apply, or how we weigh
aesthetic properties. And while we can change the general principles we employ, it takes time.
So our control over our evaluations is still not direct.
For one thing, such a generalism is contentious, especially as a claim about aesthetic
evaluation. But let’s grant that generalism is true. Notice that we have no problem weighing
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properties differently—and perceiving them to have different valences—across different genres.
Brashness is important, and positively valenced, in punk music. That same sort of brashness is
usually not important, and not positively valenced, in jazz ballads. I know fans of both jazz
ballads and punk that have no problem switching between the two. General principles may be
applied within a specific genre, are not generally applied. Furthermore, in new and original
works within a genre we have no trouble adjusting whatever thoughts we had of the genre to
accommodate the inventive work. We can change the principles by which we evaluate artworks.

6. Conclusion
I have argued that sometimes, we have evaluative agency. In particular, we have such agency in
the aesthetic realm. If I am right, there are consequences for traditional accounts of aesthetic
value. If we have direct aesthetic agency, our responses look very different than response-based
theories often make them out to be; we have control over our responses. It looks like some part
of traditional aesthetic theories, then, is in need of repair. Our evaluations are not always
immediate; they are functions of the perspectives we take on objects. Since we can change our
perspectives, we can change our evaluations. We are not always at the mercy of subagential
perceptual, emotional, or social processes. Sometimes, we can make a direct choice about what is
beautiful, even though the objective good-making features are objective in the world.
This leaves us with a question: What is the point of deciding to evaluate something in a
certain way? Having a choice in an evaluation might start to seem arbitrary. What is the point of
giving one or another evaluation? Even if it is not arbitrary (even if it is not picking), there must
be something more—something that drives our agential choices.
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This is a good question, and the larger answer leads to another suggestion; I believe that
our motivation lies in our practical identities. We choose to like things, or not, because we craft
our practical identities in large part on our aesthetic values. Indeed, this speaks to the
significance of choosing our own evaluations. I think these kinds of choices are far more
common than we often realize, especially in light of the fact that many of our aesthetic choices
are built towards developing a distinctive style or taste. We decide what suits us—and the
process of deciding, reneging, re-evaluating, is ultimately a process of deciding who we will be.
We do this about haircuts, coffee, alcohol, clothes, and tattoos. Far from being a trivial part of
our aesthetic lives, our choices mark the core of our practical identities. However, this leads to
another, larger area of research, which I leave for a later chapter. 28
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Chapter Two: Aesthetic Reasons

ABSTRACT. Do aesthetic reasons ever have normative authority over us? Could there be
anything like an aesthetic ‘ought’ or responsibility? Some philosophers have argued that
the answer is ‘yes’. I argue here that the answer is ‘no’. There are no aesthetic oughts. We
have reasons to act certain ways regarding various aesthetic objects—most notably, reasons
to attend to and appreciate those objects. But these reasons never amount to duties.
Aesthetic reasons are evaluative, not deontic. They can only entice us or invite us—they
can never compel us. Beauty gives us goods but not shoulds.

What kind of authority does beauty have over our lives and our actions? Some evaluative realms,
like morality, seem to have normative authority; moral reasons compel us. They issue demands
that we should follow. Does beauty issue such demands? Does the aesthetic realm have
normative authority?
We talk as though it is; our aesthetic language has this ring to it. I’ve told people that they
need to listen to Carly Rae Jepsen’s landmark pop album E-MO-TION. I’ve been told that I
really ought to use Punt e Mes vermouth when I make an Americano. And besides the linguistic
evidence, there is some intuitive attractiveness to the idea: When presenting a paper at a
conference, I should wear a nice shirt. If a lunar eclipse is happening, your child should watch
the lunar eclipse instead of playing around on their phone.
It might seem clear, then, that there are some aesthetic oughts or obligations. 29 Beauty
seems to compel us; it seems to have some authority over us, or make some kind of claim on us.
If this picture is right, then the aesthetic realm is deontic—it presents authoritative reasons. 30

29
Of course, I allow that normative words like ‘ought’ and ‘should’ may have non-normative and non-deontic uses;
my focus here is on normativity rather than the meaning of ‘ought’ per see. See for example Chrisman 2015.
30
If they exist, aesthetic oughts seem more modest than, say, moral oughts. A moral duty (say, to save a life) carries
more authority than any aesthetic call. Perhaps words like ‘obligation,’ ‘duty,’ and even ‘ought’ are too strong for
the aesthetic case. This doesn’t show that there are no aesthetic oughts; it only shows that these oughts can be
outweighed.
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John Broome articulates this very point: “I once advised a guest that he ought to eat a
mangosteen because mangosteens are delicious. I was speaking correctly. ‘Ought’ is certainly
not particularly a moral word.” (Broome 2013: 8). If I ought to eat mangosteens in virtue of their
deliciousness, then it looks like there are aesthetic oughts or obligations. Aesthetic reasons can
be deontic: They have normative force.
The question of whether there are in fact aesthetic obligations (or whether aesthetic
reasons can be deontic) gives rise to a crucial meta-ethical question about the relationship
between the evaluative, the deontic, and the normative. What is the reach of the authority of
reason? Are all reasons deontic? The question here is just whether aesthetic considerations can
have binding force at all. After all, aesthetics, like morality and epistemology, is at least an
evaluative realm. Is it also a deontic realm? Is it automatically a deontic realm?
And the question raises a challenge to the volitional account of aesthetic value. If
aesthetic reasons are strong enough to create duties in us to appreciate or attend to objects, then it
is difficult to see how we could have any serious agency in the realm of aesthetic value.
Recently, several philosophers have claimed that there are aesthetic obligations (Cross
2017; Eaton 2008; Kubala 2018; Lopes 2018; McGonigal 2018), either by arguing for such
obligations by presenting accounts of aesthetic obligations, or by arguing for general accounts of
reasons. My goal here is to present an alternative structure of the normative force of aesthetic
reasons. I will argue that the aesthetic realm is evaluative, but not deontic. Beauty gives us
goods, not shoulds. Beauty may seem to issue demands, such as in the examples above. But, I
will argue, these demands vanish under a closer look. My goal here is twofold. First, I provide a
metanormative picture of aesthetic reasons that shows why aesthetic reasons could never compel.
Second, I motivate this picture.
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I begin in §1 by considering what aesthetic obligations would look like if they existed. In
§2, I consider some accounts of aesthetic obligations, and raise some worries about these
accounts. I show that the strongest case for aesthetic obligations rests on a widely-accepted view
about the general normative structure of reasons. According to this view, all reasons have some
deontic force. In §3 and §4, I outline some resistance to this widely-accepted view of reasons,
drawing on work by Jonathan Dancy, Margaret Little, and R. Jay Wallace. I propose an
alternative normative structure for aesthetic reasons: Due to the nature of the aesthetic realm,
aesthetic reasons could never have deontic force; they could never have the authority of anything
like obligations. Using Jonathan Dancy’s notion of enticing reasons, I propose that aesthetic
reasons are always merely enticing—they never compel us. If we hold that aesthetic reasons are
anything stronger, I argue, we give up on a central insight of aesthetic theory: The aesthetic
realm is a realm of both play and free agency. In §5 I consider some objections. Finally, in §6, I
argue that there are important consequences for this for the importance of agency in aesthetic
value.

1. Characterizing Aesthetic Obligations
Let’s start by getting clear on what aesthetic obligations would look like if they existed. First of
all, what are obligations in general? Second of all, what makes an obligation aesthetic?
I assume here that obligations are derived from reasons. In particular, obligations are
reasons that have deontic force; they issue a binding directive. Over the past couple of decades
there has been much discussion of how reasons derive their force. For now, I rely simply on the
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notion that an obligation is a reason with a deontically binding directive. The reason need not be
universally binding, and it need not be an overriding reason.
What would make an obligation aesthetic? Given my project, I will be liberal about what
aesthetic obligations could be if they existed: I take it that an obligation is aesthetic just in case it
arises from an overriding or decisive aesthetic reason. In other words, if there are aesthetic
obligations, then one ought to undertake some action φ for some aesthetic reason R. 31 Here I
understand actions in a broad sense, to include mental actions such as attending to and
appreciating; attention and appreciation have been paradigmatic cases of aesthetic obligations
(Cross 2017; Kubala 2018; McGonigal 2018). Aesthetic value can, of course, provide reasons for
actions besides appreciation (Lopes 2018); but I take appreciation to be the central case. The big
question, as I see it, is whether a thing’s aesthetic value—its beauty, say—can ever provide a
binding reason for us to attend to it.
If they exist, then, aesthetic obligations arise from decisive aesthetic reasons. But what is
an aesthetic reason? There are many reasons; what makes a reason aesthetic rather than, say,
practical? Here we want to distinguish the right sorts reasons—properly aesthetic reasons—from
non-aesthetic reasons. Some reasons might be related to aesthetics, but they are not really
aesthetic reasons.
Here’s an example. Suppose an evil demon appears before me. To prevent the destruction
of the world, he orders, I must enjoy the complete recordings of Kenny G. Suppose that,
fortunately, I can bring myself to enjoy the large discography of Kenny G, by undergoing a
strenuous process of musical re-education and enculturation. In this case, I plausibly have a

This issue is distinct of whether there are norms in the artworld, which clearly exist. For discussion see e.g.
Neufeld (2015).
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reason—and a duty—to appreciate these recordings; and so would anyone in my position. But
while this is a reason, and while it involves aesthetic properties, it does not seem to be an
aesthetic reason. This reason is only accidentally aesthetic; it seems fundamentally moral, not
aesthetic. 32
So what does it take for a reason to be aesthetic in the right way? While there must be an
important relation to aesthetic content, I’ll grant that aesthetic reasons need not be grounded
exclusively in aesthetic properties. But they must have an important connection to aesthetic
properties. Just what connection I mean here is an important question that I will leave
unanswered. Here I will follow Andrew McGonigal’s liberal characterization of aesthetic
reasons: they are either (i) “grounded in ultimate value of some aesthetic property,” (ii)
“aesthetic property plays the right role in the content of the reason,” or (iii) “an aesthetic
property mediates in the right way”. 33 On this characterization, aesthetic reasons need not reduce
to aesthetic properties. It is enough that aesthetic properties simply figure in some robust way.
This may seem overly permissive—doesn’t this allow exactly the sort of evil demon case we
were worried about? I will simply assume that there is a sense of ‘mediating in the right way’
that does not occur in the Evil Demon case above.

So, for example, Howard Press has argued for an aesthetic obligation: “One ought to appreciate what is beautiful”
(1969: 525). But Press explicitly relies upon the moral salience of such appreciation. 32 Such obligations are really
moral, not aesthetic. “in the appreciation of beauty, as in all our relationships to the world, the sensuous no less than
the intellectual, we exercise a power, a moral power, and … the exercise of this power involves moral achievement.”
(525) “moral sensibility and aesthetic sensibility, the moral interest and the aesthetic interest, unite in aesthetic
experience.” (526)
33
As McGonigal says, one could put a lot of pressure on what it takes for an aesthetic property to mediate in the
right way. I will simply assume that a satisfactory and intuitive account can be given.
32
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2. Three Strategies
In this section, I survey three prominent strategies for establishing the existence of aesthetic
obligations. I will argue against two of them, leaving the third for the next section. It’s worth
noting at the outset that none of these strategies attempts to show that there is a distinct realm of
aesthetic obligation, or that aesthetic realm has a distinctive structure which gives rise to a
particular kind of obligation.

2.1 Intuitive Cases
The first strategy is an appeal to intuition: Some philosophers present what they take to be
intuitive cases of aesthetic obligation. The idea is that these cases present clear evidence for
aesthetic obligations.
Marcia Muelder Eaton considers aesthetic dilemmas. Suppose that you can save only one
of two paintings from a burning building, “paintings that you believe are equal in moral value”.
Suppose that one of these paintings is more beautiful than the other. Eaton writes: “I believe that
you have an uncontroversial, nonconditional aesthetic obligation to save one rather than the
other, namely, the more beautiful painting” (Eaton 2008: 5). Likewise, Andrew McGonigal
presents drowning art cases—cases where you can easily prevent the destruction of a beautiful
artwork if it costs very little (say, getting your clothes wet). In drowning art cases, MacGonigal
claims, it is clear that you ought to save the art. Both arguments involve an appeal to intuitions to
establish that there are aesthetic obligations.
Notice that both cases presumably appeal to relatively objective or quasi-realist
properties. The way these cases are presented, the obligations are not rooted in any personal
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relations one bears to the objects; the obligation is simply rooted in the aesthetic value of the
pieces—a value that is independent from any attachment one has. One’s obligation is to save the
more beautiful paintings in both cases—it is the beauty that seems to ground this obligation.
There are some doubts about how aesthetic these cases are. We may wonder whether we
are smuggling in historical properties to pass as aesthetic value here. For example, when we are
thinking that we ought to save the more beautiful painting, we may deep down really be thinking
that we ought to save the more art-historically important painting. This suggests that arthistorical importance— and perhaps not aesthetic value—can create a duty to save a painting. 34
But even if you find these cases compelling, notice that at best they provide a question
rather than an answer. If there are aesthetic obligations as these cases putatively show, what is
their normative structure? In both cases, the obligations are presumably underwritten by the
aesthetic value—the beauty—of the objects in question. How could beauty give rise to such
obligations? 35 This, I take it, is the crucial question about aesthetic obligation: What is the
normative structure of aesthetic value such that it can create obligations? This strategy does not
give an answer.

2.2 Relations
The second strategy is both reductive and relational: Aesthetic obligations are instances of more
general obligations brought about by relations, either to oneself or to something else. This

I acknowledge that culture and aesthetics are obviously closely related. This opens up a big question about how
subjective the aesthetic realm is.
35
This is not to say that the authors do not take this seriously; McGonigal provides an account of aesthetic
normativity which I discuss below.
34

44

strategy is developed along different lines by Anthony Cross, Robbie Kubala, and Andrew
McGonigal. While these are promising options, I argue that they are ultimately unsuccessful.
On Cross’s account, aesthetic obligations exist as instances of duties of love. 36 Cross
describes duties to love as “obligations to some individual that one incurs in virtue of standing in
a particular relationship to that individual—namely, a loving relationship.” Since we love
artworks, we incur obligations that result from relationships of love. Cross’s picture consists of
two stages. At a first, stage, we develop relationships with artworks, just like we develop
relationships with people. Certain movies, paintings, or albums are especially important to us. At
a second stage, we make commitments to these objects in virtue of the value they have for us.
Think of the punk, the metalhead, the opera lover, the movie buff, the foodie. These types of fans
have practical commitments to kinds of beauty. It is in virtue of these commitments that we
develop aesthetic obligations. Cross notes, crucially, that these relationship to art must be
merited by qualities in the artworks, just as relationships to friends must be merited by qualities
in the friends. So one could not generate an obligation to love bad art.
On Kubala’s account, aesthetic obligations are instances of self-promises. Kubala invokes
a passage from Proust, in which Marcel promises to return to admire the hawthorns. According
to Kubala’s account, Marcel promises to become the kind of person who attends hawthorns, and
therefore creates an obligation for himself to attend to hawthorns. 37 Kubala argues that we have

Cross discusses obligations to artworks, not to aesthetic objects. I assume here that non-artistic aesthetic objects
could be subject to the same obligations.
37
“On the morning of our departure … my mother … found me standing in tears on the steep little path close to
Tansonville, bidding farewell to my hawthorns, clasping their sharp branches in my arms. … ‘Oh, my poor little
hawthorns,’ I was assuring them through my sobs, ‘it isn’t you who want to make me unhappy, to force me to leave
you. You, you’ve never done me any harm. So I shall always love you.’ And, drying my eyes, I promised them ... I
would never copy the foolish example of other men, but that even in Paris, on fine spring days, instead of paying
calls and listening to silly talk, I would set off for the country to see the first hawthorn-trees in bloom.” Proust 1992:
203-204.
36
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duties to ourselves—commitments or self-promises—to attend to things. These self-promises
often arise out of our practical identities, especially as fans, aficionados, and the like. 38 You
shouldn’t neglect punk shows if you’re a punk; you should attend to the catalogue. Kubala’s
account is a self-promise account of aesthetic obligation; the obligation is rooted from
commitments we make to ourselves in virtue of our own practical identities.
According to McGonigal’s account, aesthetic obligations are based in our personal
obligations of integrity. In particular, we have obligations to honor our own aesthetic
preferences: we should pursue aesthetic projects that authentically express the kinds of things we
like. If you are really into French cuisine, you shouldn’t neglect it.
These three accounts share two core features. The first core feature is that they are
grounded in individual or personal relationships to artworks. In particular, they rely on similar
notions—commitments, self-promising, and obligations—all of which place obligations squarely
in one’s own self-conception or practical identity. Even McGonigal’s account, rooted in
integrity, derives crucially from one’s own self-conception. 39 The second core feature is that they
appeal to practical identities or self-conceptions that are importantly related to fanhood. On all
these views, aesthetic obligations relate to deep personal attachments. The promise to one’s self,
the commitment, and one’s integrity all depend upon holding something in high regard.
Let’s focus on the second core feature—the rootedness in deep personal attachments.
Because these accounts are all rooted in deep personal attachments, the scope of the phenomenon
is now smaller than we might have thought. On these accounts, aesthetic obligations only arise as

Kubala’s account takes inspiration from Richard Moran’s (2012) claim that beauty, in some sense, stakes a claim
on us—a claim that is binding without being universal.
39
Cross’s account requires that the object have some merit in the first place. But this meriting property does not
ground the obligation itself; it is only necessary for the obligation.
38
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relations between fans and for the objects, genres, or products of which they are fans. But this
limits the phenomena. Think back to the list of cases mentioned at the beginning. It’s not clear
that this will explain why my child should put his phone down and see the sunset, or why I
should wear a clean shirt when I present a paper. Neither of those are rooted in personal
attachments.
But, secondly, we might wonder whether even fans have personal connections so deep as
they are portrayed here. Do fans really make commitments to the objects of their fanhood?
Certainly some fans make commitments; Kubala helpfully gives several such examples. But it’s
not clear that many fans make anything like promises to themselves, or commitments to the
objects, or that their integrity lies in their fanaticism. I’m a fan of several genres, but I wouldn’t
say I’m committed to those genres, or that my integrity rests upon my appreciation for them, or
that I’ve made a promise to myself regarding my future pursuit of them. Commitment (or
integrity, or promising) implies a future-directed diachronic attitude regarding one’s future self.
Certainly I buy tickets to see these artists at later dates, but this is as far as it goes. I keep things
open; I come back to Kanye with fresh ears every once in a while, willing to hear his music in a
new way—willing to be wrong. The central point here—one which I will return to later—is that
our aesthetic loves seem to pin us down on these accounts in a way that doesn’t accurately reflect
the freedom we experience in our aesthetic lives.
And, thirdly, these accounts do not explain the intuitive cases of burning or drowning art
presented earlier. Aesthetic obligations, according to these accounts, rest ultimately in personal
orientations or attitudes. In the intuitive cases above—the cases presented by Eaton and
McGonigal—our obligation seems to derive purely from the objective (or at least quasi-realist)
aesthetic value of the artworks. This matters for the arguments of Cross and McGonigal, since
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they both appeal to these intuitive cases to motivate the view that aesthetic obligations exist in
the first place. If the intuitive cases are supposed to motivate the view that there are aesthetic
obligations, the account ought to accommodate them as genuine instances of aesthetic
obligations. But these relational accounts cannot explain the intuitive cases. For recall that the
obligation in the intuitive cases seems to derive from an objective or quasi-realist source. But, in
the relational accounts, the obligation has its normative source in personal reasons rather than
from general aesthetic value.
Indeed, these relational accounts of aesthetic obligations can start to chafe against the
intuitive cases presented by McGonigal and Eaton. Consider the burning art case. Suppose I have
developed a personal relationship with the less beautiful painting. Perhaps I made a promise to
myself to save the less beautiful painting, or suppose my integrity depends upon it. According to
these relational accounts, it seems like we ought to save the less beautiful painting. The intuitive
cases for aesthetic obligations seem to rest upon the idea that aesthetic properties themselves are
enough to demand action of us.
One worry occasionally raised against this approach is that these obligations are
meaningless, because we can opt out of them. Obligations of our practical identities, or
obligations of integrity, have no hold on us when we change our practical identities anyway. As a
metalhead, perhaps Jill ought to listen to some metal, or particular metal albums. But if Jill no
longer has a practical identity as a metalhead, it seems that she no longer has an obligation to
listen to any metal. Again, we are left with the question of how aesthetic reasons could evince
authority over our persons. If we are free to change our practical identities, then these obligations
do not have much hold on us.
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Cross has replied to this objection, saying that one can have obligations even if it is
possible to be released from them. For instance, I may have obligations while I’m in a marriage,
but I can be released from those obligations if my spouse and I end the marriage. The fact that I
can be released from those obligations doesn’t show that they don’t exist in the first place. I
agree with Cross here. However, note that this response does emphasize the fact that
commitments from self-promises, relationships, and integrity are usually codified in some
form—a form that is lacking in the art case. We all know what commitments of love look like;
they often involve explicit promises to people. Relationships to artworks rarely involve explicit
promises. Either they do not occur very often, or they involve an implicit structure that needs to
be spelled out more.

2.3 Monism about Reasons
The final strategy I consider here is more promising. Dominic McIver Lopes’s argument for
aesthetic obligations rests upon a metanormative claim: Reasons for action are just reasons what
lend weight to what one ought to do. This picture relates to Lopes’s view about values. Values
are aesthetic reasons when the fact that something has some value contributes to the claim that
one ought to do it.
the fact that x is V is an aesthetic reason for A to φ in C = the fact that x is V lends
weight to the proposition that A aesthetically should φ in C. (Lopes 2018: 38)
Aesthetic values just are reasons to undertake some action, and reasons just are things that you
should do. So, since there are aesthetic reasons, there are aesthetic obligations.
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The key premise here is Lopes’s general claim about reasons: That reasons to act just are
things that lend weight to the fact that one should act. On this conception, reasons are
constitutively deontic; what it is for something to be a reason is just for it to lend oughtness. This
view about reasons is popular. It’s endorsed by John Broome (1999), Jean Hampton (1998),
Thomas Scanlon (1998), and Joseph Raz (1999): Reasons always issue or contribute to directives
because we have a rational responsibility to always do as well as possible. We might call this
view monism about reasons, since it holds that all reasons share the same normative profile:
They are deontic in force. 40 As long as there are aesthetic reasons, then, those reasons are
deontic.
Furthermore, theorists such as Scanlon often reduce values to reasons. Christine Tappolet
describes this view as follows: “To be valuable or good would be nothing else than to have
natural properties that make it the case that one ought… to act or react in certain ways. An
imperative would lie at the heart of values.” (2005: 397) This results, as Tappolet shows, as a
reduction of all values to imperatives. It makes all value deontic; there is no distinction between
the right and the good.
Lopes’s view succeeds where the relational views fail: It explains the intuitive cases. It
explains why we ought to save the drowning painting just in virtue of the thing’s value: Its
beauty presents reasons for us to save it. 41

How exactly the normative demand gets spelled out need not concern us here. Perhaps every reason has its own
pro tanto obligation. Or perhaps obligations pertain to all-things-considered reasons, or to overriding reasons. As
Lopes acknowledges, aesthetic reasons may not always be decisive (Lopes 2018: 39). But, as we have allowed, this
does not mean that there are no aesthetic obligations—the form of aesthetic reasons is still a form of shoulds. What
it is to be a reason for φ is just to contribute to the strength of the proposition that one ought to φ.
41
Importantly for Lopes, this doesn’t mean that we all ought to pursue the same aesthetic goods. Such a world,
Nehamas points out, would be unbearable (Nehamas 2007: 83-4). Reasons press us differently depending on where
we are in life, but this only shows that we are accessing different reasons, not necessarily opposing reasons.
40
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What could be wrong with this picture? If all reasons compel us, it looks unavoidable that
aesthetic reasons give rise to aesthetic obligations. The only reason there would be no aesthetic
obligations is only that aesthetic reasons never quite stack up to moral reasons. But that is a
contingent fact. In the next section, I present a challenge to this monist account of reasons.

3. Enticing Reasons
There are some familiar strategies for arguing that aesthetic obligations do not exist. Stuart
Hampshire (1959) argued against aesthetic obligations on the basis of the normative profile of
the aesthetic realm. Hampshire argued that aesthetic objects could never present pressing reasons
for action—cases where we there is a demand for us to act immediately. But, he claimed,
obligations only extend to realms with pressing action. Expressing a similar point, Martha
Nussbaum claims:
“I can, visiting a museum, survey many fine objects with appropriate awe and
tenderness. I can devote myself now to one, now to another without the sense that
the objects make conflicting claims against my love and care. If one day I spend
my entire museum visit gazing at Turners, I have not incurred a guilt against the
Blakes in the next room. (1990: 132)
In some ways, the view of aesthetic normativity I endorse here will be close in some ways to
Hampshire and Nussbaum. But I believe that this is unsatisfying as a first move, since it only
pushes back the question: If aesthetic reasons aren’t pressing, what makes them this way in the
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first place? 42 This strategy hints at an alternative to the monistic account of reasons, but it does
little more to motivate or spell out such an alternative.
Andrew McGonigal (2018) sketches a Kantian style of argument against aesthetic
obligations: Aesthetic reasons are always subjective—that is, dependent upon an individual’s
sensibility (see also Egan 2010, Goldman 2006: 339). But, the argument goes, obligations are
categorical; they always apply universally and objectively, not subjectively. So, there are no
aesthetic obligations. I will return to consider this style of argument.
Finally, one might transpose Sharon Ryan’s (2003) argument that there are no epistemic
obligations. Transposed to the aesthetic realm, Ryan’s argument goes like this: (1) Our aesthetic
attitudes are never under our voluntary control. (2) Aesthetic obligations could exist only if our
aesthetic attitudes were under our control. (C) Therefore, there are no aesthetic obligations. I find
this strategy interesting and original, but I don’t accept either premise. 43 Most notably, I reject
the first premise: We seem to have some control over our aesthetic attitudes, since we hold each
other responsible for our evaluations (Wolf 2017).
My proposal rests upon an alternative model of aesthetic reasons from a familiar position
in meta-normative theory. My strategy here is to offer a competing account to the dominant view
of reasons, and therefore to allow for a view according to which aesthetic reasons are not
binding. This would eliminate the possibility of aesthetic obligations, since, as introduced above,
I take it that aesthetic obligations must arise from aesthetic reasons.

Another worry is that Hampshire’s argument rests on a disconnect of aesthetics from action—a move which runs
against the grain of a host of recent research in aesthetics (King 2015, Cross 2017, Lopes 2018, Nguyen
forthcoming; though see Gorodeisky and Marcus 2018).
43
For discussion, see Steup (2000, 2005) and Weatherson (2008). Pamela Hieronymi gives an argument against the
second premise.
42
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As we have seen, a familiar general claim about reasons that all reasons create oughts.
This is the monist view of reasons that Lopes endorses. Following up on a suggestion from
Joseph Raz (1999), Jonathan Dancy (2004) has argued against this monistic view of reasons.
Dancy argues that some kinds of reasons do not create oughts; he calls these reasons ‘enticing
reasons’. 44 Dancy writes: “A set of enticing reasons can be sufficient to make the action they
recommend worth doing, fun, exciting, attractive, and so on.” (99) However, while they
recommend, they do not mandate or compel. Here’s an example similar to Dancy’s: Suppose you
are thinking about seeing a play tonight. Let’s say it’s Annie Baker’s play The Flick. The Flick is
a great play (both subjectively and objectively, let’s suppose), and this is a reason to see it. But if
you do nothing instead, you have done nothing wrong. This is because a reason to see a play is a
merely enticing reason, and cannot create a duty. Dancy calls the more familiar kinds of
reasons—reasons that create oughts or shoulds—‘peremptory reasons’. While reasons may often
be like this, Dancy claims, they are not always like this. 45
To some, it sounds like enticing reasons are weightless. If this were true, it would be a
problem for enticing reasons. Weightless reasons cannot be compared against each other. But we
compare enticing reasons against each other all the time. We compare The Flick with another
play, deciding which play would be better. We compare Rocky Road ice cream against cookies
‘n cream. So it seems that enticing reasons must have weight. I grant that enticing reasons have
weight; I deny that they have any binding force.

Dancy repurposes this notion from Raz (1999), who introduces the notion of enticing reasons only to argue that
they do not exist.
45
This is the inverse of Julia Driver’s (1992) category of the suberogatory—actions that are permissible but not
wrong. These actions are permissible—indeed, they are good—but they are not required.
44
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If enticing reasons don’t have any binding force, what grounds them as reasons? 46
Perhaps, in line with McGonigal’s suggestion above, enticing reasons are not binding because
they are grounded in subjective, non-universal preferences. On this view, a reason has deontic
force only when it has universal applicability—and since aesthetic reasons lack universal
applicability (the objection goes), they do not have deontic force. Dancy considers this option.
But has he immediately notes, this is clearly false; many reasons have peremptory force, but they
do not have universal applicability (e.g. obligations to family members). Instead, Dancy
suggests, enticing reasons are distinctive in virtue of their unique style of outputs. Enticing
reasons take us to bests; peremptory reasons take us to oughts. On this account, enticing reasons
are evaluative without being deontic in virtue of their unique teleology. They take us to bests, but
without a demand; they are purely evaluative.
Two other philosophers help to make a case for enticing reasons. Margaret Little (2013)
bolsters the case for enticing reasons. She says: We often think of the justificatory force of
reasons as having a deontic force (think of reasons to act morally or reasons to believe
something). But, Little argues, justificatory reasons do not have this weight in other realms. She
provides two examples of justificatory reasons that are not deontic: (1) Fittingness in emotions.
Emotions are often warranted—think of anger—but we don’t think that one ought to have that
emotion. It’s fine if one has it and fine if one doesn’t. You are permitted to get angry at the
person who cuts in front of you in line, but ordinarily, there’s no sense in which you ought to get
angry at them. (2) Doing something sweet for one’s partner. Sweet actions for a loved one are
nice to do, and they are justified. But one is not wrong for not doing them—otherwise one would

It might be thought that the burden of proof is on the defender of enticing reasons to prove that some reasons are
not deontic. I don’t think there’s a clear default position here, so it’s not clear to me that the burden of proof falls on
the person who accepts enticing reasons rather than on the person who rejects them.
46

54

be required to do something sweet for one’s partner every chance one has! 47 Little’s thought is
that we ought not to confuse a reason’s justificatory force with its deontic force.
R. Jay Wallace argues for this same distinction with slightly different terminology: He
distinguishes deontic reasons (claims about what an agent ought to do) from aspirational reasons
(claims about what it would be best do to). Wallace distinguishes three cases based upon their
“difference in deontic structure”. In one case, MOVIE, you have a choice between going to see an
Antonioni film or staying home and watching some trash TV. Wallace holds that it seems wrong
to hold that one ought to see the movie. In another case, SMALL LOAN, you have a choice
between paying your credit card bill or not. Here, it seems that you ought to pay the loan in a
practical sense. In another case, DISTRAUGHT FRIEND, it seems you ought to comfort a distraught
friend rather than attending a fairly unimportant meeting. Here it seems that you ought to
comfort your friend in a moral sense.
The difference between these cases pertains to what Wallace calls a “dimension of
deontic structure.” Only MOVIE lacks deontic reasons. Wallace considers what he calls a
teleological approach to normativity, according to which “the fundamental normative relation is
the productive relation that our potential actions stand in to valuable states of affairs”. In other
words, the teleological approach to normativity says that one ought to promote value. If this is
true, there is no room for aspirational normativity; all reasons become deontic. The teleological
approach to normativity is familiar from, for example, traditional consequentialist accounts. If
our duty is to promote pleasure, then any kind of pleasure, aesthetic or not, can at least
theoretically create an obligation.

47

For more on justifying vs requiring reasons, see Gert 2007.

55

Importantly for us, Wallace argues that aesthetic responses are not deontic; he argues that
deontic force applies exclusively to the realm of morality. This is because, for Wallace, moral
demands are necessarily second-personal. To make a moral demand is to make a demand of
someone. And, Wallace says, aesthetic reasons are precisely not second-personal in this sense.
“Unlike, say, an aesthetic response, … moral blame makes a demand; it addresses
the charge of having acted culpably, that is, having done wrong, violated an allthings-considered moral obligation, without adequate excuse. It holds someone
answerable in a way that third-personal responses like aesthetic attitudes do not.”
(Wallace 2013: 220). 48
Aesthetic reasons do not make demands of others. So, they do not issue oughts or obligations.

4. Aesthetic Reasons Are Merely Enticing Reasons
Enticing reasons, then, offer an alternative—hopefully an alternative that the reader finds
promising—to the monistic view of reasons. But why think that all aesthetic reasons are enticing
reasons? There is already some reason above—both Dancy and Wallace bolster their arguments
by appealing to the aesthetic domain. In this section, I suggest that aesthetic reasons are enticing
reasons. The argument here is not exhaustive, but I believe it helps to spell out why such a
connection has been natural.
The main idea is that aesthetic reasons do not compel because the aesthetic realm is a
realm of freedom. That is why aesthetic reasons are enticing and not peremptory, aspirational
and not deontic. These are two hallmarks of aesthetic life that suggest the importance of freedom

Furthermore, some theorists like Thomas Scanlon reduce values to reasons. As Christine Tappolet says, this
results in the claim that values are just deontic. “To be valuable or good would be nothing else than to have natural
properties that make it the case that one ought… to act or react in certain ways. An imperative would lie at the heart
of values.” Tappolet 2005: 397
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in our aesthetic lives. First, aesthetic life is marked by play; and second, aesthetic life is marked
by autonomy.
Kant famously emphasizes aesthetic experience as essentially involving a free play of the
faculties, and it is the pleasure wrought by this free play that is the basis for aesthetic pleasure.
Schiller thought that play was the heart of beauty: “With beauty shall man only play, and it is
with beauty only that he shall play” (Schiller 15.8, p. 107). Something sounds wrong about a life
where our aesthetic choices are required rather than free. I suspect that the reason this rings
wrong to our ears is that aesthetics involves free play.
I want to dwell on an important connection between play and freedom. Consider Bernard
Suits’ famous definition of games as “the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles”
(2005: 54-55, my emphasis). Play involves the ability to experiment. When you play, you’re not
forced to choose the best option. If aesthetic reasons were deontic or peremptory, we would be
compelled to always choose the best thing.
This is, on the one hand, a claim about what aesthetic motivation feels like. Aesthetic
value expressly does not strike us as something that compels us—and this is related to its
playfulness. It may seduce us, we may obsess over it, it may even drive us crazy—but it
precisely does not bind us.
But it is also a claim about play itself. Hilde Hein distinguishes several elements in
Schiller’s account of play; the first two are as follows:
“a) Play originates as the natural and spontaneous expression of a primary instinct
activated by the overflow of vital energy. b) Play consists in the functioning of the
faculties in the fashion to which they are normally adapted, cognitive as well as
physical, but without the compulsion of either internal pressures or external
demands.” (Hein 1968: 67)
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The connections here to freedom are unmistakeable: natural and spontaneous; without
compulsion of demands. Both of these were dispensed as claims about what play is, but they
relate to aesthetic action. Think of when you’re listening through new albums on Spotify on a
Friday. If it’s a good week for music, you’ll find a track or an album that really hits you—one
that you can’t stop listening to. The music seems to be a natural and spontaneous expression of
an instinct activated by energy. But, along the lines of Schiller’s second (more Kantian) thought,
it also seems fitted for you—it occurs freely and without pressure.
Recall Schiller’s claim that “With beauty shall man only play.” (Schiller 15.8, p. 107). If
the most we can do with beauty is play with it, and if play involves freedom, then beauty does
not compel. If we had a duty to aesthetically maximize, then there would be pressure to
maximize our aesthetic lives. And if we had such pressure to maximize, we would not be able to
explore in natural and spontaneous ways. But, of course, we are able. Indeed, this is part of what
it means to have aesthetic experience.
The second hallmark of aesthetic life is free agency: We are free to choose our aesthetic
pursuits. I like country music, you’re a metalhead. I see the big band on Monday nights at the
Village Vanguard, you’re seeing experimental music at The Stone. If aesthetic reasons
compelled us to choose what’s best, then we would not have this freedom. But we do.
In response, one may claim that what’s proper or fitting for us to do depends on who we
are. Philosophers have emphasized the importance of aesthetic autonomy; our aesthetic
attributions necessarily come from ourselves. But, one may continue, this is exactly what creates
aesthetic obligations. Kubala emphasizes the importance of practical identities; through our
practical identities, we forge passions, and aesthetic reasons come to be more powerful.

58

It will be helpful to state the point more carefully: It is not just that we have freedom to
choose different things from each other. The key point is that, even when are aesthetic reasons
are decisive—and even if they are decisive for me in a way that they are not for you—that
decisiveness does not compel us, it does not create an out. But, in an ironic twist, if aesthetic
reasons exerted deontic force, then this yields a very limited picture of aesthetic agency: We
would be compelled to attend to beauty that is expressive of our selves. In fact, I claim, we have
freedom to explore things that are not related to ourselves. Our aesthetic freedom is related to our
freedom to change over time.
Margaret Little argues that, if all reasons exert a deontic force, then to be a good agent is
to be one who acts only for the best reasons. But this, Little argues, is a thin picture of agency: to
be a free agent seems to require the ability to act freely even in the face of optimizing reasons.
Here we can distinguish actions that we perform out of a sense that we ought to act from our own
self-conceptions, and actions we perform, unfettered by our past lives, driven by beauty. Picture
a someone who is a fan because they love it—because they feel it is a free expression of who
they are. Contrast this with the fan who attends the concert because they feel committed to the
persona. Our practical identities do not force our aesthetic pursuits.
Consider a person who Alex King calls the indifferent anaesthetic: someone who
recognizes what’s beautiful but is not called to pursue it. Intuitively, there’s nothing wrong with
such a person (King 2018). If aesthetic reasons only entice and don’t create demands, there’s
nothing incoherent with both recognizing an aesthetic reason and not feeling compelled to act
upon it. King’s point is that motivational internalism seems particularly implausible in the
aesthetic realm. To my mind, this goes some way towards explaining the freedom of the
aesthetic realm.
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The core upshot of this normative structure, of course, is that aesthetic reasons are
evaluative but not deontic—they live in the kind of logical space for which Dancy argues.

5. Objections
Someone who believes that rationality demands the optimal, like Lopes, may try to account for
this kind of free choice. Joseph Raz attempts to do just this. Raz claims that we are able to
exhibit free choice because many reasons are incommensurable; they stack up the same on the
deontic scale, and we’re free to choose among the remaining options. Should you listen to the
Dixie Chicks, or Prince? They’re both very good along incommensurable values (let’s assume),
so you’re free to choose. On the view I am endorsing, aesthetics is a realm of agential freedom,
which implies that you need not pick the best option, every time.
Distinguish this from some neighboring phenomena. For one thing, this is not evaluative
freedom. Evaluative freedom is the freedom to decide what’s best for yourself. If all reasons are
peremptory or deontic but they were on a par with each other, you could still have evaluative
freedom—and if so, then your ability to construct your own best options turns them into oughts
that have force for you (Chang 2009, 2013). Instead, the view I endorse here is that it’s
permissible for you to knowingly choose what you think is not the best, even if you have the
freedom to decide what’s best for you. (And here I mean not just something that you are
supposed to like but don’t—I mean something that you know you would think is better.) For
another thing, Raz-style freedom wrought by incommensurability is not free in the sense I am
discussing here. All of these still make sure you must be an optimizing actor, always making the
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best aesthetic choice. Absent enticing reasons, we are left with a view that we always ought to
perform at our aesthetic best. This doesn’t sound like freedom.
Another objection stems from the thought that there are different degrees of deontic
force. Lopes considers the objection that these should are not “serious” enough to really be
shoulds or obligations. As Lopes says: “Morality has no lock on normativity, and not all
normativity is heavy-duty normativity.” (2018: 40) 49 “We wonder what we should do, even
when there is no dilemma in sight, nothing serious at stake, and no impending guilt or shame.”
(2018: 40). But it is not so clear that Lopes can avoid this view. Similarly, John Broome argues
against Dancy’s picture of enticing reasons (2013: 60-61). Broome claims that you should do
what your reasons say, even when it comes to aesthetic matters like eating mangosteens. But,
Broome says, these shoulds are not obligations.
In reply, note that it’s not clear how to back up the idea that not all reasons have the same
strength. Reasons still have deontic force on this view. So one thing to say is that this view needs
to more development. But, secondly, even allowing that some reasons have lesser deontic
strength, it still challenges the idea that we have aesthetic freedom.
There are three more objections which stem from intuitive cases.
One thought is there are clear obligations in some realms of art. For example, it seems
clear that, when performing a work of art, one ought to play the notes of the score—there is, in
other words, some duty on behalf of the performer to the composer (Paul Thom, Aron Edidin).
Elsewhere, I’ve argued extensively against taking these obligations seriously; throughout
western fine-art music, performers frequently disregard notes of the score (Dyck 2014). If that is
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In support of this claim Lopes cites Raz, Wedgewood, Thomson, Parfit, Wallace, and Scanlon
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true, then it is less clear that these duties exist. However, there is still a conceptual problem that
such a norm exists in many circles; how do we deal with those? I share with Guy Rohrbaugh
(forthcoming) the view that this norm in performance is a constitutive element necessary for the
practice (or at least a subset of the practice); it is not related to aesthetic value. These reasons
seem artistic, not aesthetic. But notice anyway that this is not a central aesthetic obligation of
appreciation, which is the case I focus on here. 50
Another objection comes from the following case: Imagine someone for whom aesthetic
value plays no role. They do not seek out beauty; they do not appreciate it when it comes around.
It is not that this person is hostile to aesthetics, or that they are a crank. We can imagine that they
live a very happy life, surrounded by good friends, and doing a great amount of good. There
seems to be something intuitively wrong with such a person. And what is wrong seems to be that
they do not live up to an aesthetic demand; it seems that everyone ought to appreciate some
aesthetic value in their lives. And therefore, one might conclude, there is an aesthetic obligation
to appreciate some things, at least sometimes.
While this might be some kind of aesthetic obligation, it is not an obligation in the sense I
am concerned here. This only shows that we should make room in our lives for the aesthetic
domain. It does not tell us how to fill that domain. This, I take it, is the central question about
aesthetic obligation—at least, it is the question that has occupied the literature on aesthetic
obligations. Even if we admit that these are aesthetic obligations, I emphasize that these are not
the kinds of obligations that the literature has concerned itself with. 51

50
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The final objection comes from clear cases where we weigh moral reasons against
aesthetic reasons. Consider a debate between installing more lights in a highway—for safety—or
no lights—for beauty. 52 Here we have a debate between moral reasons and aesthetic reasons.
People may very well choose not to install the lights because of aesthetic value. Yet, if aesthetic
reasons are merely enticing, how could they ever stand up so compellingly to moral reasons? If I
am right, then moral reasons and aesthetic reasons are not of a piece. And if they are not of a
piece, then they cannot be compared against each other. Yet they are compared against each
other. So (the objection goes) I am wrong.
In response, I allow that enticing reasons are often compared against deontic reasons.
And I allow that enticing reasons often win out. Tonight, I am going to spend my money at the
movies rather than at Oxfam. The fact that there are two different realms of reasons, with
different normative profiles, does not imply that we cannot compare those reasons against one
another.
Finally, someone may wonder whether this is even a theory of aesthetic normativity.
According to some definitions of normativity, ‘normativity’ has to do only with the deontic. But
my claim here is just that the aesthetic realm is not deontic. So, really, one may say, the theory I
provide here is not a theory of aesthetic normativity; it is a theory that precludes any aesthetic
normativity.
If one wants to define ‘normativity’ in an exclusively peremptory way, then my theory of
aesthetic reasons is one that does not allow for normativity in this sense. However, it is not clear
that it is not a theory of normativity; it is an eliminativist theory of normativity, which is a theory
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of normativity nonetheless. And, further, it is not clear that normativity needs to be defined in
terms of peremptory or deontic reasons anyway.

6. Enticing Reasons and Agency
What does any of this have to do with volitionalism? The goal in this chapter has been to
establish a theory of aesthetic normativity according to which aesthetic reasons do not carry any
normative force. If aesthetic reasons do not compel us from a normative perspective, we are free
to choose which reasons to endorse. So the argument here serves to provide theoretical space for
volitionalism, although it is still not an argument for volitionalism. Volitionalism is a theory of
aesthetic value. This account of aesthetic reasons is not meant to serve as an account of aesthetic
value, although it is meant to be the start of one. In the next section, I will argue for a two-stage
account of aesthetic value.
This chapter works in tandem with chapter one in order to create a picture according to
which we are free to pick what we like in the normative realm. The goal of Chapter One was to
show that we have freedom from an internal perspectives; our own evaluations, from the inside,
can be up to us. This shows that we have agency from the inside. The goal of this chapter, by
contrast, is to provide a backing for the view that there is no normative requirement—no
requirement of rationality, practical action, or morality—that we take particular aesthetic actions.
This allows for room for agency from the outside. Free of demands, we can pursue whatever
aesthetic projects we like.
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One may argue that the accounts of Anthony Cross and Robbie Kubala, rooted in
practical identities, allow us freedom with respect to our aesthetic obligations. By creating our
practical identities, we create aesthetic obligations for ourselves. However, I stress that, while
my account of aesthetic value will make room for importing elements of practical identities, an
account of aesthetic obligation is implausible as rooted in our practical identities. It does not
seem, as I said, that we make anything like commitments. And only commitments are strong
enough to foist obligations upon us.

7. Conclusion
Kant thought that aesthetics involves a sensus communis, a common sense or understanding.
Kant believed in this so strongly that he thought that what pleases us aesthetically pleases us
necessarily—the common sense extends to all of humanity. For Kant, this is intimately related to
our aesthetic response—it demands agreement. And for Kant, this is where the normative force
of aesthetics comes in. Although it seems plausible that there is a common sense that’s important
for aesthetics, it’s not clear that this is a demand. Instead, it looks to be a kind of invitation. 53
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Chapter Three: The Personal Nature of Aesthetic Value

“But there isn’t actually a most beautiful person in the world, because there are so
many kinds of beauty. Some people love roundness and softness, and other people
love sharp edges and strong muscles. Some people like thick hair like a lion’s mane,
and other people like thin hair that pours down like an inky waterfall, and some
people love someone so much they forget what they look like. Some people think
the night sky full of stars at midnight is the most beautiful thing imaginable, some
people think it’s a forest in the snow, and some people… Well, there are a lot of
people with a lot of ideas about beauty. And love. When you love someone a lot,
they just look like love.”
Rebecca Solnit, Cinderella Liberator

1. Introduction
My goal in this chapter is to set the stage for the theory of aesthetic value that I will present in
the next chapter. I present a structural basis for aesthetic value. I briefly argue for a commonlyaccepted baseline view about aesthetic value: aesthetic value is response-based but objectsensitive. In other words, aesthetic value is based in human response to the actual properties of
objects. Here I propose a two-stage view of aesthetic value. In the first stage, objects have
reasons for aesthetic value, positive and negative. This is necessary but not sufficient for
aesthetic value, however. Aesthetic value requires a response to those reasons; that response is
the second stage. Exactly what form this takes is the subject of the next chapter.
In this chapter, I argue for three constraints on a theory of aesthetic value. I claim that
aesthetic values are rooted in personal importance, and that personal importance is distinctive; it
differs from person to person. This is the personal condition or the nonconvergence condition. I
also argue that an adequate theory of aesthetic value should not merely justify the aesthetic value
of objects, persons, and events; it should go further, explaining the motivational profile of
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aesthetic value. This is the motivational condition. Finally, and in particular, a theory of aesthetic
value should explain the unique motivational significance of authentic personal values; we
should explain why people are especially motivated by their aesthetic loves. This is the
authenticity condition.
I then consider traditional response-based theories of aesthetic value from Hutcheson and
Hume. These theories are both (a) dispositional and (b) hedonist. According to these theories,
value is a response that ideal or real agents are disposed to have. And aesthetic value is
specifically a kind of value from pleasure. I argue that these traditional theories do not
adequately meet any of the three constraints above.
Finally, I propose an alternative view about what kinds of responses constitute aesthetic
value. Aesthetic value has its basis not upon beliefs that something is good or upon dispositions
of valuing, but upon acts of valuing. I draw upon recent work on valuing to develop this claim.
Before I do any of that, however, I begin by clarifying what I take to be the relationship
between aesthetic value and aesthetic experience more broadly. I argue that an account of
aesthetic value ought to be distinct from an account of aesthetic experience.

2. Aesthetic value and aesthetic experience
Aesthetic experiences may typically be experiences of value. When you watch a film, it’s
difficult not to be evaluating the film while you’re watching it. Going out for drinks afterwards
with friends, the first thing you ask is: “What did you think?” If you’re more urbane, you might
use a little tact—say, by starting with a witty comment comparing the movie to something else.
What goes for conversation goes for criticism: As Noel Carroll (2008) has argued, the job of the
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critic is a primarily evaluative job; the critic’s goal is to give a thumbs-up or a thumbs-down
about the work.
And yet, while aesthetic experiences are typically value-laden, an aesthetic experience is
not necessarily or constitutively an experience of value. My experience of a symphony, for
example, may not be an evaluation of the film. I may listen to a set at the Village Vanguard just
to get a sense of the music. Indeed, this is how many critics approach new kinds of music. While
their ultimate goal as critics is to evaluate works, this involves subsidiary aesthetic experiences
which stave off an evaluation for the time being.
Some theories of aesthetic experience tie aesthetic experience to value; they provide an
account of aesthetic experience which is constituted in part by an account of aesthetic value.
According to the evaluative or the axiological approach to aesthetic experience, aesthetic
experiences are “self-rewarding or valued for their own sake” (Carroll 2015: 172). This view is
endorsed by Iseminger (2006). Carroll (2012: 165) cites a problem with this view, a problem
initially raised by: Many aesthetic experiences are not primarily, or even at all, about valuing an
experience for its own sake. The classic example here, owing to Dickie, is the music student. A
music student may listen carefully to a symphony the night before a test; and they may listen
with their attention structured exactly the way a music fanatic might listen. The music student is
not attending to the music for its own sake; the music student is attending to the music for an
instrumental reason: They want to do well on the test. Yet it seems entirely plausible that the
structure of their attention looks exactly like that of a music fanatic.
Furthermore, as Carroll points out, this view seems to imply, wrongly, that “aesthetic
experiences are always positive” (2012: 166). If the evaluative approach is correct, then any
aesthetic experience is valued for its own sake, and therefore it is valued. But, as Carroll points
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out, this is far from obvious. Many aesthetic experiences are of ugliness, tragedy, horror, or plain
old bad art. The fact that these experiences are negative—or that the evaluation is negative—
arguably does not make them any less aesthetic. Here we have a straightforward reason not to
endorse a theory of aesthetic experience which comes with a built-in theory of aesthetic value
Another approach to aesthetic experience is the affective approach. According to this
view, aesthetic experience is characterized by a certain kind of emotional state. Proponents of
this view include Jesse Prinz, who argues that aesthetic experience is characteristically one of
wonder.
The affective approach falls prey to the previous two objections. This view cannot
explain Dickie’s music student either; the student, let us suppose, is not having an experience of
wonder, but clearly is having an aesthetic experience. Indeed, consider many music or art critics,
for whom art is part and parcel of their everyday lives. A Thursday spent at Chelsea Galleries is
like any other Thursday. While some art may spark a sense of wonder, presumably the
experiences they have of ordinary art are also aesthetic experiences.
I follow Carroll here in advocating for a content-based approach to aesthetic experience.
Aesthetic experiences are characterized by a certain kind of content of the experience. In
artworks, this means the content of the work of art. This approach allows for many different
kinds of reactions to aesthetic experience. This approach includes “formal properties, expressive
properties, and aesthetic properties” (171). And yet, I do not think that my account of aesthetic
value here relies on any particular theory of aesthetic experience. So if the reader is skeptical of
this particular approach to aesthetic experience, this should present no obstacle to my view of
aesthetic value.
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For all this, I will advocate an account of aesthetic value which is closely tied to
experiences of aesthetic value. I have insisted above that an account of aesthetic experience need
not imply any account of aesthetic value per se; a theory of aesthetic experience can be distinct
from a theory of aesthetic value, because aesthetic experience is not constitutively value-laden.
However, this is not to say that a proper theory of aesthetic value will be untethered from
experience; a theory of aesthetic value should be beholden to our experience of aesthetic value in
particular. In fact, in both this chapter and the next, I appeal to experiences of aesthetic value.

3. Aesthetic reasons and aesthetic value
One approach to aesthetic value holds that aesthetic value is mind-independent. Let us call this
approach the objectivist or object-based view of aesthetic value. According to an object-based
model, aesthetic value exists whether or not humans do; it is a natural property of the world. This
view has been defended by Zemach (1996).
The objectivist model gets something importantly right. As I suggested in the last two
chapters, it aligns closely with realism about aesthetic reasons, a framework for thinking about
aesthetic reasons that I have advocated in the past two chapters. Aesthetic reasons present
objective properties, and some of these properties have objectively good and bad valences.
Consider, for example, that artistic originality is typically an aesthetic virtue. The fact that X
presented a radical departure is a reason to positively evaluate it. Or, drawing upon the first
chapter, consider that we often evaluate an artwork by evaluating several of its component parts,
and it is often clear the value that these component parts have. For example, it might be clear that
the acting is good, or the cinematography is good. This is especially true of aesthetic properties
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which are properly perceived only in the context of certain art-historical contexts and creators’
intentions. I suggest that at least some aesthetic reasons are objective properties of objects. This
is especially true for the aesthetic value of artistic properties. The fact that Florence Foster
Jenkins was unable to sing on key, in the context of midcentury chamber song, is a reason that
her performance was bad. Following Ruth Chang, I will call these reasons given reasons. I am
silent here on whether these reasons are internalist or externalist.
Whatever aesthetic reasons are, however, they are not enough for aesthetic value. It
seems clear that aesthetic value depends in some way upon our sensibilities. Recall the argument
in chapter 2 that aesthetic reasons within a work are not decisive. The acting can be good, the
directing bad. But notice that, in fact, this is exactly the situation we find ourselves in in many
aesthetic and artistic disagreements. Sometimes we disagree about the valence of particular
properties. More often, however, we disagree about the way we weigh these properties.
Either way, the basis for the resistance to an object-based theory of aesthetic value seems
to be a thought that aesthetic value depends upon human response. I assume that aesthetic value
involves some kind of response, even if aesthetic reasons do not. Whether or not aesthetic
reasons are mind-dependent, they are not enough for aesthetic value. Another way to put this is
that aesthetic value is, at least partly, based on or constituted by some aesthetic evaluation,
whether real or ideal. To repeat the last section: It seems clear that an adequate account of
aesthetic value should be based upon human evaluation. In a world without beings to value
things, there would be no beauty.
So, then, the proper account of aesthetic value seems to be a response-based view. But
what kind of response-based view should we adopt? My goal in this chapter is to take some steps
towards answering that question.
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4. Three Constraints on Aesthetic Value
I argue here for three constraints on aesthetic value. These constraints are required by the
volitionalist theory of aesthetic value, but they are not sufficient for it. Still, these constraints are
vital for the overall argument of this dissertation. In this chapter, I introduce and motivate these
three constraints. I argue that traditional hedonic theories of aesthetic value cannot accommodate
them. In the next chapter, I show that the volitionalist account succeeds where traditional views
fail, since it can account for these constraints. The overarching argument, running in this chapter
and the next, is an abductive argument for the volitionalist view.
I will argue here that an adequate theory of aesthetic value should explain a different set
of facts than it has traditionally been called upon to explain. I begin with the thought that
aesthetic value should be analyzed for its importance to us. This is significant with respect to the
paradigmatic cases that a theory of aesthetic value should explain: They suggest that
paradigmatic cases of aesthetic value should be cases of personal importance. Yet traditional
theories of aesthetic value take masterworks as their paradigms. Second, I will argue that a
theory of aesthetic value should explain aesthetic motivation. This much is increasingly accepted
(see, for example, Levinson 2010; Riggle 2014; Lopes 2017). Finally, I will argue, art motivates
us in ways that speak to our aesthetic authentic personalities. A theory of aesthetic value should
explain the personal nature of our aesthetic loves. Aesthetic values, in other words, are personal.
These three ideas intersect closely, but they suggest an unorthodox picture of aesthetic value. I
argue that traditional, idealist response-based theories cannot accommodate these conditions.
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I then argue that a theory of value should be based in activities of valuing. I call this view
the valuing-first model of value. This suggests a theory of aesthetic value that is response-based
(in a loose sense of ‘response’) but not idealist. A valuing-first model of aesthetic value, I argue,
preserves these three core insights.

4.1 An account of aesthetic value should explain distinctive personal values
In his famous article “The Importance of What We Care About,” Harry Frankfurt argues that
there are three important domains of philosophical inquiry. He begins by discussing the first two:
The first, epistemology, tries to answer the question of what we should believe. The second,
ethics, tries to answer the question of how we should behave. The third, Frankfurt argues,
pertains to what we should care about. Frankfurt writes that this final branch, like ethics,
concerns how we should act. Frankfurt explains this similarity, but goes on to isolate an
important difference between how we should behave and what we care about:
There is naturally an intimate connection between what a person cares about and
what he will, generally or under certain conditions, think it best for himself to do.
But while the third branch of inquiry therefore resembles ethics in its concern with
the problems of evaluation and of action, it differs significantly from ethics in its
generative concepts and in its motivating concerns. Ethics focusses on the problem
of ordering our relations with other people. It is concerned especially with the
contrast between right and wrong, and with the grounds and limits of moral
obligation. We are led into the third branch of inquiry, on the other hand, because
we are interested in deciding what to do with ourselves and because we therefore
need to understand what is important or, rather, what is important to us. (1982: 257)
Frankfurt claims that the question of what to care about is fundamentally a question of what is
important to us.
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My suggestion here is that aesthetics falls into this third category. Beauty and art are
important to us not primarily because of what they teach us, although they may teach us things.
Nor are beauty and art important to us primarily because of how they help us order our relations
with other people, although they may help us help others. It seems clear that the importance of
aesthetics has to do with its status as something we care about—as something that is important to
us, independently of such benefits. Susan Wolf has argued that art and beauty, along with
philosophy, are “good for nothing” (2010): “many academic works and many works of art are
such that if they had never been produced no one would be worse off” (2010: 48); yet, despite
the fact that they are not instrumentally good, they are still valuable to us. When we think of our
aesthetic lives, we primarily think in terms of what is important to us. And this suggests in turn
that the question of aesthetic value in particular is a question about what matters to us; aesthetic
value is a question of what we care about. This is a Frankfurtian starting point for aesthetic
value.
So far, this is all consistent with ways that philosophers have talked about aesthetic value.
It is easy to construe traditional theories of aesthetic value as being consistent with the view that
aesthetic value is something we care about. But consider now the ways that aesthetic theories
have structured the answer to this question: The question is about what we care about—together.
The traditional approach of aesthetic value aims at convergence; the goal is to answer a question
of which artworks are good and which are bad. Consider, for example, Hume’s approach to
questions of artistic value. In stating his antinomy of taste, Hume takes it as a crucial datum that
there are clearly good works of art, masterworks: works that have withstood the test of time.
These works are taken to be benchmarks of artistic value. Likewise, Hutcheson begins his essay
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on aesthetics by considering obvious cases of beauty; cases where Hutcheson takes there to be
obvious agreement. Both of these cases begin with putatively universal cases of beauty.
The traditional approach aims to account for convergence—for commonly-found
aesthetic and artistic greatness. On this view, aesthetic value should primarily be conceived of as
something of universal appeal. The reason masterworks are called upon to serve an important
methodological role is that they seem to be reliable indicators of commonly-accepted value
(across time—and hopefully across cultures, too). We might even call it the universal approach.
This is the approach taken by Hume, Hutcheson, and Kant, and many other general theories of
aesthetic value. It is possible for these approaches to be consistent with Frankfurtian starting
point for a theory of aesthetic value; they can certainly account for aesthetics as important to us.
But they will think of it as something that is important to us, collectively—as a group, as a
culture, as a species.
But there is another way to approach the question of what we care about—a way more in
line with how Frankfurt understands what we care about. We might also think of our aesthetic
lives as being filled with things that we care about as individuals, the way that Frankfurt
describes them. We might approach aesthetic value, then, in terms of what is important to us
personally, in terms of what we love individually. The aesthetic parts of our lives are some of the
intimate and important parts of our lives. Call this approach the personal approach.
The crucial element here is that the personal approach will not necessarily yield
convergence, since what is important to us will not be held in common. The personal approach
changes what we take to be our paradigmatic cases of aesthetic value. Riggle calls these kinds of
things our aesthetic loves. This is what Levinson calls having a distinctive aesthetic personality
(Levinson 2010: 230).
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Consider, for example, the ways in which we construct our tastes and styles: We take on
certain things as important to us. Some of us will shop at Hot Topic, others will shop at Costco,
still others at Macy’s. Consider which movies we take to be the most important to ourselves.
There’s a lot of divergence. And we think carefully about which movies fit us best, which speak
to us most. The clear answers to this question will not converge. More importantly, however,
they will start from our aesthetic loves, not merely our likes. We like a lot of the same things, but
I doubt we love a lot of the same things. As an answer to the question of what we care about
aesthetically, the personal approach reaches deeper. The personal approach, then, will yield
nonconvergence. This is not a necessary truth about a personal approach; we can imagine a
world in which, in fact, we all had the same aesthetic loves. Certainly we love some of the same
things, but our own aesthetic lives differ wildly from person to person.
Why should we take the personal approach to be important for aesthetic value? My main
argument here is blunt: An account of aesthetic value should capture our experience of aesthetic
value. Our experience of aesthetic value is primarily as something that matters to us in the way
Frankfurt specifies above. But the way in which it matters is not primarily in a shared way, but in
an individual way. This is true of how experiences of aesthetic value present themselves: The
most valuable things to us, aesthetically, are often distinctive. This is also true of the importance
with which aesthetic objects present themselves to us. It is very rare that masterworks are the
most important aesthetic objects to us. And even if they are, we rarely find the same personal
importance from the same masterworks.
Why have early modern philosophers taken the universal approach to aesthetic value?
One reason starts with an epistemic dimension: convergence shows which objects are most likely
of greatest aesthetic value. But what is the point of identifying and isolating objects with primary
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aesthetic virtues? Once we have a set of objects that have great aesthetic value, we can ask what
properties (intrinsic or relational) they have in common. Presumably, the properties they share
will be an indicator of aesthetically valuable properties. This approach, then, is aimed at
convergence for the goal of isolating some properties in common. Clearly, the answer is that
aesthetic value is realized in objects which will be shared. Notice, though, that this seems to be
an implicitly generalist strategy: Convergence plays an important role because it helps to
pinpoint the properties or principles that make artworks have maximal possible value.
The overriding motivation for taking the universal approach, I believe, is an anxiety
about objectivity in aesthetic value. The assumption of these early modern authors is that, in
order for aesthetic value to be objective and real, it must be universal; there must be convergence
about objects of aesthetic value. According to Hutcheson, our capacity for perceiving beauty is a
faculty for apprehending a certain kind of ratio of unity-in-variety. In later chapters of his
aesthetic treatise, Hutcheson has more to say about how enculturation can be a necessary
condition for perceiving some kinds of beauty—but also how biases, both personal and cultural,
can lead one astray. The more universal one’s objects of aesthetic pleasure are, the more comfort
one can take that one is getting things right.
As I mentioned, Hume begins his “On the Standard of Taste” by claiming that the
benchmarks for aesthetic value just are masterworks—works that have stood the test of time.
Hume begins his antinomy of taste with the initial reflection that everyone seems to have their
own taste. However, the counterbalance to that reflection—what creates the antinomy of taste—
is that there are clear standards of taste. Masterworks are central to Hume’s methodology in
establishing standards of taste. They are central to Hume’s epistemology of artistic value.
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The personal approach may not be maligned, but it has been minimized. One illustrative
way to see this is through Ted Cohen’s essay on high and low art. Cohen argues for a revisionary
take on the distinction between high and low art: The difference between them, Cohen argues,
amounts to a difference about whether art’s value is universal or personal. Low art, Cohen
claims, has to do with our own individual loves—artworks that we do not demand everyone
share an appreciation for: LAPD Blue, Happy Days, Doonsbury, and Justin Bieber. We know that
our love of low art is idiosyncratic. High art, claims Cohen, is art that we think that everyone
should love: Mozart, the Chrysler Building, Shakespeare, Miles Davis. High art is art that we
think ought to be prized universally. Of course, Cohen’s point here is to provide a revisionary
definition of high and low art; it is not to provide an account to aesthetic or artistic value. And
Cohen does not explicitly connect this to the view that real artistic value should be thought of as
coming from universal appealing art, not from personally appealing art. But the line is clear:
High art strikes us as having necessary appeal, whereas the appeal of low art strikes us as being
contingent.
Cohen’s thought here tracks the main problem people have had with personally appealing
art: personal appeals must somehow be rendered together with the particularities of one’s own
life—that one may be confusing. Hutcheson, Hume, and Kant are all clear that a proper
judgement of taste must not be susceptible to any prejudices. Indeed, the notion of disinterest has
traditionally been meant to keep exactly this notion at bay. This can also be found in the
arguments above. The assumption is that our personal favorites must be infected by facts about
our practical identities, personal histories, and so forth. For this reason, they are not tracking pure
aesthetic qualities; they are infected by extra-aesthetic value.

78

To be clear, the worry here is that, if we allow personal values to infect aesthetic value,
then aesthetic value is at the whims of the personal and particular contingencies of individuals.
Let us call this worry the associationist worry, since the worry is that we do not want to
construct a theory of aesthetic value that relies upon trivial associations that people make
between personal details about aesthetic value. This worry is connected to the idea that our
judgments are not in fact aesthetic at all; they are based upon practical concerns or idiosyncratic
emotional valences with certain objects. Riggle 2015: 442: “The meaningful attachments we
form with aesthetic objects arguably reflect broader non-aesthetic concerns of ours—our values,
ideals, personalities, histories, cultures, or projects.”
One response to the associationist is to hold that aesthetic value just is rooted in any kind
of connection. Some people have interpreted James Cutting’s (2003) work to show that aesthetic
value may be merely a function of mere exposure. I am skeptical of this kind of response; as I
have said, I think that a theory of aesthetic value ought to be rooted in real properties and
reasons, not in extra-aesthetic preference.
There are two points I have in response to the associationist worry. First, consider the
claim that these associations are illicit because they are extra-aesthetic. Notice that this response
requires a strict autonomism about the aesthetic realm—it requires aesthetic properties to be
divorced from other kinds of properties. This is an extreme view. Here I will appeal to two
distinct arguments from Noel Carroll against an autonomist view. First, consider Noel Carroll’s
(1996) argument for moderate moralism, the view that artistic value/properties sometimes
depend upon moral properties. Some films require us to take certain moral attitudes towards
characters or situations; they require the right kind of moral uptake. In a slightly different vein,
but more appropriate for the current discussion, notice that many artworks require certain
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practical identities of their audiences. Country music often calls upon its audience to think of
themselves as working-class. Bruce Springsteen songs require us to think about labor in a certain
kind of way. Rap songs also require a certain understanding of justice. In these cases, having a
practical identity of a certain sort can enhance, not detract, one’s proper appreciation of an
artwork. Second, Daniel Kaufman (2002, 2003) has argued that artistic value is a matter of how
well an artwork fulfills its intended functions; and many of these functions are given by genres.
Comedies are supposed to make us laugh; horror movies are supposed to scare us in particular
ways. Noel Carroll (2008) approvingly cites this view of artistic value. But how, Carroll asks, do
we assess the value of an artistic function in the first place? Carroll suggests that we assess
functions for the role they play in a culture at large. On this view of artistic evaluation, assessing
a work of art requires assessing culture at large. What goes for artistic evaluation here seems to
go for aesthetic evaluation, at least some of the time. Appreciating something’s aesthetic value
often requires knowing not only how it serves its function, but the value of that function in a
culture at large.
But a second point is easy to miss. Notice that our personal preferences are often rooted
in aesthetic differences, not practical differences. Some of these may arise because of certain
dispositions or sensibilities. A sensitive soul, I prefer Paul Simon to Korn. Our aesthetic
preferences are not due simply to associations. The associationist worry assumes that any
difference between individuals will be due to an extra-aesthetic difference. But there is no reason
to think that is the case. Differences between individuals may be aesthetic rather than practical.
We may think of this as an individualist challenge to the universalist approach. Why think that
all people will prefer the same things in the first place? The universalist has to appeal to a claim
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that humans are all alike in important aesthetic respects (or that they all ought to be alike), but it
is far from clear that such a claim is true.
There are other worries about the universalist approach. One is that the universalist
approach, as Hume takes it, starts by considering masterworks. The problem here is that our
assessment of masterworks is frequently infected by social influences. This worry is epistemic: It
does not deny that there are masterworks, it just denies that it is too difficult to identify such
masterworks, since we frequently confuse aesthetic properties for power relations, given social,
racial, gender, and class inequality (e.g. Bourdieu 1986, Hein 1990, Taylor 1999).
There is another worry, particularly fitting for the present discussion. If we take the
universal approach, we cannot make sense of aesthetic values as things we care about in
Frankfurt’s sense. Very few of us spend the most time with masterworks. This doesn’t capture
what’s important about Frankfurt’s claim, and it doesn’t capture what’s important about why art
is so important to so much of us personally.
This isn’t to suggest that a shared sensibility is irrelevant to aesthetics, or that art’s
importance has nothing to do with a shared sensibility. On the contrary, sharing parts of our
sensibilities is a great part of aesthetic joy. But it is not the only part of our personal lives. When
we start to get convergence, it’s because we become more similar anyway.
So far I have discussed a theoretical motivation for convergence, and therefore for
universalist theories: These theories provide us with a normative foundation for some sort of
realistic aesthetic value. I have proposed that we might instead begin with the demand that we
understand aesthetic value as something that is important for us.
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But there is another kind of motivation for accepting the convergence required for
universalism about aesthetic value: Some aestheticians, most notably Kant (1796), has claimed
that aesthetic judgment has a universalist phenomenology. Part of making a judgment of taste,
according to Kant, is that it demands agreement from everyone constituted the way I am. Of
course, this is just a claim about the phenomenology of aesthetic value. From the fact that
aesthetic evaluation presents itself as universalistic, it doesn’t follow that aesthetic value itself is
universalistic. But recall Kant’s transcendental methodology: The fact that judgments of taste
reveal themselves as such means that, in order for them to be satisfied, they must meet with
universal agreement.
But it’s not clear that aesthetic phenomenology in fact has this kind of universalist
character. Nehamas asks us to consider this world of convergence in detail; consider a world
where everybody liked the same things. This world, Nehamas claims, would be a nightmare. As
Nehamas says:
“If aesthetic judgment makes a claim to universal agreement, then, ideally,
everyone would accept every correct judgment: in a perfect world, we would all
find beauty in the very same places.
But that dream is a nightmare. … Imagine, if you can, a world where everyone
likes, or loves, the same things, where every disagreement about beauty can be
resolved. That would be a desolate, desperate world.” (2007: 83)
Nehamas is claiming that, for from universal agreement being a precondition of aesthetic
judgment, aesthetic judgment is horrific from the point of view of an aesthetic judgments; it is
something we resist when making an aesthetic judgment. Ted Cohen briefly says something
similar: “A world in which you and I never connected would be a horror. And so would a world
in which we were exactly the same, and therefore connected unfailingly, with every object on
every occasion.” (1993: 156)
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The point of this line of argument is that aesthetic value discloses itself as something that
ought to be individual. While there may be some convergence, complete convergence would be
terrible. So, theories of aesthetic value are wrong to begin by taking complete convergence as a
desideratum.
Replying to Nehamas, Nick Riggle argues that this world is not in fact a nightmare.
Riggle writes:
“normally, it is exciting when one meets someone who likes or loves artworks that
one likes or loves. For all I know, in every city in the world there is someone who
has an aesthetic sensibility nearly identical to mine. That does not bother me in the
slightest. What difference does it make if there are two or two thousand such
people? And if there is a difference, then where is the line to be drawn?” (2015:
437)
Riggle goes on to argue that Nehamas’ scenario is ambiguous between two situations. In one
situation, everyone genuinely loves the exact same things. In another situation, people only
pretend to like the same things; people, in this second scenario, are posers. Riggle argues that the
second scenario is bad, but poses no real argument for aesthetic uniqueness. He argues that the
first scenario is not bad the way that Nehamas thinks it is bad. I agree with Riggle that the second
scenario is not a problem, but it seems clear that Nehamas means to describe Riggle’s first
scenario: A world where everyone likes the same things.
So who is right, Nehamas or Riggle? Is a scenario of complete convergence a nightmare?
Riggle is certainly correct that we like to meet someone who loves the same artwork that we do.
But notice that the claim Nehamas makes is not mere agreement about some artworks. In
Nehamas’s situation, there is agreement across an entire aesthetic profile. Consider Nehamas’s
situation now, even for two people. At first, you find out that you both like films by Jim
Jarmusch and Kelly Reichart; you both dislike Wes Anderson films and Marvel movies… or,
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almost all Marvel movies. Suppose you find out that you both find that Venom is the rare
exception of a good Marvel movie. Slowly, you realize that you and this person share an exact
aesthetic preference profile not just about film, but about music, visual art. You have the exact
same tastes in food. You share the exact same judgments about human beauty, cities,
architecture… The situation starts to sound spooky! Finding a couple of shared judgments is
fine, but finding even one person who is exactly like you, in all respects, would be strange. The
point here is that Riggle is right that some aesthetic agreement between two people is often
welcome. But it is not strong enough to cast doubt on Nehamas’s thought experiment: agreement
across a whole aesthetic profile would be very strange. And here, in fact, we can see the strength
of Nehamas’s claim. Agreement across a whole aesthetic profile, even between two people,
would be weird. Imagine if there was agreement with everyone!
And anyway, notice that, applied as a response to Kant, Nehamas does not need the claim
that universal agreement is a nightmare; he needs only the claim that, normally, aesthetic
judgments do not demand such convergence. This is a much lower bar than the one Nehemas
provides.
However, Riggle still raises an important question. Nehamas paints a scenario of
aesthetic uniqueness, but doesn’t explain what’s wrong with it. So, what’s the problem? Put
more aggressively, the challenge could be put as follows: If aesthetic uniqueness is a core part of
our identity, then what we like depends upon those around us. And if that is true, then it is not
purely based upon aesthetic considerations.
Here again the points from above can be re-applied. For one thing, I resist the notion that
the aesthetic realm is autonomous, cut off from other domains of life. But even the autonomist
can agree that aesthetic autonomism does not imply a need for universal convergence. It is
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simply false that, if something is due to personal considerations, it is extra-aesthetic, or not
aesthetic. Instead, it is perfectly plausible that we have distinct aesthetic sensibilities or
characters, where the difference between these characters is not necessarily due to any aesthetic
difference.
Of course, traditional, universal approaches can explain personal distinctiveness in a way.
They explain personal distinctiveness as the vagaries of life playing a role in disturbing what
should be ideal human response. My point here is not merely that an adequate theory of aesthetic
value should have some explanation for personal distinctiveness; it is that an adequate theory of
aesthetic value should reflect the importance of personal values. Since the importance of
distinctive values looms large in our own experience, and since a proper theory of aesthetic value
should be based upon our own experience of aesthetic value, a proper theory of aesthetic value
should explain the importance of personal values.
My goal here has just been to argue that an adequate theory of aesthetic value should take
a personal rather than universal approach. Later on, I will spell out the traditional Humean theory
in more detail, focusing on its ideal and hedonic aspects. Some of these criticisms will reappear,
but I want to note that Hume’s starting point—the demand for convergence—can be
distinguished, at least in principle, from the ideal and hedonic aspects of his theory.

4.2 An account of aesthetic value should explain aesthetic motivation
Theories of aesthetic value have tended to focus on a justificatory aim: They aim to justify the
aesthetic value of objects. This is true of hedonic approaches, dispositional approaches, etc. The
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goal of these theories has been to show under what conditions some object is worthy of attention
or appreciation.
From a philosophical standpoint, it might seem natural to take a justificatory approach.
But when we look at a theory of aesthetic value in more closely, this approach seems less
natural.
Consider a practical or motivational question about the aesthetic realm: What should I
do? What should I attend to or appreciate? What should I spend my hard-earned money in?
Should I invest my time in planting a flower garden, or finally watching Antonioni films? Notice
that a justificatory approach does not answer this question; these things are all fully justified. In
fact, there are thousands of aesthetic actions that are justified.
Imagine that one looked to these traditional theories of aesthetic value for advice on what
to do. Traditional theories of aesthetic value, by providing only a justification of aesthetic value,
treat us as though we live in an aesthetic world of scarcity, seeking anything that might be
beautiful, and making certain that it is in fact beautiful. The justificatory approach treats aesthetic
value as though it were extremely rare. Furthermore, the justificatory approach treats beauty as
though the stakes were extremely high—as though skepticism about aesthetic properties were the
proper starting point for a theory of aesthetic value.
There may be justifications for both of these implications, but at least on first glance,
both implications seem false. We do not live in a world of aesthetic scarcity, seeking beauty in
the few places where it may be found. It seems obvious that we live in a world filled with
beauty—natural beauty, human beauty, artistic beauty and creative beauty.
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Another approach to aesthetic value is to start by asking the motivational question: What
should I pursue? Faced with this question, we do not need any justifications, since beauty is all
around us. Instead, the question now becomes: Why should I pursue the things I do? Indeed, the
justificatory answer is a useless answer to such a question. It is not enough to say why things are
good, or even great; there are plenty of good and great things around. Plenty of good options
abound.
Indeed, the motivational question promises much more interesting and rich answers about
aesthetic value: Why do we value the things that we do? If the motivational question serves as
our guide to aesthetic value, our answer to the question of aesthetic value will be that much more
informative and fulfilling. In other words, an account of aesthetic value that answers the
motivational question will be capable of more explanatory work than an account of aesthetic
value that answers merely the justificatory question.
In response, someone may claim that, by demanding that a theory of aesthetic value
answer the motivational question, I am endorsing a form of aesthetic motivational internalism.
Let’s back up for a moment and review the notions of internalism and externalism from moral
psychology and meta-ethics. The motivational internalist holds that a moral (or aesthetic)
judgment that one ought to act in some way is necessarily motivating. When I judge that I ought
to save the drowning child, I’m necessarily motivated to save the drowning child. The
motivational externalist, by contrast, holds that one may make a moral judgment and yet not be
motivated to act upon it. So, the objection goes, I am assuming the truth of aesthetic motivational
internalism. And, since aesthetic motivational internalism is wrong, a theory of aesthetic value
should not be responsible to explain aesthetic motivation.
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The problem with this objection is that I do not assume the truth of motivational
internalism here. There is no need for a theory of aesthetic value to come fully loaded with an
account of aesthetic motivation. I am not claiming that all aesthetic judgments are necessarily
motivating. I am merely claiming that an account of aesthetic value which explains aesthetic
motivation ought to be preferred, all else being equal, to an account of aesthetic value which
does not explain aesthetic motivation.
Understood as such, then, I take this claim to be relatively uncontroversial. And indeed,
as I will argue below, it does not eliminate very many options in terms of aesthetic value alone.
Many standard theories of aesthetic value can explain aesthetic motivation. The question is
whether they can do so adequately.
Before I move on to the third condition, I want to briefly note one point about aesthetic
motivation.
Notice that, given the preceding discussion, the aesthetic case will not be similar to the
typical moral case. I do not mean to take a stand on the question of internalism here. But notice
that the plausibility of motivational internalism for some case depends strongly on the normative
profile of the content of that judgment. Internalism is much more plausible for obligatory action,
or duty, than it is for supererogatory action. It is certainly not plausible for merely permissible
action. Regarding merely permissible action, this view would say that, if you judge that phi is
permitted, then you are motivated to phi. But of course this is not the case.
So we can see that the internal motivation may be affected by a judgment’s normative
profile. If a judgement regards mere permissibility, we should not expect internal motivation. If a
judgement regards obligation, perhaps there is internal motivation. But remember a point made
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in the last chapter: Aesthetic reasons are merely enticing, and never have a deontic profile.
Aesthetic reasons, I argued, do not compel. But ordinarily—at least in the kinds of cases that are
usually discussed in the literature on moral motivation—moral obligations do compel us. When
discussing moral obligations, moral philosophers typically discuss moral actions that compel us.
The point here is simply that, given the conclusion of the last chapter, we need to think
carefully before articulating exactly what aesthetic motivational internalism would look like. I do
not mean to suggest that aesthetic motivational internalism is necessarily false. Perhaps we could
still have necessary aesthetic motivation to act when we perceive that some action would yield
aesthetic goods—it seems possible that motivation can occur without a demand. Instead, the
point is just that we do not need to answer the question about whether aesthetic judgments are
necessarily motiving in order to want a theory of aesthetic value to be able to explain aesthetic
motivation. 54 A theory of aesthetic value is better when it can explain aesthetic motivation here,
whether or not it is internalist.

4.3 An account of aesthetic value should explain the unique motivational profile of
aesthetic authenticity
I argued above that a theory of aesthetic value should take as benchmarks of aesthetic value not
(merely) universal goods, but also personal goods. It should explain the aesthetic value not just
of masterworks but also what is distinctive of our individual lives. Furthermore, I argued that a
theory of aesthetic value should explain our motivation. This final constraint unites the two, with
a small modification. The idea here is that an adequate theory of aesthetic value should explain
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For more on aesthetic motivational internalism and externalism, see Archer (2018) and King (2018) respectively.
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that some of our personal aesthetic values ought to be (or are) authentic to ourselves. Very
minimally, the aesthetic values that motivate someone are the ones that are authentic to their self.
I will have much more to say about how one’s aesthetic pursuits should express one’s self. This
builds slightly upon the first constraint above. Not only are our aesthetic lives distinct, they are
distinct in the things that really speak to us.
The motivation for this comes from taking Frankfurt’s seriously that aesthetics is
important because of our personal attachments. The first constraint on a theory of aesthetic value
was that it should explain the distinctiveness of these personal attachments (Levinson 2010). This
condition, by contrast, has to do with the authenticity of personal aesthetic attachments
(Levinson 2010: 230). I may have several distinctive aesthetic attachments, but only some of
them are authentic. Only some of them seem to express my own aesthetic sensibility—a
sensibility that is properly expressive of and responsive to my character.
To see what it means to be authentic to one’s self, let me build up levels of aesthetic
authenticity. Let’s start with a negative condition, that one should not be motivated by things that
one does not like. This means, minimally, that one should not be a poser; one should not pretend
to like things that one knowingly dislikes. This is a minimal condition on authenticity. Secondly,
we may try out several kinds of authenticity. One may go through a grunge phase, a punk phase,
a street clothes phase, before one determines which of these are most expressive of one’s true
self.
But neither of these get to the core case of authenticity, which occurs when we form
meaningful personal attachments with objects. Both Cross and Kubala discuss cases of
commitments to aesthetic objects, and both state that the commitment must come from one’s
practical identity. My claim is not that one is committed to attend to things that are authentic to
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one’s aesthetic self. Instead, my claim is that one is motivated to attend to things that are
authentic to one’s aesthetic self. Any adequate of aesthetic value should explain how aesthetic
objects that we prize the most have a special motivational force.
What does it mean for an account of aesthetic value to explain aesthetic authenticity?
Minimally, an account of aesthetic value should allow for the possibility of aesthetic
authenticity—that is, it should allow for meaningful attachments we form to objects that are
expressive of our aesthetic characters. More fully, an account of aesthetic value should explain
how things have aesthetic importance for us based upon our real selves.
In the next section, I will mount a stronger challenge from authenticity. This challenge
will come from the sources of authenticity: I argue that evaluation ought to properly come from
our selves, which implies a kind of volitional attitude. For now, however, my goal is just to show
that much of what is most important to us in art and beauty, whether positively or negatively,
pertains to judgments which are authentic to our selves.
What is so hard about this constraint? One might think that it is very easy for an account
of aesthetic value to explain why we are motivated to love the things that speak to our authentic
selves. Levinson, for example, seems to take this approach. In the next section, I will show that it
is not so easy after all.

4.4 The Personal Importance Challenge
In this section, I have argued that a proper theory of aesthetic value should meet three
underappreciated constraints. A theory of aesthetic value should explain aesthetic motivation. It
should also explain personal authentic values—personally authentic and personally distinctive.
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Let us all these three constraints ‘the personal importance challenge’. The personal importance
challenge is distinctive because it does not demand that aesthetic value is realized in the same
kinds of objective properties. Instead, it allows that different objects may have different aesthetic
value for different people. Instead of finding a shared property of objects, the goal instead is to
search for a shared relation between people and objects. Of course, all of these constraints are
closely intertwined. My goal has not been to show that they come apart, only to distinguish three
important elements.
In the next section, I will consider standard response-based theories of aesthetic value. I
will argue that these theories cannot explain the personal importance challenge.

5. Traditional response-based theories of aesthetic value
For the past few hundred years, philosophers have more or less agreed upon a standard story
about aesthetic value. While their views may diverge significantly, standard philosophical
theories have shared a response-based view of aesthetic value: Whatever else it might be,
aesthetic value is rooted in human response. On this view, aesthetic value is either a property of
human response (ideal or actual), or it is a property that depends on human response. Different
versions of these standard theories appeal to different kinds of responses. Figures such as Kant,
Hume, Hutcheson, and Burke have variously invoked responses of sentiment, pleasure, reason,
or perception. And indeed, a response-based view undergirds contemporary hedonic theories of
aesthetic value. Since they appeal to responses, I will call these theories response-dependent
theories. Response-dependent theories belong to a family of views that I will call subjectivist.
Subjectivists all share the view that aesthetic value is a feature either of individuals, or that
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depends on features of individuals, rather than on features of objects themselves. Most
subjectivist theories are somewhat sophisticated in that they are not committed to all-out
relativism; they attempt to show that aesthetic response is intersubjective, so that aesthetics is not
totally individualist.
Not all theories of aesthetic value are subjectivist. According to object-based theories of
aesthetic value, aesthetic value is a real property of objects—objects have their aesthetic values
independent of any subjects’ responses to those objects. Certainly object-based views, and
arguments for them, enjoy some support (see Beardsley, Shelley 2010 and Zemach 1997). 55 But
subjectivist theories, and therefore response-based theories, are still the main game in town.
There are probably many reasons why response-based theories enjoy such popularity. I
believe that one reason for the popularity of response-based theory is that it is implied by two
very natural assumptions. The first assumption is that object-based theories are false—or,
conversely, that subject-based theories must be true. (What could aesthetic responses be if not
based upon actual human responses? Imagine that the universe contains a single, lonely object;
that object could not have aesthetic value.) The second assumption, reiterated earlier in t his
chapter, is that response-based theories are the only alternative to object-based theories—or,
conversely, that response-based theories are the only plausible versions of subjectivism.) How
else could humans ground aesthetic value, if not by our responses? Since object-based theories
are wrong, some form of response-based theory must be right. Yet the great virtue of these views
is that they provide for some kind of
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Shelley claims that Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Reid also held an object-based view of aesthetic value.
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I will argue that prominent response-based theories are false. I start by laying out familiar
response-based theories: Humean and Hutchesonian theories.

5.1 Hume’s view
Here, I will read Hume’s view to be composed of two stages, in the most orthodox interpretation.
The first stage consists of a picture about aesthetic experience. According to Hume, an
aesthetic experience occurs when one perceives an object, and thereupon has an affective
response of approbation, in the case of beauty (and disapprobation in the case of ugliness—here I
will focus on beauty). Aesthetic experiences are all instances of these feelings of approbation (or
disapprobation). So, this first stage has at least two parts. The first part is perceptual: We have a
perception of an aesthetic or artistic object. The second stage is affective: we have a reaction of
approbation in response to the perception. According to Hume, this elicitation is automatic. 56
A natural question arises: How do we sort out disagreement regarding aesthetic value?
Why is there divergent taste? At this point it looks as though Hume’s account makes every
response equally normatively valid. Either we never have aesthetic disagreements; or, if there are
disagreements, then no one is wrong. And both options seem false. Hume is aware of this
problem. The second stage of his theory is designed to answer this problem and to provide a
normative theory.

There is some disagreement about whether approbation is this emotional response itself, or whether it is a further
reaction to this emotional response. On the former view, a perception immediately elicits some emotion, which is
equivalent to approbation. On the latter view, perceptions elicit emotions, and emotions in turn elicit approbations.
Either way, Hume is clear that, when our response is one of approbation, we find the thing is beautiful.
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Hume’s strategy is to show that his view can get some kind of convergence. The second
stage provides a normative basis for correct aesthetic experiences. According to this stage,
aesthetic value is fixed or identified by ideal critics. Hume holds that good artworks—beautiful
artworks—are whatever the ideal critics prefer. (Here Hume famously lists five features of the
good taste of ideal critics: “strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice,
perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice”) There is an important debate about what
makes the ideal critics’ judgments normatively binding. Ideal critics identify the beautiful not
because they establish it by fiat. Instead, they identify the beautiful because they are in the best
epistemic position to do so. The most popular answer is that ideal critics are the best at
appreciating the work, but that the virtue of delicate taste is ultimately what undergirds aesthetic
value. So, then, what makes delicate taste so great?
The standard answer is hedonic. 57 Ideal critics are ideal because their delicacy of taste
results in an ability to detect which artworks will cause the most pleasure, either because more
delicate objects cause more pleasure (Levinson) or because ideal critics are not derailed by
having associations which tend not to lead to optimal pleasure (Railton).
On the hedonic interpretation that I explore here, Hume’s view amounts to the following.
There are two stages in aesthetic experience: A perceptual stage, and an affective stage. The
affective stage follows automatically from the perceptual stage. Artworks are beautiful when
they result in a feeling of approbation for a qualified audience, an ideal critic. What grounds the

Note that the hedonic answer here is not the only answer. On Jacqueline Taylor’s view, delicate taste is good
because of its sociability. And there is an object-based answer here as well: what makes ideal critics ideal is not that
ideal critics know how to get more pleasure out of the thing, but instead can properly appreciate the intrinsic value
of the object. This reading of Hume is object-based rather than response-based. I will set aside this final possibility
for now, since I will return to consider object-based views of aesthetic value at the end. I do not consider it to be a
plausible reading of Hume, since Hume has comments that seem explicitly against such a view. See Gracyk 2016.
Note also that James Shelley articulates a Humean view upon which artworks are intrinsically good.
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ideal critic’s responses as ideal are a sensitivity to the actual object, and an ability to detect what
artworks produce the most pleasure.
Peter Railton expounds a version of this theory according to which masterworks are great
because they most reliably elicit the greatest amount of pleasure. According to Railton, we can
think of masterworks and our sensibilities as cogs in a machine. Masterworks are like smooth
cogs, without any “bumps” that we will get stuck on. Many non-masterworks have bumps: They
have features that cause folks to get “stuck” on some aspects of those works and experience more
displeasure. True judges are important because they guide us towards the reliably “non-bumpy”
artworks. On this account, ideal critics serve an epistemic role. The real value of works lies in
their ability to elicit pleasure. This is a causal account; good art is good because it causally elicits
the right sort of reaction in the right sort of audience. The dispositional element of Hume’s view
is clear.
There is some degree about whether this view is subjectivist or not. On one interpretation,
Hume is a dispositionalist about aesthetic value: Beauty is a disposition of an object to cause
reactions in ideal critics. On another interpretation, Hume is a subjectivist about aesthetic value:
The value is purely in our feeling. I will take Hume to be a dispositionalist here. For one thing,
this is the most popular view as an interpretation of Hume (Savile, Mothersill, Levinson). For
another thing, is also how Hume’s view has lived on in the contemporary literature (Railton,
Lewis. 58 Furthermore, dispositional theories of value have been prominent in fairly recent

Savile, Mothersill, and Levinson endorse a dispositionalist reading of Hume; so does David Wiggins. Gracyk and
Baxter argue against dispositionalist readings of Hume. On another interpretation, Hume is a subjectivist about
aesthetic value—for example, when he says that “The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration” (Treatise,
471).
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metaethics, having been defended by David Lewis (1989), Michael Smith (1989, 1994, 2002),
Peter Railton (1986), and Mark Johnston (1989).
Given all of this, then, it is clear that Hume’s view cannot account for personal
distinctiveness. Because Hume has as an aim to explain a shared standard, and because that
standard requires convergence, Hume cannot allow for personal distinctiveness. It is true that
people in different ages, or times, or cultures, may justifiably find things valuable when those
things have the same degree of aesthetic value. But one should always trade up one’s own
pleasures for objects that will offer the maximum amount of pleasure.

5.2 Hutcheson’s view
Famously, Hutcheson says that beauty cannot be perceived by any of the five traditional senses;
he posits a sixth sense, a sense of beauty. However, says Hutcheson, beauty is not purely
internal. It corresponds to a pattern in the world; beauty is a reaction we have to objects which
exemplify a formula of unity-amidst-diversity. This position has been variously described as
dispositionalist or subjectivist. While there is substantial textual support for both readings, I
believe the issue is often terminological; I will assume that, like Hume, we can adequately
describe Hutcheson’s view as dispositional. 59 Hutcheson provides a clear and succinct

Kivy: “the ‘object’ of the sense of beauty is, for Hutcheson, a complex Lockean idea that is ‘constructed’ by the
external senses, by the mental activities of compounding, abstracting, and so forth—and, yes, by the understanding.
And in that ‘construction’ process, certainly, epistemic perception is deeply involved. It is that constructed object
that may or may not, in the relations of its parts, possess uniformity amidst variety; and it is that property that
causally, non-epistemically interacts with the internal sense of beauty, whether one knows it is there or not,
producing the idea of beauty in the perceiver.”
59
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explanation of the basics of his view in this passage, where he argues why there is a dedicated
aesthetic sense:
This superior Power of Perception is justly called a Sense, because of its Affinity
to the other Senses in this, that the Pleasure does not arise from any Knowledge of
Principles, Proportions, Causes, or the Usefulness of the Object; but strikes us at
first with the Idea of Beauty …. And further, the ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like
other sensible Ideas, are necessarily pleasant to us, as well as immediately so;
neither can any Resolution of our own, nor any Prospect of Advantage or
Disadvantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity of an Object. (Hutcheson 1726/2004,
25)
In this passage, Hutcheson mentions the core of his view: beauty is a perception of unity-amidstvariety. Hutcheson also mentions two additional important aspects of his view. The first is that
aesthetic judgments are immediate, or non-inferential. The second is a stipulation on the kind of
psychological attitude with which one approaches the aesthetic: Aesthetic experience is
essentially disinterested, so that one's pleasure is purely in the form of the object and not from
the prospect of any practical advantage which the thing offers: say, financial, or romantic.
Hutcheson also mentions another view he shares with Hume: The good of aesthetics
comes from pleasure. Hutcheson, then, advocates hedonism about aesthetic value; unity-amidstvariety is good because it causes pleasure of a certain kind—i.e., pure pleasure in the perception
of unity-amidst-variety. Notice that Hutcheson here seems to be committed to an evaluative or
axiological view of aesthetic experience. What it is to have an aesthetic experience is just to have
a positive aesthetic experience. Hutcheson knows that, on this account, he cannot account for
negative aesthetic experiences like ugliness, and he tries to explain them away as based upon
interests. However, I set aside this point about Hutcheson’s account of aesthetic experience.
What’s important is just that, for Hutcheson, aesthetic value essentially involves pleasure.
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Like Hume, Hutcheson must provide some account of divergent taste. If the perception of
beauty is a sense, and if it is the sense of things that have unity amidst variety, then it seems as
though everyone should agree when it comes to matters of taste. So why don’t we?
And again, like Hume, Hutcheson is aware of this problem. He has two responses. The
first way he deals with this problem is to insist that sometimes, we are mislead in aesthetic
perceptions; we can get a kind of good feeling that is not a result of our aesthetic sense, but is
instead an association of a perception with an emotional state, contingently made and reinforced.
Consider what Hutcheson says about differences regarding fashion:
As to Dress, we may generally account for the Diversity of Fancys from a like
Conjunction of Ideas: Thus, if either from any thing in Nature, or from the Opinion
of our Country or Acquaintance, the fancying of glaring Colours be look’d upon as
an evidence of Levity, or of any other evil Quality of Mind; or if any Colour or
Fashion be commonly us’d by Rusticks, or by Men of any disagreeable Profession,
Employment, or Temper; these additional Ideas may recur constantly with that of
the Colour or Fashion, and cause a constant Dislike to them in those who join the
additional Ideas, altho the Colour or Form be no way disagreeable of themselves,
and actually do please others who join no such Ideas to them. (p. 22)
We make associations between perceptions and emotions—we associate a certain “glaring
colour” with levity, say—and this is what is responsible for disagreement. But, strictly speaking,
that these are not really judgments of taste, since they are not perceptions of unity amidst variety.
These are only associations of perception and emotion. Hutcheson rejects the sort of aesthetic
associationism that Hume adopts above.
The second way that Hutcheson accounts for divergence of taste is that people perceive
different amounts of beauty, relative to one’s expectations about beauty. Here is what he says:
Deformity is only the absence of Beauty, or deficiency in the Beauty expected in
any Species: Thus bad Musick pleases Rusticks who never heard any better, and
the finest Ear is not offended with tuning of Instruments if it be not too tedious,
where no Harmony is expected; and yet much smaller Dissonancy shall offend
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amidst the Performance, where Harmony is expected. A rude Heap of Stones is no
way offensive to one who shall be displeas’d with Irregularity in Architecture,
where Beauty was expected. (61-62) 60
One’s reaction can be tempered by one’s expectation. And this can explain why we might
disagree about the degree to which something is beautiful—although, for Hutcheson, there could
never be any real disagreement about whether something is beautiful or not. The only
explanation Hutcheson has for that is the misleading associations above.

5.3 Two shared commitments
Hume and Hutcheson, then, share two commitments that I want to highlight. The first is to a
dispositional, response-based understanding of aesthetic value. In particular, the right kinds of
dispositions are connected to convergence. The proper responses are responses that everyone
ought to have. The second commitment they share is to a hedonic picture of aesthetic value. Art
and beauty are good because they give us pleasure, or a certain kind of pleasure. When I refer to
‘traditional response-based theories,’ then, I mean a commitment to these two core aspects. In
what follows, I want to explain why neither Hume nor Hutcheson can allow for the Personal
Approach to aesthetic value.

“There are indeed many Faces which at first View are apt to raise Dislike; but this is generally not from any
positive Deformity which of it self is positively displeasing, but either from want of expected Beauty, or much more
from their carrying some natural indications of morally bad Dispositions, which we all acquire a Faculty of
discerning in Countenances, Airs, and Gestures.” (p. 62)

60

100

5.4 The first problem: Personal Distinctiveness
First of all, response-based theories cannot explain the personally distinctive nature of
aesthetic evaluation. At the very least, they cannot tolerate personal distinctiveness as a
permissible basis for evaluation. These force aesthetic value into convergence, since they provide
a normatively binding view about what makes for a good aesthetic evaluation.
Hume, for example, holds that aesthetic value is determined by ideal critics, and ideal
critics are ideal because—given Mill’s test—they can identify the best pleasures. This view aims
at convergence. Ideal critics are ideal because the same things should please all of us. So, then,
as Levinson (2002) argues, we should trade up whatever worse things may please us for better
things.
Hutcheson holds that aesthetic value is again a kind of pleasure, and that the right kind of
ratio will be found pleasing by everyone. The extent to which there is disagreement is the extent
to which someone is getting things wrong. I showed above that, for Hutcheson, there are two
sources of aesthetic disagreement. In the first kind of case, people disagree because extraaesthetic considerations are clouding their judgment. We can set this aside, since it is clear that
one person is making a mistake according to Hutcheson. In the second kind of case, people
disagree because they have different expectations about beauty. The bumpkin, who has never
heard early French music, will find Rameau beautiful. But the esthete will find Rameau a bit
tawdry, because the esthete has had greater exposure to better early French music. In the latter
case, it seems, the bumkin ought to expose themselves to more French music; the bumpkin is still
making a mistake.
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But why can’t we modify the hedonism to hold that different things appeal to different
people? Why not hold, for example, that there are different personality types, and, for each
different personality type, different things will be found to be more or less reliably pleasing? One
kind of person, the normie, will be pleased by Costco, The Notebook, and Coldplay. Another
kind of person, the emo kid, will listen to Fallout Boy and shop at Hot Topic.
Both Hume and Hutcheson will resist this move. To make this move is to give up on
Hume’s real standard of taste, a desideratum of his theory. Hutcheson will also hold that, to the
extent that we find different things beautiful, it is because either our judgment is clouded or
because there are different degrees of exposure, one worse than the other.
Andy Egan (2012) explains why dispositional theories of value aim for convergence in
general. Without convergence, the theories of aesthetic value cease to have any normative
significance. If everyone has a different standard, it seems that everyone is the benchmark for
their own value. These theories of value therefore lack any normative force. Secondly, without
convergence, there is no real disagreement. If peoples’ disagreement is based upon different
meanings of a term, or upon different standards, then we cannot explain real aesthetic
disagreement. Suppose there is a disagreement about the normie and the emo kid about Coldplay.
The normie thinks that the sentence “Coldplay is a good band” is true. The emo kids thinks that
the same sentence is false. Intuitively, there is real disagreement about the truth of the sentence.
But if we contextualize the sentence by personality type, there is really no disagreement. The
normie means “Coldplay is pleasing to normies.” The emo kid means “Coldplay is pleasing to
emo kids.” There is therefore no real disagreement. This modification isn’t successful.
At this point, one might appeal to a different reading of Hume. Stephanie Ross has
argued that Hume’s critics are real, not ideal. The argument is as follows: P1. If Hume’s critics
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were ideal, then they would be perfect beings with respect to taste. P2. Any perfect being with
respect to taste would never have to learn by practice or experience. P3. But Hume is clear that
critics have to learn by practice and experience. C. So, Hume’s critics are not ideal. If Hume’s
critics are real and not ideal, then the need for convergence disappears.
Ross’s argument here is ingenious, and seems right at first. However, I have three
responses. First, I believe that casting Hume’s critics as real rather than ideal undersells the
amount of normative work that they are doing in Hume’s theory. Recall that Hume is after a real
standard of taste. I believe it is clear that, given Hume’s desire for a standard of taste, Hume
takes critics to be ideal; only ideal critics can provide the normative basis for convergence that
Hume wants out of his theory. Second, while it is true that Hume says that ideal critics must
learn by practice and experience, I believe that this is a recommendation as to how we may do
our best to approximate an ideal critic when we make aesthetic judgments. So, I deny P3:
Perhaps surprisingly, on my reading, it is not ideal critics themselves that learn by practice and
experience. Hume’s claim here about critics is meant as practical advice for how we might do
our best to approximate, imperfectly, the ideal critic. Secondly, I deny P2 anyway. It is
conceivable that one could become a perfect being with respect to taste through practice. As long
as we are positing ideal judges anyway, there seems to be no problem with supposing that the
ideal judge, given unlimited time and access to aesthetic goods, could gradually become a perfect
judge through practice and experience.
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5.5 The second problem: Aesthetic motivation
These standard theories are also unable to provide a satisfactory theory of aesthetic motivation.
Of course, traditional theories have an account of aesthetic motivation, as Dominic McIver
Lopes (2018) has pointed out. Pleasure motivates; it gives us reasons to do things. But there are
two problems.
These theories require us to train up. We should be aesthetic optimizers—after all, the
proper perceivers are correct perceivers, ideal perceivers. Lopes puts the problem as follows:
Aesthetic value is based upon pleasure, but not all pleasures are equal. How to tell the best
pleasure? Consider Mill’s test for pleasure: The better pleasure is one that an expert would
choose, where an expert is someone familiar with both pleasures. This, then, reveals the
importance of ideal critics: Since they are familiar with both pleasures, they will know the better
one. This is where the idealist dispositional component enters: It is a way to tell true pleasures
from false pleasures.
But notice the resulting picture of motivation on this view: We are motivated by gaining
pleasure, and accordingly we should be motivated to pursue the choices of the ideal critic. But,
first of all, this is radically revisionary. We often do not seek to radically revise our aesthetic
selves in order to conform with the recommendations of ideal critics. One thought may be that
the demands of ideal critics are too expensive. But consider that we would be fairly unwilling to
make even a relatively easy and inexpensive switch.
At the end, this view is at radical odds with our experience. There are various ways to put
this. One is to say that the result is radically revisionary. We might also say that it is too
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demanding: We are unwilling to go this far. It is just this point with which I began: Our aesthetic
lives are personally distinctive.
In reply, one may claim that pleasure motivates different people in different ways. What
brings me pleasure is different than what will bring you pleasure. But to say this is to opt for a
relativist theory of value.
And this applies to the third aspect of the particular strength of motivation when it comes
to our aesthetic loves. We often pursue aesthetic goods that express our own personal authentic
selves, even though it may give us greater pleasure to ‘trade up’. What is important to us instead
is a kind of personal authenticity. We should stop watching Chopped and start watching The
Sopranos; we should stop going to Carly Rae Jepsen or Lil Nas X, and instead listen to more
Beethoven.
The hedonist may reply that this is still a consideration of pleasure. The idea is that it is a
significant cost to rework one set of pleasures for another. Training up is simply not worth it
once we run the cost-benefit calculation.
In reply, however, note that this simply displays that our aesthetic lives typically don’t
work when we try to figure out what will maximize our pleasure. The problem is that we do not
consider the cost-benefit calculation in the first place. What is important to us is our distinctive
aesthetic personalities.
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5.6 The third problem: The distinctive aesthetic motivation of aesthetic loves
It should be clear that traditional theories of aesthetic value will not be able to account for the
distinctive aesthetic motivation of our aesthetic loves. If they cannot explain for distinctive
personal values, and if they cannot explain aesthetic motivation, then this will be hopeless.
It is worth noting, however, that traditional theories take distinctive values as threats to a
coherent theory of aesthetic value in the first place.

6. Toward a valuing-based theory of aesthetic value.
If dispositional theories of aesthetic value are false, then we have several options. One option is
to rework the idealist theory. According to this idealist approach, we should seek some other
form of ideal value. I will not explore this approach, since it does not seem plausible.
Two other available options remain. One option is to hold an object-based theory of
aesthetic value, according to which value is purely in objects themselves, and does not involve a
relation to human subjects. Another option is to hold that aesthetic value is to modify the idealist
strategy: Hold that aesthetic value is based upon evaluations, but that it is based upon actual acts
of evaluation rather than ideal acts of evaluation. I call this a valuing-based approach of aesthetic
value.
In the next chapter, I endorse a hybrid theory of aesthetic value—a theory of value that
consists of two stages. On the first stage, aesthetic objects present reasons for their value and
disvalue. But these reasons are not enough to establish aesthetic value. Here I appeal to the
intuition that aesthetic value would not exist in a world without humans; aesthetic value depends
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upon our taking up aesthetic reasons. This is the second stage: Through acts of value, we take up
reasons for objects. This is how we create aesthetic value. As Lopes claims, aesthetic values
occur when agents acts for aesthetic reasons. But it is not enough to act for a reason; one has to
adopt the value of the reason. In the next section, I will argue that this amounts to an act of the
will.
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Chapter Four: The Volitionalist Account of Aesthetic Value

1. Introduction
In the first chapter, I argued that it is possible, rationally and psychologically, for us to choose
our evaluations; we have evaluative freedom when it comes to the aesthetic realm. In the second
chapter, I tried to provide a normative framework for allowing that this kind of evaluative
freedom is not just possible, but permissible—and not just permissible, but embedded in the
structure of aesthetic normativity. It is an essential part of aesthetic reasons that they allow for
choice. In the third chapter, I argued for three unorthodox constraints on any plausible theory of
aesthetic value. I argued that any theory of aesthetic value should explain our distinctive
aesthetic values, and I should that traditional hedonic accounts of aesthetic value fail to do so.
Here I provide a further and stronger argument, not just that we have agency over our
aesthetic evaluations, but that our agency is an essential part of our aesthetic evaluations. In
particular, I argue that our volition is the basis for our valuing in the aesthetic realm. In other
words, I present a voluntarist, or volitionalist, theory of aesthetic value.
The voluntarist theory is a response-based theory of aesthetic value. It holds, with the
theories discussed in the last chapter, that aesthetic evaluation is based upon responses. But the
volitionalist theory holds that aesthetic value is not built out of responses of pleasure or desire.
Instead, the volitionalist theory holds that aesthetic value is built out of acts of valuing, and those
acts of valuing in turn are best understood as responses of endorsement. Your finding something
beautiful is not a matter of being pleased by that thing, or a matter of desiring it, or a matter of
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cognizing it. Your finding something beautiful is a matter of putting yourself behind it—of
avowing it, or committing to it, or aligning yourself toward it.
But the volitionalist theory of aesthetic value, as I articulate it here, is not entirely
response-based. Here I take a cue from Ruth Chang’s “hierarchical voluntarism” about practical
normativity. My theory involves two stages. The first stage a reason-stage, a stage at which
objects have objective reasons to be evaluated in certain ways. These reasons are objective parts
of the fabric of the world. But those objective reasons are not enough for a theory of aesthetic
value, since aesthetic value requires things to be valued; objective aesthetic reasons
underdetermine aesthetic value. Aesthetic value exists only when a subject endorses one of these
reasons. And this endorsement is to be understood as an act of volition.
The complete theory of aesthetic evaluation, then, looks like this:
For some object, action, or event X, and some aesthetic value, V,
X is V =df

1. there exists some reason R for some subject S to aesthetically value X as V
2. S aesthetically values X as V for R, where
3. S’s aesthetically valuing X occurs in virtue of S’s alignment of their will to
regard X as V in virtue of R.

Of course, (3) is the core element of volitionalism; it claims that valuing occurs in virtue of the
will. Most of this chapter is aimed at defending (3). But this also requires a defense of (2), the
claim that aesthetic value occurs in virtue of valuing. I suggested some reasons for this in the last
chapter. In the next section, I provide a defense of (1) in the next section, arguing for hierarchical
voluntarism. I argue that, in the aesthetic realm, there are given reasons; but these given reasons
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run out. I introduce the volitional model of aesthetic value in §3: I explain how it builds upon
traditional models of volitionalism, and how it differs from those. I devote §4 to considering a
crucial question: Is the will too strong? The will seems to imply commitment, and commitment
seems too strong to characterize aesthetic value. By clarifying this question, I clarify what I take
the will to be. In §5 I provide four arguments for volitionalism. In §6, I argue that there is some
precedent for volitionalism from two very different historical sources, Jonathan Edwards and
Frederich Nietzsche. In §7, I explain the lessons of aesthetic volitionalism for versions of
volitionalism about value more generally.

2. Hierarchical Voluntarism
My model of aesthetic value follows Ruth Chang’s (2009) hierarchical voluntarist model of
practical action. According to the hierarchical voluntarist model, there are two stages of reasons.
At the first stage there are given reasons, reasons which objects present for or against their value.
But, crucially, given reasons are not enough to motivate us to action, or to valuing. As I
suggested, a proper theory of aesthetic value ought to be based upon valuing.
I will focus most of the argument in this chapter on the third condition: That aesthetic
evaluation essentially involves an alignment of the will. However, I want to briefly address the
first stage of the hierarchy here, the claim that there are given reasons. I have provided some
arguments for this in previous chapters. Here, I appeal to an understanding of given reasons
inspired by Scanlon (1998): Given reasons exist in virtue of properties in the world. It is a fact
that Caroline Shaw’s choral music is original, and the fact that Caroline Shaw’s music is original
is a reason to listen to it (although it may be defeated by other reasons). Properties in the world
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provide pro tanto reasons for action. Some of these given reasons are reasons for aesthetic action,
rooted in aesthetic properties.
An important objection to traditional volitional accounts of normativity is that these
accounts render anything good, as long as it is endorsed by an agent. Since normative force
comes from rational autonomous reflection, any kind of reflection is sufficient to make
something good for an agent. This is what is known as the mafioso’s problem: The mafioso
reflectively endorses that he should send someone to sleep with the fishes tonight. Volitionalist
theories of normativity imply, wrongly, that, since the mafioso reflectively endorses this option,
this is what he ought to do. In the aesthetic realm, the correlate problem might be the problem of
stinky trash. If all it takes to make something beautiful is to avow oneself towards it, then it
follows that a bag of stinky trash could be beautiful, since someone could avow oneself towards
it. But this is absurd; stinky trash is not beautiful. So, aesthetic volitionalism is false.
By endorsing a hierarchical voluntarist model of evaluation, we are able to avoid the
stinky trash objection. For not just any volitional attitude is sufficient to make something
valuable for someone. Instead, the volitional attitude must be based in an objective reason—a
reason that actually exists. Presumably, stinky trash lacks any reason for positive evaluation in
the first place; it fails the first stage of the hierarchy.
But it is equally part of the hierarchical voluntarist model that given reasons run out; the
claim here is that, when it comes to the aesthetic realm, given reasons do not yield a clear
normative or practical result. Given reasons underdetermine our responses. There are several
arguments which can be given for this, gleaned from previous chapters.
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The first argument, made in the first chapter, is an object-based argument that our given
aesthetic reasons run out in the sense that our evaluation is still up to us, in some sense, even
after we recognize reasons. The argument in the first chapter was meant to show that we can
often make a decision about how we evaluate things. Two of the arguments in this chapter
showed that the reasons that speak for or against the value of objects are often inconclusive; they
do not show decisively what an object’s aesthetic value is. There were two cases in which this
happens, cases which I used as arguments. The first argument was an argument from
interpretation. Recall the argument: Evaluating an aesthetic object is often up to one’s own
interpretation. Aesthetic objects admit of multiple interpretations, several of which are equally
warranted. And the object may have a different aesthetic value depending upon which
interpretation one endorses. Second was an argument from weight-of-significance. Artworks and
aesthetic objects often have many properties. Some of these properties speak in favor of the
object’s aesthetic value; others are reasons for the aesthetic object’s disvalue. These reasons are
given by the object—but the significance which we endow to one over the other is often a
function of our own choice. The key point—a point which speaks in favor of hierarchical
voluntarism—is that the given reasons run out; they underdetermine the final evaluation of an
object.
The second argument, made in the second chapter, is a normative argument that our given
aesthetic reasons run out in the sense that they do not demand any aesthetic action; our aesthetic
lives are free. In other words, aesthetic reasons underdetermine our actions from a normative
point of view. I argued that aesthetic reasons never compel us to action, since the aesthetic realm
is essentially a realm of enticing reasons, not of deontic reasons. Aesthetic reasons speak in favor
of objects, and they invite our attention, but, since they do not compel us, they do not require any
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action. Since this is the case, aesthetic motivation is more complicated than simply the value of
the objects striking us. This is another sense in which given reasons run out; they are not
normatively required for valuing. No matter how many aesthetic reasons there are for
something’s value, a subject can acknowledge that it is valuable, but the subject need not value
it.
The third argument, referred to in the previous chapter, arises from the intuition that
aesthetic value is somehow mind-dependent. There I suggested that aesthetic value must be built
out of acts of valuing. And acts of valuing require something more. What more they require, I
argue, is particular orientations of the will. If aesthetic value is built out of acts of valuing, then
objective (given) aesthetic reasons are not sufficient for aesthetic value.
So, I endorse a version of hierarchical voluntarism here. While there are given aesthetic
reasons, these reasons “run out” in the aesthetic realm—they are not enough for value, since they
are not enough for our individual acts of valuing.
Note that, while I endorse Chang’s model for aesthetic reasons, I do not assume it is true
of reasons in general. Indeed, some of these arguments rely on particularities of the aesthetic
realm. Furthermore, I do not assume the truth of Chang’s argument regarding practical reasons.
While I find it personally convincing, nothing on my argument hangs on Chang’s model being
correct in the practical realm.

3. Articulating Volitionalism about Aesthetic Value
The core of volitionalism about aesthetic value is that holding something or someone to be
beautiful is not just in perceiving something good, or in receiving pleasure (whatever particular
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kind of pleasure it might be) from that thing or that person. To find something beautiful, you
must adopt a certain kind of stance towards it: a stance involving some orientation of the will.
This may be understood in various traditional ways: As commitment, as avowal, as resolution, as
endorsement. It may be understood as putting oneself behind something. I will primarily speak in
terms of commitment (and I will say more about how to understand commitment in later
sections). The volitional theory says that this stance is best understood as a certain orientation of
the will—it is not based in cognition, perception, or desire. You like something because you go
in for it. And you find things aesthetically disvaluable because you orient yourself against it.
These commitments we make are how we create our aesthetic values.
There are four things to keep in mind. First, not all aesthetic values are positive. Some are
negative. This theory is meant to account for both positive and negative aesthetic values. One’s
volitional orientation against something is what partly constitutes negative aesthetic value.
Second: I do not mean to claim that the theoretical tool of volition is exhaustive as a
theory of aesthetic value. Aesthetic valuing requires other cognitive attitudes in order to evaluate
something as beautiful or ugly. Aesthetic valuing also typically involves conative attitudes, such
as desiring and wanting. Perhaps these conative attitudes are also required for aesthetic valuing.
The claim, instead, is that this is a feature that is partly constitutive of our experiences of
aesthetic value; it is a core feature of values like beauty.
Third: Our aesthetic valuings are typically reflected in our aesthetic actions. My claim
here is that valuing is constituted by endorsement. So, I hold that our endorsements typically
result in aesthetic actions. This is especially the case where we thinking of the aesthetic will as a
kind of commitment; aesthetic commitments typically revolve around actions. But not all
aesthetic actions arise from our own aesthetic commitments. I might see a movie at my brothers’
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behest; there, my action is not guided by an aesthetic commitment to the art-object in question—
although my commitments will still guide my evaluation. I make no claim that commitments
guide all of our aesthetic actions. My claim is that commitments guide our aesthetic action when
our aesthetic action is motivated by our own values.
Finally: This is a subjectivist theory of aesthetic value; aesthetic value, on this view, is a
relation between a person and an object. This follows quickly from my claim, defended in the
last chapter, that aesthetic value is rooted in acts of valuing. However, while the view is
subjectivist, it is not relativist. This is because volition alone is not sufficient to make something
good: I can’t will that a bag of trash be beautiful. So the voluntarist picture is supposed to make
volition alone necessary, not sufficient. As I have argued above, proper orientations of the will
must be based upon features that are presented by the objects as reasons for its positive or
negative appraisal.
In order to articulate aesthetic volitionalism, I’ll explain two prominent contemporary
accounts of volitionalism.

3.1 Contemporary accounts of volitionalism
In the past two decades, volitionalism (or voluntarism) has emerged as a powerful source of
thinking about normativity, due in large part to work by Christine Korsgaard and, more recently,
Ruth Chang. While there are other important figures in the volitionalist literature, I will focus on
Korsgaard and Chang in particular.
According to Korsgaard, normativity must have some kind of force to it; normativity
compels us in certain ways. A theory of normativity, therefore, should answer a motivational
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question: Why should I be moral? Korsgaard finds traditional internalist and externalist answers
wanting. Korsgaard argues against neo-Humeans that the force of normativity cannot come from
desire. In a Kantian line of argument, Korsgaard argues that desire might motivate, but not in a
genuinely normative way. Nor can purely external moral properties motivate us. If the property
of the good exists, claims Korsgaard, I still haven’t been shown why I ought to pursue it. Instead,
claims Korsgaard, the force of normativity comes from the will; only a volitional source is
enough to motivate us in the right kind of way. Through various alignments of ourselves—
through our wills—we constitute ourselves to be people for whom certain kinds of reasons
present themselves as authoritative. It is in virtue of our commitments to being certain kinds of
people that we find ourselves motivated to pursue certain forms of action.
Obligation, according to Korsgaard, requires reflective endorsement: The autonomous,
volitional act of putting one’s self behind something. “in one sense no human action can happen
without reflective endorsement. When people skip reflection or stop too soon, that is a kind of
endorsement, for it implies that the work of reflection is done” (Korsgaard 1996: 161).
Korsgaard argues that, through reflection, we have the opportunity to take ourselves out of the
throw of our impulses, free of their force. Only when we act through reflection can we can act as
autonomous agents. But, in addition to this rational element, Korsgaard holds that we also need
commitment to act. Proper commitment to action, claims Korsgaard, comes only through
endorsement of a reason. The following passage explains this connection:
“our capacity to turn our attention to our own mental activity is also a capacity to
distance ourselves from them, and to call them into question. I perceive, and I find
myself with a powerful impulse to believe. But I back up and bring that impulse
into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me
and now I have a problem. Shall I believe? Is this perception really a reason to
believe? I desire and I find myself with a powerful impulse to act. But I back up
and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse
116

doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I act? Is this desire really a
reason to act? The reflective mind cannot settle for perception and desire, not just
as such. It needs a reason. Otherwise, at least as long as it reflects, it cannot commit
itself or go forward.” (1996: 93)
Korsgaard argues that our reasons are normatively binding only when they align with our
practical identities. A practical identity, according to Korsgaard, is “a description under which
you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your
actions to be worth undertaking” (1996: 101). It might be a conception of one’s self as Muslim,
or as an American, or as a writer, or as a family person. By conceiving of ourselves in these
ways, we have normative reasons to act. I may see myself as someone who likes to fish on the
weekend; you like to go gallery hopping, and she sees herself as someone who rides
motorcycles. Our conceptions of our own practical identities give us reasons to act—self-chosen,
autonomous reasons to act. 61 Since these reasons are autonomously chosen, they have a real
normative hold on us.
Ruth Chang has provided another argument that what she calls “voluntarist reasons” can
be important sources of practical normativity. Chang considers what she calls ‘hard choices’;
choices where a person is stuck between two options which may be equally good, and seem
equally good to that person. For example, you may be deliberating between graduate school in
philosophy, and getting a law degree. External reasons do not solve the problem, because the
decision may be equally hard. Nor do internal reasons solve the problem, because the reasons
you have may also be equally good. If neither internal nor external reasons help you make a hard

Korsgaard: “you must have some conception of your practical identity, for without it you cannot have reasons to
act.” (Korsgaard 1996: 120)

61
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choice, what will? Chang claims that there is another way that we can decide; we can put
ourselves behind one of the options. This, she claims, is a voluntarist reason.
That solves the problem of hard choices. By choosing to endorse one of the options, by
putting ourselves behind it, we constitute ourselves as being someone for whom that option is in
fact better. We change our practical identities so that one of these options is better. So, for
example, what the hard choice requires is for you to see yourself, say, as a lawyer—and not just
to see yourself as one, but to construct your own identity as partly lawyerly. This creates more
reason for you to pursue that option. If you are a lawyering kind of person, then the lawyering
option wins over the philosophizing option. By putting yourself behind lawyering, you thereby
give additional reason for you to become a lawyer.
Voluntarist reasons for Chang are different than Korsgaard’s reflective endorsements.
Reflective endorsements, as Korsgaard thinks of them, arise out of conceptions of our practical
identities. But voluntarist reasons, according to Chang, arise out of our “rational identities”—that
is, out of our “ideal rational selves”: “Your rational identity, in short, is who you would
distinctively be were you perfectly rational. It is the rationally angelic you” (2009: 117). Rational
identities are distinct from practical identities on two grounds. First of all, rational identities need
not be grounded in self-conceptions; and second, they are grounded on reasons, not action. Yet,
like practical identities, ideal rational selves are distinctive to each person. We have different
reasons to do this, because we make ourselves into different people for whom different reasons
are important. The fact that one aligns oneself with, say, being a lawyer, provides a further
reason for one to choose the lawyering option.
The distinction between practical identities and rational identities is important. However,
the larger commonalities between Chang and Korsgaard are my focus here. I will assume
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Korsgaard’s view that our self-conceptions of our practical identities are what give rise to
reflective endorsement (in Korsgaard’s terminology) or voluntarist reasons (in Chang’s
terminology).

3.2 Aesthetic Volitionalism
Both of these accounts of volitionalism provide us with a blueprint for what aesthetic
volitionalism might look like. Consider, first, Korsgaard’s account of practical normativity.
Korsgaard argues that normativity has a hold on us in virtue of our commitments to our practical
identities. But notice that practical identities may motivate us to aesthetic action. The work of
Eileen Myles may appeal to a person in virtue of that person’s practical identity as urbane.
Country music might appeal to a person in virtue of that person’s identity as being from the
country. But we also create aesthetic practical identities that can be purely aesthetic. I may have
a practical identity aligned with some particular artform, sensibility, or artist (I might consider
myself an opera lover, a pop music fan, or a Phish fan).
And consider how Chang’s account helps us construct a version aesthetic volitionalism.
As I showed in the last section, several of the last chapters have all shown that our given choices
run out in the aesthetic realm. If Chang is right, then, our aesthetic choices are typically hard
choices. Hard choices, by definition, occur when our given reasons run out. The way we make
this choice, I claim, is through a volitional act: We put ourselves behind one of the options. By
identifying myself as a country fan, I construct myself into someone for whom country music has
value. )Of course, this may not be true of every case of aesthetic action, since not all aesthetic
action necessarily involves an endorsement. I might go to see a movie because my partner wants
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to see it, not because I want to see it. I’m perfectly happy to see the movie, but it’s not my thing.
It is the desire to please my partner that motivates me, not the aesthetic qualities of the thing. But
that is not an ideal case of aesthetic valuing anyway. I am concerned to analyze not just any
motivation to pursue aesthetic activities; I want to analyze specifically aesthetic motivations.)
When we face a hard choice between two aesthetic options, it is our own commitments to one of
the two options that allow us to decide, not merely the aesthetic merits of the thing—or even our
own desires! It is our willingness to put ourselves behind one of the options through which we
engage in the activity of valuing these things. I will go on to make this argument in more detail
in a later section.
In both Korsgaard and Chang’s arguments, the key point is that our practical identities in
the aesthetic domain have special value for us—we value them—partly because we commit to
them, and by committing to them we make ourselves into whom they are valuable. More
specifically, we make ourselves into people who value the reasons that make these things worth
attending to. The dazzling displays of technical virtuousity in heavy metal may be a reason to
like heavy metal. But it is not until I align myself to the value of technical virtuosity that it
actually becomes a value for me.
To many, this may seem to be the exact opposite of a correct theory of aesthetics. It has
been a core orthodoxy in aesthetics that aesthetic judgment is disinterested. There are two
problems this raises for the volitionalist theory. The first problem is that the volitionalist theory,
as I have presented it, draws upon commitments. Since they seem interested, commitments
would get in the way of proper aesthetic judgment, not aid it. Rather than illuminating aesthetic
value, our commitments would leave us blind to aesthetic value. The second problem that
disinterest raises for the volitionalist theory is that the volitionalist theory, as I have presented it,
120

draws upon our practical identities. But, while disinterest is divorced from action, practical
identities are necessarily tied to action.
My response to this objection runs throughout the last chapter: This line of defense
assumes that our practical identities must be social or moral, and that any influence they have
over our values must be extra-aesthetic influence. But notice that one may have a purely
aesthetic identity. As I argued in the last section, this practical identity may be purely aesthetic; it
may not be necessarily connected with a particular extra-aesthetic social identity. My love for
Eileen Myles may be based in her terse, blunt, emotional sensibility.
Consider, for example, an example of an aesthetic disagreement with a friend. Suppose
you are trying to convince your friend that something is delicious, or gorgeous. Your friend
disagrees. You appeal to some aspect, arguing that it’s good. Importantly, your friend might see
the value of that thing, but still not value it themselves. What would make the difference for your
friend to come around? I hold that your friend must come to adopt a certain kind of value. They
must take it on, avow it, get behind it—they must change the orientation of their will with
respect to that thing.
These accounts, of course, are meant to be accounts of ethics and practical rationality
respectively. I do not advocate volitionalism in these domains, nor do I argue here that
volitionalism is an adequate theory of normativity in general. My only goal here is to argue for
volitionalism as a theory of aesthetic value.
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3.3 What are our commitments to?
I have claimed that aesthetic value is created out of a certain kind of volitional relation to
something. I will soon consider questions about what this relation must look like—how should
we understand attachments of the will? Before I address the question of the relation, however, I
will address the question of the relata. What are these commitments to, or endorsements of?
Typically, I claim, our commitments (or endorsements) are directed towards practices.
Committing to aesthetic practices forms are core part of our practical identities. We can
understand practices smaller or more largely. I may have a commitment to being a film buff, so
that I try to see films generally. More likely, however, I see myself as into a more restricted set
of films. Maybe it’s films by a certain kind of person—say, Jim Jarmusch films. Maybe I am into
the Marvel cinematic universe, so that I try to see every Marvel movie.
When we think about the cases, we see that we rarely commit solely to one type of
aesthetic practice. Consider a person who’s really into Marvel movies. They like Marvel movies,
but they might have thought that Venom was just a little too goofy for them. In this case one kind
of aesthetic commitment (Marvel movies) brushes up against another kind of commitment (a
commitment against goofy movies). Indeed, aesthetic commitments are rarely so cut-and-dry.
Country fans have endless debates about where the boundaries of country lay, and—more
importantly, if not so frequently—what is “real country”. Outlaw country fans hold that Waylon
Jennings is the heart of country music. Importantly, this is not just true for country music. It
exists in hip-hop, jazz, avant-garde, and even the standard classical repertoire (who is better:
Bach or Handel? Mozart or Haydn?).
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What we start to see is that almost no one shares the exact same set of aesthetic
commitments. I might see myself as a goth, and commit myself to every goth thing. More likely,
however, if I am goth, I see myself as a certain kind of goth and am more selective about what
kinds of goth things I am into.
So our endorsements are typically towards practices. First of all, ‘practices’ is understood
in various degrees of fineness of grain. Different people may have the same word for a practice,
but they may refer to different practices under the same description. Second of all, endorsements
or commitments are not solely towards practices. One may have a commitment towards an
object, or a work, or a movement, without committing to the practice as a whole.
Furthermore, practices themselves often have constitutive norms. Consider, for example,
a constitutive norm of western art-music: When playing a piece, one should play all and only the
notes written in the score, in the order they were written. Guy Rohrbaugh (forthcoming) argues
that this norm does not have its basis in any value- or pleasure-maximization. Instead, it seems to
be a deontological norm of the practice. But from whence does this norm get its force?
Rohrbaugh argues that it is simply a constitutive norm of the practice. The norm makes the
practice what it is. Notice that these norms require certain attitudes on the part of participants:
Attitudes to take up those norms. Classical music wouldn’t exist the way that it does if audiences
and performers simply ceased paying attention to these norms. So practices themselves require
certain kinds of commitments to their constitutive norms, if they are to continue.
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4. Is the will too strong?
In this section, I want to consider a crucial objection to aesthetic voluntarism: The will is too
strong to play the role it is called upon to play in aesthetic value. Contemporary volitionalists
such as Korsgaard and Chang do not say too much to provide positive characterizations of the
will. But whatever it is, the will is often tied crucially to the notion of commitment. And, it might
be thought, commitment is too strong of a way to think about aesthetic value.
Consider, for example, Richard Holton’s (2006) argument for the will as functionally
distinctive from belief and desire. Intending, Holton claims, is not a matter of belief, but nor is it
a matter of desire. I can try to remove the big tree from the middle of the road even if I don’t
believe that I can do it. Likewise, I can try to do things that I don’t desire. Richard Holton takes
the notion of intention to be central for his account of volition. In particular, Holton argues, the
will has to do with a certain kind of resolution that one stands by in the face of resistance.
Furthermore, Holton argues that the will is a faculty which has the function of regulating our
own intentions, such that one follows through on those intentions.
Or consider Cheshire Calhoun’s account of commitment. Calhoun takes commitment to
be extensionally equivalent, if not identical, to volition. She defines commitment as follows:
“commitments are authored rather than passively suffered; they are a species of
intention but differ from mere-intentions insofar as they involve a strong resistance
to reconsideration; and they involve a preparedness to see to it that one’s intention
to engage persists.” (2009: 622)
This picture of commitment—and volition—makes it look like volition is a heavy-duty notion.
Calhoun’s definition involves three parts, each of which seems to chafe against our experiences
of aesthetic value. Calhoun claims that commitments are actively authored rather than passive.
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But our aesthetic experiences may seem to be frequently passive. We simply catch a glimpse of
the sunset, and we’re struck by its beauty; we don’t commit to it. Calhoun claims that
commitments are a species of intention that are resistant to reconsideration (similar to Holton’s
claim that volitional intentions are resolutions in the face of resistance). But there is nothing
wrong with reconsidering my aesthetic passions; people frequently do this. Finally, there is an
intention to see to it that one’s commitment persists; one may enjoy something aesthetically as a
one-off event, without intending to return to it.
Indeed, my project of accounting for aesthetic value in terms of commitment may seem
to contradict earlier parts of this dissertation. Earlier, in Chapter Two, I considered accounts of
aesthetic obligation based upon commitment from Kubala and Cross respectively. There I argued
that commitment was not sufficient to do the work there that it was called upon to do.
Commitments issued obligations, I claimed, only when they are calcified and codified as such—
as contracts or promises. But, I argued, we do not have contracts or promises in our aesthetic
lives. That would detract from our freedom. This may strike some as curious in the present
context, where I am appealing to the will. It may be thought that the paradigmatic activity of the
will is one of commitment.
In what follows, I will call attention to several features of commitment that may make it
seem too strong to play the role it is called upon to play here. My goal is to argue for a much
weaker notion of commitment than the one that philosophers traditionally have in mind. Further,
I will suggest, the notion of the will need not require anything so strong as commitment.

125

4.1 Four problems about commitment
Here are four reasons for thinking that commitment is too strong to characterize aesthetic life.
For one thing, commitment may seem to imply a formal profile that is not characteristic
of aesthetic life: It may seem to require codification. The paradigmatic case of commitment is
marriage, which involves a formal commitment with explicit commitments about faithfulness,
maintaining attitudes of love, and so forth. Yet our aesthetic lives do not involve commitment in
this sense. Another way of putting this is that commitments may imply certain procedural
requirements that look too strong for the aesthetic realm.
For another thing, commitment may seem to imply a temporal profile that is not
characteristic of aesthetic life. Cheshire Calhoun (2009) has argued that commitments typically
involve promising to take a course of action in a future-directed way, even when one no longer
desires to take that action, or when one thinks that is no longer the most pleasing course of
action. Again, in the stereotypical case of commitment, marriage, one pledges one’s commitment
for the rest of one’s life. Promises to stay together in marriage, for example, are explicitly made
to show that one will remain faithful to one’s partner even when the going gets tough—even, in
other words, when one no longer wants to stay in the same location as one’s partner, or when one
no longer wants to be sexually faithful to one’s partner, or when one no longer wants to love
one’s partner. One may object that our aesthetic lives are not characterized by these kinds of
lifelong commitments. I may take up Beethoven symphonies for a couple years, and then leave
them for a while. I might take up choral singing while I’m in grad school, and then leave it
behind when I begin a postdoc.
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The third problem is that commitment may seem to imply a phenomenologically modal
profile that is not characteristic of aesthetic life. Harry Frankfurt has argued that caring for things
involves commitment, and commitment implies what Frankfurt calls a “volitional necessity”
(1982: 264). Things we care about, claims Frankfurt, seem to present themselves as things that
we need—things that we couldn’t do without. Think about love for one’s children or one’s
spouse. Commitment to caring for important people in our lives seems unavoidable.
Indeed, this necessity often intersects with the force of aesthetic normativity. As a strain
of thinking about aesthetic normativity, voluntarism frequently has arisen as a way to explain the
force or compulsion of normative values. That was how I explained the view above. According
to Korsgaard, only the will can provide the kind of normative force necessary to explain the
compulsion that (according to Korsgaard) is typical of normative judgment. However, there is
another way to understand normativity as something that essentially involves a kind of
motivational force. Korsgaard writes that “An obligation always takes the form of a reaction
against a threat of loss of identity” (1996: 102). Crucial for Korsgaard’s argument is the notion
that we are motivated to act on our own endorsements, grounded in our practical identities,
because without those endorsements, we wouldn’t be who we are. So obligation presents the
compelling form that it does because it is necessary for our identity.
Stated this way, Korsgaard’s theory is one of obligation, not merely of value. Duties are
so pressing precisely because our very existence relies upon them. I do not make such a dramatic
claim about our practical identities, that we could not survive a change in practical identity.
Instead, I merely claim that, when we have a certain practical identity, part of what it is to have
that practical identity is to endorse some aspect. So our practical identities involve valuing
certain things, but they do not involve obligations.
127

Some philosophers have thought that aesthetic objects do in fact present themselves as
volitional necessities. Richard Moran (2012) has argued that philosophers have viewed beauty
with suspicion because of its seductive power in our lives. It may seem that one is fascinated by
a movie and feels the need to return to it over and over again—like Nehamas feels, in his book
Only a Promise of Happiness, about an artwork. (See Kubala 2017 for more examples.) Yet, as it
should be clear from Chapter Two, I consider this too strong to be truly aesthetic. It would be a
problem if my view had the result that aesthetic goods seemed to possess volitional necessities.
Finally, referring to Calhoun’s first condition on commitment, commitment may seem to
have to be active rather than passive. Commitments involve being in a dynamic state rather than
a passive state. In other words, commitment may have the wrong state profile to count as
relevant to aesthetic value.
So these four problems present worries about any theory of aesthetic value that is rooted
in volition: Volition implies commitment, and aesthetic values do not seem like commitments.
We might also think of this as a demandingness problem: If aesthetic value is rooted in the will,
then it is rooted in commitment. And if aesthetic value is rooted in commitment, then—for the
four reasons above—aesthetic value is very demanding. But clearly aesthetic value is not this
demanding. So aesthetic value is not rooted in the will. In what follows, I want to argue that the
notion of commitment is not so stringent as it seems.

4.2 A lower bar for commitment
While marriage may be a prototypical case of commitment, it is far from the typical case of
commitment. Consider all of the many commitments we make throughout our days: to work
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lunches, happy hours, shows, friends, and so forth. Not every commitment is a commitment for
one’s whole lifetime. I can commit to going to a party next week.
But this raises the question: What are commitments? And it invites a second question:
What is a theory of the will meant to provide? Can there by volitional exertions that are less than
intentions? In theories of the will, commitment is the core feature of the will. I mentioned earlier
that, for Holton, the will is meant to provide a particular kind of intention: A theory of the will
should explain how we have resolute intentions in the face of resistance. Calhoun, too,
understands the will as intimately tied to commitments, which are (among other things) resolute
intentions in the face of resistance. These two ideas go together: Commitments are stronger than
mere intentions. Mere intentions can be undone. Commitments are also stronger than what
Calhoun calls “provisional plans”, since, by definition, provisional plans are easily undone.
Commitment involves an intention to carry through on an action come what may. Commitment
requires a forward-directed resolute plan, according to Calhoun. Volitionalists do not have much
to say when it comes to exactly what the relationship of the will and commitment is. It is usually
assumed that an argument for commitment is an argument for volitionalism (or voluntarism).
In the face of this problem, we might think that either the will should involve more than
commitment, or we should lower the bar for what counts as commitment. Think of other
elements that the will is called upon to explain: taking up reasons (Chang), or endorsement
(Korsgaard). ‘Endorsement’ does not seem as stringent as the typical sense of ‘commitment’. In
what follows, I want to argue that we should relax how strongly we think about commitment.
Calhoun argues that commitment is necessary for an identifiable normative identity—it is
something that unifies one’s action as an agent. Here is what she says:
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“Someone who does not make any commitments, even relatively simple
commitments to time-extended projects, relationships, social identities, and the
like, will appear not to have made up her mind what she really values. Having no
commitments that unify her agency across time, she will not have anything
convincing to say to others about what she cares about and about who she is as an
agent—that is, as someone who chooses and acts on the basis of what she values.
Thus having an identifiable normative identity appears to go hand in hand with
making commitments.” (2009: 620)
(Calhoun goes on to argue that nothing follows about the content of those commitments. Just in
virtue of the fact that commitments may be required for having an identifiable normative
identity, it doesn’t follow that one will make a commitment to any particular project or what
principles one will endorse. In other words, people can choose what they want to commit to.)
I want to focus on Calhoun’s argument that commitment is required for an identifiable
normative identity. Notice the ubiquity of these kinds of values: “relatively simple commitments
to time-extended projects… and relationships”. These suggest that commitment is far more
common than the stringency with which we usually associate the word. Notice, first, that these
commitments may be stable even if they are not frequent. This might include going biking with
your kids a couple times over the summer, or going skating in the winter. It might include giving
a friend a call a couple times a year. And think how this applies to the aesthetic realm—the
things that I choose and act on the basis of what I value are very many things indeed. And notice,
second, that these commitments may be stable even if they are not intense. Consider this
example: I like a certain kind of good action movie, so I will try to see John Wick movies when
they come out. I don’t always like action movies, but I like, and try to see, some of them. This
looks like a commitment in Calhoun’s sense. These are all values that guide relatively simple
commitments to time-extended projects. Indeed, even important commitments—careers, for
example—are not commitments to something forever.
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Notice how ubiquitous these kinds of low-grade commitments are in the aesthetic realm.
When I buy a ticket to a show, I often thereby make some kind of commitment to myself to go to
that show. Of course, this doesn’t always happen; sometimes I buy a ticket without making that
commitment. I can buy a ticket to go see a show at the Village Vanguard in October, but I might
not be committed to going; I might buy it with the idea that I’ll go if I’m feeling up to it,
knowing that often I’m totally wiped by the end of the day. Usually, however, I buy tickets as a
way of making commitments to myself that I will go.
And we don’t just make commitments to one-off events or objects. Indeed, our
commitments to events are often driven by more global commitments to a certain kind of
practice. My commitment to go to the Vanguard show manifests itself in virtue of my more
global commitment to be a jazz fan. It is not an intense, feverish commitment, but it is a
commitment nevertheless. My commitment to go to the Chelsea galleries a few times a year
manifests itself in virtue of my more global commitment to attend to certain strands of
contemporary art. Aesthetic commitment does not require fandom.
Still, the word ‘commitment’ often seems to imply something more intense than we need.
To develop a more permissive notion of commitment, it is helpful to draw upon a final notion of
Calhoun’s essay. Calhoun considers what she calls prizing. To prize something, says Calhoun, is
not just to believe it is valuable; it is to value that thing. Calhoun defines prizing as “a normative
attitude toward what one takes to be not only valuable but also special in a way that cannot be
fully accounted for by showing what makes the thing, person, or activity valuable” (637). She
claims that prizing has two features: “(1) a value judgment about the prized objects (or person,
activity, way of life, identity, etc.) that is based on intersubjectively available reasons for
assigning that particular value and (2) a personal attitude of regarding the object as special and
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worthy of behavioral and attitudinal responses that treat it as special.” (638). Prizing is involved
in loving relationships, but it is also clearly involved in many aesthetic relationships with objects
and practices as well.
Calhoun argues that this kind of prizing typically involves commitment, since our
normative identities typically involve commitments. Calhoun:
“The principal practical expression of prizing something, of one’s regarding it as
special, is commitment—commitment to living one’s life as an X, to collecting X,
to taking care of X, to rooting for X, to striving to achieve X, and so on.” (638)
Notice, again, that this commitment may not be forever.
So, instead of commitment, we can think of prizing. Prizing implies commitment, but
without the heavy-duty baggage. And it is not just prizing that we can think of as a less stringent
form of commitment; consider Korsgaard’s notion of endorsement, or Chang’s notion of taking
up reasons.
Calhoun herself is skeptical that humans are necessarily prizing creatures, and it seems
that some humans are in fact not prizing creatures. But prizing seems to be a very important and
ubiquitous feature of what is important to us as humans. In order to prize something over any
length of time, one needs to make a commitment to that thing, not just be driven along by a plan
or a mere intention. My claim here is that planning—and therefore, prizing—are psychologically
ordinary features of humans. Indeed, they are not just typical of us, but aspects we rely upon
from each other in a crucial way.
So, our normative identities are rooted in prizing, and prizing involves commitment.
‘Prizing’ is better than ‘commitment’, since ‘prizing’ lacks the deep seriousness of commitment.
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As I will argue below, this kind of prizing is not understood in terms of belief or desire; only
volition offers the right kind of analysis.
All this helps get clear on a picture of the will. In particular, this yields a low bar for the
will: The will need not require anything as substantial as high-grade, life-long commitment.
Commitments may take low-stakes forms as well. One may commit to watch one horror movie a
year, or to be on the lookout for particular kinds of horror movies. Furthermore, commitments do
not need to be lifelong. One may commit to get into a band, but that does not involve a
commitment to stay interested in that band. In fact, given what I have said in chapter two, a
commitment to stay interested in a band would preclude aesthetic freedom in one’s own life.

4.3 Replying to the four problems
Now we can begin to reply to the four objections above. Commitments need not involve the
formal and temporal profile that they were alleged to have in the last section. Not all
commitments are codified, and not all commitments persist forever; they need only persist, but
virtually all of our aesthetic pursuits persist for some amount of time.
Furthermore, as Calhoun herself argues, commitments need not take the form of
volitional necessities. She argues that this sense of commitment—of volitional necessity—seems
too strong to capture most of what we find important about many of the things we care about and
commit to. The landscape of a full life is constituted not just by things that need to be done; it
also involves things that we voluntarily, freely, place there. What Calhoun says here is especially
important about our aesthetic lives. Beauty does not present itself as having to be chosen; it
presents itself as something that we can freely choose—as something that we could take or leave.
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This leaves us with one final objection. Calhoun claimed that commitment must be active
and not passive. The problem is that many aspects of our aesthetic lives are passive, but they can
still have aesthetic value. My friend Dan, growing up in Oklahoma, yearned for the aesthetically
and artistic thrills that life in New York City would bring, and moved here as soon as he was old
enough. Dan’s brother was content to enjoy the wide-open plains and common music in
Oklahoma. Dan’s brother presumably has no less aesthetic experience—and still prizes his own
aesthetic goods—even though he may have been more passive.
My response is that this objection is too slippery about the distinction between ‘active’
and ‘passive’. One may stay in Oklahoma, but this is still a choice enough. Dan’s brother is the
author of his own aesthetic life, even if it is not so exciting; Dan’s brother still makes a choice to
stay in Oklahoma. So, we should be generous about what we allow for in maintaining an active
aesthetic life.

4.4 Making commitment safe for aesthetic volitionalism
In this section, I have tried to show how integral commitment is to our aesthetic lives. On the one
hand, I have tried to argue that a kind of commitment is essential to the way we live our aesthetic
lives. On the other, I have tried to show that the bar for commitment is very low. To commit to
something, one need not see it as connected to the core of one’s own identity. One need only
have a conception of oneself as someone who values that kind of practice or object.
According to the view I have advocated here, aesthetic value is rooted in the will, since
valuing things, as prizing them, involves a certain kind of commitment to them. However, this
commitment may have a somewhat short temporal lifetime. And it may not present itself as a
134

stringent commitment; we have parts of our aesthetic lives that we keep on the back burner.
Furthermore, this commitment may not present itself as necessary. And, finally, a commitment
may be active while seeming to others to be very passive.

5. Four Arguments for Volitionalism
In this section I give four arguments for volitionalism. Some of these arguments draw upon
previous chapters of the dissertation.

5.1 The Agency Argument
The first argument begins with the fact that we have aesthetic agency in our aesthetic lives.
Because our lives are characterized by agency in the aesthetic realm, the argument claims, the
faculty to best understand aesthetic value is the will. The argument can be formalized like this.
1. Our experiences of aesthetic value are characterized by agency.
2. If our experiences of aesthetic value are characterized by agency, then volition is
essential for aesthetic value.
3. So, volitionalism about aesthetic value is true.
The agency argument reaches back to Chapter One. It uses that same argument and propels it
forward to a bolder conclusion. I will not defend premise (2) here; I will focus on defending the
first premise. There are two arguments I have for (1).
The first argument for (1) is based upon aesthetic responsibility. First of all,
responsibility exists in the aesthetic realm. We hold each other responsible for our opinions
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about beauty and art. If someone has a bad judgment, we try to show them why it is wrong; we
take our opinions to be revisable. Furthermore, we think that aesthetic evaluations should hang
together in a consistent way; if someone likes this, they should also like that. We hold each other
responsible for views similar to how we hold artists responsible for their work. The argument,
then, is that our aesthetic values involve responsibility, and responsibility implies agency.
The second argument for (1) is based upon our experiences of personal style. It is
important that we construct our own aesthetic identities in personal style. We find our own style,
we craft our own views about what’s good and what’s bad, we figure out who we will make
ourselves to be. By ‘personal style’ here, I mean not just how one dresses, speaks or comports
oneself, though those are absolutely aspects of personal style. I also mean the kinds of films one
thinks are great, the kinds of books one likes, the kinds of aesthetic objects one takes the most
delight in. Maybe you’re the kind of person who spends their week off in the woods, with an allterrain vehicle, drinking and camping and fishing. Maybe I’m the kind of person who spends
their week off doing wine tasting. Maybe she’s the kind of person who spends their week off
reading at home. These are all ways we have different personal style.
In the aesthetic realm, personal style is highly individualized and includes a norm of
authenticity: People’s style should be expressive of who they are. Both of these facts suggest that
personal style is something that is created, not discovered; it is something people make through
trial and error, but it is something that people use to make themselves into who they are.
Aesthetic values as regarding personal style, then, since they are constructed individually.
Personal style is a project of self-constitution, since it involves acts of self-interpretation. But
these acts of self-interpretation are not inevitable; they involve choices we make about how we
will see ourselves.
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If this is true, then the aesthetic values we work out in our personal styles. We have a
strong sense of agency in our personal style. Indeed, something stronger is true: Our personal
style is how we express our agency.
Putting the argument in terms of self-constitution suggests a deep connection to
volitionalism, since Korsgaard’s (1996) account of volitionalism is based upon self-constitution.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that values seem to stem from our character—a phenomenon
applied much more frequently to moral considerations than to aesthetic considerations. Charles
Taylor holds, for example, that our character reflects our deeper self in the sense that, while it
may be created by external influences, it is not entirely the result of those influences. We have a
character such that, when actions flow from our character, we are responsible for those actions.

5.2 The Valuing Argument
The second argument goes like this:
1. Aesthetic value is based upon acts of valuing.
2. Acts of valuing typically involve a kind of prizing—an act of the will.
3. So, aesthetic value is based upon acts of the will.
In his work in free agency, Gary Watson (1975) takes individual values to lie at the heart of the
issue of agency; we act as free agents, Watson claims, when we act from our values. Watson
distinguishes our values from our desires, bringing attention to cases in which we seem to desire
things that we do not value. Watson’s example is of a tennis player who briefly desires to
obliterate her opponent, but who does not really value obliterating their opponent—they keep
this desire only to help them win the game. Or one may have sexual desires that one does not
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value—say, if one is trying to be celibate. Watson points out that: “some desires, when they
arise, may ‘color’ or influence what appear to be the agent’s evaluations, but only temporarily.”
(214) Watson claims that we have valuational systems—decision-making processes which yield
judgments about what it is best to do. Watson defines a valuational system as follows:
“The valuational system of an agent is that set of considerations which, when
combined with his factual beliefs (and probability estimates), yields judgments of
the form: the thing for me to do in these circumstances, all things considered, is a.
To ascribe free agency to a being presupposes it to be a being that makes judgments
of this sort. To be this sort of being, one must assign values to alternative states of
affairs, that is, rank them in terms of worth.” (215)
The central point is that one’s motivational system—a set of considerations which move
someone to action—may not be consistent with one’s valuational system. But, Watson claims,
this divergence frequently occurs when we act from desires rather than from values. So the two
can come apart.
What this shows, Watson holds, is that the mechanism of values (and our agency!) is not
desire, but something more volitional, like identification or commitment. Watson considers the
standard way to accommodate these cases from Harry Frankfurt: Evaluations are rooted in
second-order desires—what you want to desire. So your evaluations are still rooted in your
desires—they are just not rooted in fleeting desires, but in stable, considered desires which take
first-order desires as their subject.
Let’s take a moment to recognize the import of this for aesthetic value. First of all, as we
noticed, it seems that we have aesthetic agency, and our agency is good when it arises from what
we value. Furthermore, note that there are aesthetic cases where our valuational system and our
motivational system diverge. Consider my judgment that it is best to go to BAM, but I end up
staying at home and watching Real Housewives. Or often, in our aesthetic lives, we choose our
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values over our desires. I do not particularly desire, in the moment, to watch a movie on a
Sunday afternoon; but, since I value it, I go anyway.
According to Watson’s own early account of valuing, one values something when one
has a positive evaluation of it. Later, Watson holds that judging good is distinct from valuing.
Samuel Scheffler points out that this is inadequate as a theory of valuing; positive assessment is
not enough for one to value something. Scheffler’s example is Bulgarian history; he believes that
it is valuable, but he himself does not value it, since he has not studied it and never intends to.
This has special significance for the aesthetic realm, where it has frequently been argued that
mere acquaintance is not sufficient for aesthetic judgment.
Bratman argues that valuing can be present in a being who has beliefs and desires. But,
he argues, this is not what valuing looks like for creatures like us. Valuing something, according
to Bratman, “is not simply a matter of its present, considered desires and preferences. It is in part
a function of its higher-order self-governing policies. The introduction of these self-governing
policies has changed the structure of its valuing.” (2000: 260) For Bratman “the agent’s
reflective valuing involves a kind of higher-order willing.” (2000: 261)
How should we understand a higher-order willing? The hedonic theorist may claim that
we can have Frankfurtian self-governing policies at this point; higher-order willing may just be
second-order desires. But there is good reason to think that self-governing policies are a matter
of the will. Consider Richard Holton’s argument that this is a matter of the will. Intending,
Holton claims, is not a matter of belief, but nor is it a matter of desire. I can try to remove the big
tree from the middle of the road even if I don’t believe that I can do it. Likewise, I can try to do
things that I don’t desire. Furthermore, Scheffler argues that this too is not enough for valuing
something. I may want to desire whiskey, but if I cannot bring myself to desire it, it is not a real
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value of mine. Values, Scheffler points out, necessarily involve the right kinds of first-order
desires.
It may seem that we’re squarely in the realm of moral psychology and have left aesthetics
squarely behind. But appreciate the importance of self-governing policies and plans for our
aesthetic lives. Notice how much our aesthetic values are reflected by our policies and plans and
self-governance. Sometimes, of course, we act without consideration to aesthetic reasons. You
may see a play because your spouse wants to go see it, not because you want to. But ordinarily,
our aesthetic lives are free choices we make about how we govern the aesthetic parts of our lives.
Consider, for example, how many of these things are done beforehand. We buy tickets to shows,
we get haircuts, we buy clothes. Notice that these are aesthetic commitments to our future selves.
So it looks, as Bratman claims, that our aesthetic values involve a kind of willing about the kinds
of people we choose to be—and not a willing rooted in second-order desire.
At this point, it is worth repeating a crucial explanatory advantage that volitionalism has
over traditional hedonic theories. This point is one made by R. Jay Wallace (1999). Wallace
argues that forms of motivational internalism in terms of belief-desire psychology face a serious
worry: They cannot explain how one is a source of their own action. Wallace’s crucial point is
that, if one endorses a second-order desire account of willing, one is committed to two theses
about motivation. First, that only desires can be motivating; and second, that one cannot cause a
desire in oneself. Only desires can cause other desires. Indeed, this is just part of the deeply
Humean view that Frankfurt endorses when he endorses the second-order desire account of
values. One’s values, on Frankfurt’s view, are desires to desire. But where do those second-order
desires come from? One cannot have control over these, Wallace alleges. Only the voluntarist
picture can provide an account which reconciles freedom. It is from the will that we commit to
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certain paths of action—to being certain ways, to orienting ourselves for or against the Jonas
Brothers. Only the volitionalist can provide an adequate account of willing. Otherwise, we are
left without evaluative agency.
Back, then, to the main question: What is valuing? According to Scheffler, valuing
something requires a cluster of attitudes. The following are necessary conditions on valuing:
1. A belief that X is good or valuable or worthy,
2. A susceptibility to experience a range of context-dependent emotions regarding X,
3. A disposition to experience these emotions as being merited or appropriate,
4. A disposition to treat certain kinds of X-related considerations as reasons for action in
relevant deliberative contexts.
Valuing may be accompanied by all of these features, but my point here is that they are not
enough. Valuing, at least in the aesthetic realm, requires a fifth dimension, the most crucial
dimension: Valuing something requires a volitional attitude of avowal. In order to value X, one
must avow oneself to X, or to the reasons that speak in favor of X. One must put oneself behind
the thing. In short, one must prize it.

5.3 The hard choices argument
The second argument for aesthetic volitionalism comes from Ruth Chang’s hybrid account of
reasons. Chang considers, as you recall, hard choices—choices where we are faced between two
equally good options. How do we rationally choose? We choose, Chang argues, not merely by
assessing the value of the reasons; that is not enough in a case where we face two equal options.
Instead, Chang argues, we choose by putting ourselves behind one of the options; we choose to
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avow ourselves to one course of action. This avowal, claims Chang, is essentially an act of the
will; we decide to become a certain kind of person, and thereby give ourselves more reason to
perform one course of action over the other.
My arguments in the first two chapters help to apply Chang’s claim to the aesthetic
realm. In Chapter Two, I argued that there are no aesthetic obligations; the realm of the aesthetic
is never a realm of duty. It is better to describe the aesthetic realm as purely supererogatory, a
realm of pure freedom. While we can weigh aesthetic options against each other, no aesthetic
option presents itself as needing to be done.
But if that is true, notice how similar our aesthetic choices are to hard choices. There are
plenty of aesthetic goods all around us, and we have plenty of reason to attend to each of them.
How do we choose? This is relevantly similar to Chang’s case, given that we need not optimize
in the aesthetic case.
How we choose what we value is by deciding to put ourselves behind some option or
another—by avowing one option or another. One might decide to get into a book club, or join a
choir, or buy a MoMA membership. These are all concrete ways of avowing particular aesthetic
identities to one’s self. But one’s steps need not be as formal as this. One may buy a vinyl player,
or get a haircut, or start shopping at Hot Topic (or American Eagle! Or Old Navy! Or Brooks
Brothers!).
Furthermore, this is not a calculation of what we desire; it is a decision we make about
the kinds of people we will be. And inasmuch as it is a commitment to the kinds of people we
will be, these avowals are rooted in the will. Again, these commitments do not need to be
marriages. I might think of myself as someone who will love country music forever. I like sour
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beers these days, too, but I suspect it’s just a phase. Yet it does not follow that my love for sour
beers is any less a volitional avowal. And one may think of oneself as having catholic aesthetic
tastes. In an attempt to be cosmopolitan, one may
What happens when one avows one course of action but cannot adopt it? Here we should
think of one believing something is good, but not valuing it, given Watson’s definition of value
as involving a particular set of dispositions.

5.4 An abductive argument: Voluntarism explains the Personal Approach
The final argument for volitionalism, drawing upon the argument in the last chapter, is that it
does a better job of explaining the Personal Approach than its main competitor, the hedonic
theory of aesthetic value. For one thing, volitionalism can explain how our aesthetic lives are
distinctive. Yet, it can explain this in a nonblameworthy place. The hedonic theory can explain
distinctiveness as something that is actually occurring—it can explain descriptive
distinctiveness—but it cannot explain the permissibility of distinctiveness, or the fact that it’s a
good thing.
Furthermore, the volitionalism does a better job of explaining aesthetic motivation in
general. It can explain why we’re motivated to pursue things that don’t always bring us pleasure:
Because our avowal motivates us rather than the prospect of pleasure.
Finally, the volitionalist theory of aesthetic value does a better job of than hedonism at
explaining our special motivation towards our aesthetic loves. Certainly traditional hedonisms
can explain why aesthetic loves exist, but they cannot explain why this is a good thing.
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But notice that even if the reader rejects the Personal Approach that I argued for in the
last chapter, they can still accept the volitionalist theory of aesthetic value. The arguments above
do not rest upon the Personal Approach. The core of those two arguments was, first, that
volitionalism explains aesthetic freedom where other theories of aesthetic value do not. This
sense of aesthetic freedom was not the sense of freedom used in the Personal Approach; it was
not an attempt to defend the distinctiveness of our aesthetic lives, but instead was an attempt to
explain the indeterminist freedom we have in our aesthetic lives. and, second, that volitionalism
explains our hard aesthetic choices in a way that other theories of aesthetic value do not.

6. Historical precedent for evaluative volitionalism
Korsgaard and Chang have cited various historical influences for voluntarism, including Hobbes,
Locke, Pufendorf, and Sartre. In this section, I discuss two further historical sources of thinking
about aesthetic value. Despite the historical and ideological difference of these two thinkers, they
seem to have a similar view about valuing: Jonathan Edwards and Freiderich Nietzsche.
Jonathan Edwards, an early American idealist, is often known as a theologian and
preacher. But Edwards’ account of metaphysics is coming more into view in contemporary
analytic philosophy (see Reid 2006; LeLordo 2014, 2017). Edwards’ original theological system
held a high place for aesthetics. Edwards was influenced by early modern accounts of beauty,
especially Hutcheson’s view that beauty was a perception of harmony and proportion; Edwards
included this component in his account of secondary beauty. Yet, for Edwards, the primary
feature of beauty is in similarity or agreement. Edwards says that beauty—or ‘excellency’, as he
calls it,
144

“consists in the similarness of one being to another—not merely equality and
proportion, but any kind of similarness. … This is an universal definition of
excellency: The consent of being to being.” (Edwards 1957, p. 336)
I want to immediately note that Edwards’ term ‘excellency’ here may not refer uniquely to
aesthetic value; for Edwards, it looks like aesthetic and moral values are bound together. But we
can take Edwards’ account as important for aesthetics. There are several surprising elements of
Edwards’ view here. One of these aspects is that beauty should be defined as a relation directed
towards being in general. Why think that being itself is the only proper object of aesthetic
attitudes? While this is an interesting topic, I want to focus elsewhere.
Key to Edwards’ account is his notion of of similarity or agreement, crucial for Edwards.
One may interpret Edwards’ view as having to do with objective similarity; in other words, that
someone finds something else beautiful when they share some of the same (or similar)
properties. Suppose that two Midwestern couples meet each other by happenstance on vacation
in Italy. Since they are similar in so many respects, they may find themselves liking one another.
Here, the mere agreement is enough to create an aesthetic sense. However, there is something
deeper involved in this for Edwards. William Wainright (2016) explains this view as follows:
“One who loves others, for instance, actively desires their welfare, ‘agrees’ with them or
‘consents’ to them.” Wainright explains that Edwards himself is concerned to show that this
shows the supreme excellency of God, since, given God’s omniscience, God can consent to the
most beings: “consent is ‘comprehensive’ or ‘universal’ only when directed towards being in
general.” And only God’s consent is big enough to be directed towards being in general. Of
course, the theological details here are entirely beside the point. The important part is that, for
Edwards, beauty is a relation that involves a certain orientation—consent or agreement—
between a person and something else. Edwards understands beauty as a kind of valuing, in line
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with the view of value we have seen in the previous chapter. For Edwards, beauty involves an
activity, since it involves a kind of consent.
Furthermore, this activity is standardly volitional. Multiple commentators have noted that
the aesthetic sense, for Edwards, is active. Roland Delattre explains that this beauty, for
Edwards, consists “in creating and bestowing beauty, not in being passively beautiful, but in
joyful, beautifying activity” (Delattre 2003: 281). In his classic 1949 study of Edwards, Perry
Miller is clear that this kind of consent involves the will: “the moment of beauty and virtue
depends… upon the consent, upon an act of the will” (1949: 243). Not all interpreters of
Edwards hold that the aesthetic sense is rooted in the will. Sang Hyun Lee (1976, 1988) argues
that the aesthetic sense is fundamentally a sense of habit—where habit, Lee argues, is a partly
active sense. But it is at least plausible that Edwards had a volitional account of aesthetics,
especially since Edwards refers to the aesthetic sense as “a sense of the heart”.
Secondly, consider Nietzsche’s account of value, at least on one interpretation. Some
interpretations of Nietzschean value are fictionalist, others are neo-Humean. Aaron Harper
argues that, for Nietzsche, value is rooted in acts of valuing. “central to Nietzsche’s conception
of value is that valuing is, first and foremost, an activity” (2012: 73). According to Harper, these
acts of valuing are essentially commitments. A Nietzschean value, Harper claims, is “a
commitment made to oneself, where the individual is accountable to oneself rather than another”
(2012: 71). To summarize: “Valuing is an activity for Nietzsche because it is a process of
becoming and remaining committed to [a] certain set of cares and concerns” (2012: 119). I am
not concerned to defend this as an exercise in Nietzsche interpretation, but it is at least a
plausible precedent for the view that, according to Nietzsche, values have their source in
commitments.
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Commitments, standardly, come from the will. Nietzsche is very clear that our values
have their ultimate source in our physiological drives and desires; but drives and desires are not
their only source. If we accept Harper’s interpretation, it is plausible that, according to Nietzsche,
the will is a source of valuing.
My goal here is not to defend this as a correct interpretation of Nietzsche. I raise it only
because Nietzsche may be a plausible ancestor to the kind of thesis about aesthetic value I defend
here.

7. Lessons for volitionalism as a general normative strategy
The goal of this chapter is not merely to show something about aesthetic value—most notably,
that aesthetic value can take a volitionalist form. The goal of this chapter has also been to think
about values and reasons in non-standard ways. I mean to have shown how to think about
volitionalism in a new kind of way.
First of all, I have shown that volitionalism provides an adequate account of normativity
that is neither moral nor practical normativity. The most prominent form of volitionalism,
Christine Korsgaard’s, takes a moral form. Only the will, according to Korsgaard, can provide
the normative force necessary to answer a motivational question about morality—namely, why
be moral? Another prominent form of voluntarism, Chang’s, is meant to solve a moral problem.
Only the will, according to Chang, can explain how we can choose rationally in hard choices
when our reasons run out.
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While these theories have their virtues, the aesthetic realm is well-suited for
volitionalism. After all, the aesthetic realm seems personal, individual, and it seems particularly
relevant for our ideal rational identities and our practical identities.
Aesthetic volitionalism also shows that the will plays a role in many more situations than
we might have realized. In traditional versions of voluntarism or volitionalism, the will is called
upon to provide a basis for morality, and to answer hard questions about which career we choose.
And certainly these kinds of heavy duty questions have aesthetic aspects. The choice about a
career involves multiple aesthetic aspects. Furthermore, aesthetic questions have significant
consequences for our lives, since they themselves meaningful attachments, but they also form the
basis for their meaningful attachments. Browse a dating app and you’ll find people talking about
their favorite movies and music, the kinds of clothes, whether they like the outdoors, and so
forth.
But many aesthetic choices are not that significant. Again, volitional actions need not
involve lifelong commitments. They involve whether one will spend money for that play five
months from now. Looking over the flannel sleeveless sweater, you ask yourself: Could this be
my look for this fall? My claim in this chapter has been that, in answering any of these questions,
you often put yourself behind (or against) one option or another. This kind of voluntaristic
avowal is no less volitional even if it is temporary. It still involves prizing.
Finally, a related point: Applications of volitionalism to the aesthetic realm shows that we
need not think of the will as something requiring heavy-duty commitment. Commitment has
been the paradigmatic case of volition, and marriage is the paradigmatic case of commitment.
Holton’s account of volition is based upon resolutions for the future. But volition need not be so
heavy-duty as marriage. For one thing, it’s worth noting that commitment may not be so strong.
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Resolutions for the future take many forms, very few of which are as heavy-duty as marriage.
But, more importantly, volitionalism is often understood not just as a commitment or avowal, but
also as a kind of endorsement or (I have argued) even a prizing. These cases of volition offer
less-stringent examples of commitment.
So, then, I take it that this chapter shows that we need not think of the will, or
commitment, as something so serious. The will doesn’t have to involve such a strong modal
profile. I have shown theoretical reasons that we need the will to play a role in smaller, more
ordinary actions as well.

8. Conclusion: An Intentionalist Account of Aesthetic Value
The importance of intentions has long been recognized as crucial for the existence, nature, and
interpretation of aesthetic value. Indeed, this is one of the crucial insights of the past fifty years
in philosophy of art. Artworks are the kinds of things they are because they have been made with
certain intentions (Mag Uidhir 2015). Furthermore, it is essential when interpreting a work of art
that one knows the creators’ aims (Carroll 1996). And knowledge of creators’ aims is essential
for evaluating works; we must know what creators were aiming at in order to know whether, and
how well, they fulfilled those aims (Carroll 2008).
Volition is at least partly based in a particular kind of intention. So, if what I have said
here is right, I have suggested the basis for an intentional account of aesthetic value: Value is
based not just in the intentions of creators, but also in the intentions of audiences.
I believe that much more can be said in favor of volitionalism. For example, I believe that
volitionalism solves longstanding problems in aesthetics, such as the problem of disagreement. I
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also believe that volitionalism offers clear advantages to Lopes’ recent (2018) network theory of
aesthetic value. Those arguments, however, will have to wait for more development. It is enough
here that I have argued for volitionalism as a plausible account of aesthetic value.
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